

Package ‘seirMFG’

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Type Package

Title Mean-Field Game Equilibrium for SEIR Epidemics on Networks

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Description Implements the forward-backward sweep algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium contact policies in SEIR epidemic mean-field games on heterogeneous contact networks, as described in Wang (2026) [<doi:10.5281/zenodo.19381052>](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381052). Supports both heterogeneous networks with arbitrary degree distributions (e.g., truncated Poisson) and homogeneous networks. Computes equilibrium susceptible contact effort, value functions, epidemic trajectories, and the effective reproduction number R_t .

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Imports stats, graphics

Suggests ggplot2, testthat ($\geq 3.0.0$)

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compute_Rt	<i>Compute the time-varying effective reproduction number R_t</i>
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Description

Computes R_t for the heterogeneous-network SEIR-MFG equilibrium using the next-generation spectral radius formula (Theorem 3.6 of Wang, 2026):

$$R_t = \frac{\beta}{\gamma \langle k \rangle} \sum_k k^2 P(k) n_k^{S^*}(t) S_k(t).$$

This scalar formula holds for uncorrelated networks.

Usage

```
compute_Rt(result, network, gamma = 1)
```

Arguments

result	A list returned by <code>seir_mfg_het</code> or <code>sir_mfg_het</code> , containing matrices S and nS .
network	A list returned by <code>make_poisson_network</code> .
gamma	Numeric. Recovery rate. Default 1.

Value

A numeric vector of length $M + 1$ giving R_t at each time step.

References

Wang, W. (2026). Learning contact policies for SEIR epidemics on networks: A mean-field game approach. [doi:10.5281/zenodo.19381052](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381052).

Examples

```
# Simple network setup (fast)
net <- make_poisson_network()

# Full solve then compute Rt (slow)
res <- seir_mfg_het(network = net, sigma = 2, verbose = FALSE)
Rt <- compute_Rt(res, net)
plot(res$t_grid, Rt, type = "l", xlab = "Time", ylab = "Rt")
```

make_poisson_network *Build a truncated Poisson degree distribution*

Description

Constructs the degree distribution $P(k)$ for an uncorrelated Markovian network with a truncated Poisson degree distribution, and computes the transmission rate β required to achieve a target basic reproduction number $R_0 = \beta \langle k^2 \rangle / (\gamma \langle k \rangle)$.

Usage

```
make_poisson_network(mu = 8, k_max = 25, R0 = 4, gamma = 1)
```

Arguments

mu	Numeric. Mean degree of the Poisson distribution. Default 8.
k_max	Integer. Maximum degree (truncation point). Default 25.
R0	Numeric. Target basic reproduction number. Default 4.
gamma	Numeric. Recovery rate. Default 1.

Value

A list with components:

k_vals Integer vector of degree values $1, \dots, k_{max}$.

PK Numeric vector of probabilities $P(k)$, summing to 1.

K_bar Mean degree $\langle k \rangle$.

K_bar2 Second moment $\langle k^2 \rangle$.

beta Transmission rate achieving the target R_0 .

R0 The target R_0 .

References

Wang, W. (2026). Learning contact policies for SEIR epidemics on networks: A mean-field game approach. [doi:10.5281/zenodo.19381052](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381052).

Examples

```
net <- make_poisson_network(mu = 8, k_max = 25, R0 = 4, gamma = 1)
net$beta # approximately 0.4444
net$K_bar # approximately 8
```

seir_mfg_het

*Solve the heterogeneous-network SEIR mean-field game***Description**

Computes the Nash equilibrium contact policy and epidemic trajectory for the SEIR mean-field game on an uncorrelated heterogeneous network using the iterative forward-backward sweep (FBS) algorithm (Section 6.1 of Wang, 2026).

Usage

```
seir_mfg_het(network, sigma = 2, gamma = 1, r_I = 50, n_min = 0.1,
             eps = 1, C_E = 0, C_I = 0, S0 = 0.98, E0 = 0.01,
             I0 = 0.01, T_end = 30, dt = 0.05, omega = 0.3,
             tol = 1e-7, max_iter = 2000, verbose = TRUE)
```

Arguments

network	A list returned by make_poisson_network .
sigma	Numeric. Incubation rate. Default 2.
gamma	Numeric. Recovery rate. Default 1.
r_I	Numeric. One-time infection cost. Default 50.
n_min	Numeric. Minimum contact effort in (0,1). Default 0.1.
eps	Integer. Isolation cost exponent; $f_k(n) = k^\epsilon(1/n - 1)$. Default 1.
C_E	Numeric. Health cost in state E. Default 0.
C_I	Numeric. Health cost in state I. Default 0.
S0	Numeric. Initial susceptible fraction. Default 0.98.
E0	Numeric. Initial exposed fraction. Default 0.01.
I0	Numeric. Initial infectious fraction. Default 0.01.
T_end	Numeric. Time horizon. Default 30.
dt	Numeric. Time step. Default 0.05.
omega	Numeric. FBS relaxation parameter in (0,1]. Default 0.3.
tol	Numeric. Convergence tolerance. Default 1e-7.
max_iter	Integer. Maximum FBS iterations. Default 2000.
verbose	Logical. Print convergence info. Default TRUE.

Value

A list with components:

S, E, I, R Matrices of shape $K \times (M + 1)$: compartment fractions.

nS Matrix of shape $K \times (M + 1)$: equilibrium effort $n_k^{S^*}(t)$.

I_agg Numeric vector: aggregate infectious fraction $\sum_k P(k)I_k(t)$.

t_grid Numeric vector of time points.

converged Logical. Whether FBS converged.

n_iter Integer. FBS iterations used.

References

Wang, W. (2026). Learning contact policies for SEIR epidemics on networks: A mean-field game approach. [doi:10.5281/zenodo.19381052](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381052).

Examples

```
# Simple network setup (fast)
net <- make_poisson_network(mu = 8, k_max = 25, R0 = 4)

# Full FBS solve (slow: ~40 iterations x 25 degree classes)
res <- seir_mfg_het(network = net, sigma = 2, verbose = FALSE)
plot(res$t_grid, res$I_agg, type = "l", col = "red",
      xlab = "Time", ylab = "Aggregate I(t)")
```

 seir_mfg_hom

Solve the homogeneous-network SEIR mean-field game

Description

Computes the Nash equilibrium contact policy and epidemic trajectory for the SEIR mean-field game on a homogeneous network where all nodes have degree k and the effective per-contact transmission rate β_k is fixed.

Usage

```
seir_mfg_hom(k = 8, sigma = 2, beta_k = 4, gamma = 1, r_I = 50,
             n_min = 0.1, eps = 1, C_E = 0, C_I = 0, S0 = 0.98,
             E0 = 0.01, I0 = 0.01, T_end = 30, dt = 0.05,
             omega = 0.3, tol = 1e-7, max_iter = 2000, verbose = TRUE)
```

Arguments

<code>k</code>	Integer. Node degree. Default 8.
<code>sigma</code>	Numeric. Incubation rate. Default 2.
<code>beta_k</code>	Numeric. Effective transmission rate βk . Default 4.
<code>gamma</code>	Numeric. Recovery rate. Default 1.
<code>r_I</code>	Numeric. One-time infection cost. Default 50.
<code>n_min</code>	Numeric. Minimum contact effort. Default 0.1.
<code>eps</code>	Integer. Isolation cost exponent. Default 1.
<code>C_E</code>	Numeric. Health cost in state E. Default 0.
<code>C_I</code>	Numeric. Health cost in state I. Default 0.
<code>S0</code>	Numeric. Initial susceptible fraction. Default 0.98.
<code>E0</code>	Numeric. Initial exposed fraction. Default 0.01.
<code>I0</code>	Numeric. Initial infectious fraction. Default 0.01.
<code>T_end</code>	Numeric. Time horizon. Default 30.
<code>dt</code>	Numeric. Time step. Default 0.05.
<code>omega</code>	Numeric. FBS relaxation parameter. Default 0.3.
<code>tol</code>	Numeric. Convergence tolerance. Default 1e-7.
<code>max_iter</code>	Integer. Maximum FBS iterations. Default 2000.
<code>verbose</code>	Logical. Print convergence info. Default TRUE.

Value

A list with components:

S, E, I, R Numeric vectors of length $M + 1$: compartment fractions.

nS Numeric vector: equilibrium effort $n^{S^*}(t)$.

t_grid Numeric vector of time points.

converged Logical.

n_iter Integer. Iterations used.

References

Wang, W. (2026). Learning contact policies for SEIR epidemics on networks: A mean-field game approach. [doi:10.5281/zenodo.19381052](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381052).

Examples

```
# Full FBS solve (slow: ~40 iterations)
res <- seir_mfg_hom(k = 8, sigma = 2, beta_k = 4, verbose = FALSE)
plot(res$t_grid, res$I, type = "l", xlab = "Time", ylab = "I(t)")
lines(res$t_grid, res$nS, col = "red", lty = 2)
legend("topright", c("I(t)", "nS*(t)"),
      col = c("black", "red"), lty = 1:2)
```

sir_mfg_het

*Solve the heterogeneous-network SIR mean-field game***Description**

Computes the SIR-MFG Nash equilibrium on an uncorrelated heterogeneous network. This corresponds to the limit $\sigma \rightarrow \infty$ of [seir_mfg_het](#) (Lemma 5.7 of Wang, 2026). The initial infectious seed absorbs the exposed compartment: $I_0^{\text{SIR}} = I_0 + E_0$.

Usage

```
sir_mfg_het(network, gamma = 1, r_I = 50, n_min = 0.1, eps = 1,
            C_I = 0, S0 = 0.98, I0_sir = 0.02, T_end = 30,
            dt = 0.05, omega = 0.3, tol = 1e-7,
            max_iter = 2000, verbose = TRUE)
```

Arguments

network	A list returned by make_poisson_network .
gamma	Numeric. Recovery rate. Default 1.
r_I	Numeric. One-time infection cost. Default 50.
n_min	Numeric. Minimum contact effort. Default 0.1.
eps	Integer. Isolation cost exponent. Default 1.
C_I	Numeric. Health cost in state I. Default 0.
S0	Numeric. Initial susceptible fraction. Default 0.98.
I0_sir	Numeric. Initial infectious fraction (absorbs exposed seed). Default 0.02.
T_end	Numeric. Time horizon. Default 30.
dt	Numeric. Time step. Default 0.05.
omega	Numeric. FBS relaxation parameter. Default 0.3.
tol	Numeric. Convergence tolerance. Default 1e-7.
max_iter	Integer. Maximum FBS iterations. Default 2000.
verbose	Logical. Print convergence info. Default TRUE.

Value

A list with components S, I, R, nS, I_agg, t_grid, converged, n_iter.

References

Wang, W. (2026). Learning contact policies for SEIR epidemics on networks: A mean-field game approach. [doi:10.5281/zenodo.19381052](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381052).

Examples

```
# Simple network setup (fast)
net <- make_poisson_network()

# Full FBS solve (slow)
res <- sir_mfg_het(network = net, verbose = FALSE)
plot(res$t_grid, res$I_agg, type = "l", col = "blue",
      xlab = "Time", ylab = "Aggregate I(t)")
```

 sir_mfg_hom

Solve the homogeneous-network SIR mean-field game

Description

Computes the SIR-MFG Nash equilibrium on a homogeneous network. The initial infectious seed absorbs the exposed compartment: $I_0^{\text{SIR}} = I_0 + E_0$.

Usage

```
sir_mfg_hom(k = 8, beta_k = 4, gamma = 1, r_I = 50, n_min = 0.1,
            eps = 1, C_I = 0, S0 = 0.98, I0_sir = 0.02, T_end = 30,
            dt = 0.05, omega = 0.3, tol = 1e-7,
            max_iter = 2000, verbose = TRUE)
```

Arguments

k	Integer. Node degree. Default 8.
beta_k	Numeric. Effective transmission rate βk . Default 4.
gamma	Numeric. Recovery rate. Default 1.
r_I	Numeric. One-time infection cost. Default 50.
n_min	Numeric. Minimum contact effort. Default 0.1.
eps	Integer. Isolation cost exponent. Default 1.
C_I	Numeric. Health cost in state I. Default 0.
S0	Numeric. Initial susceptible fraction. Default 0.98.
I0_sir	Numeric. Initial infectious fraction. Default 0.02.
T_end	Numeric. Time horizon. Default 30.
dt	Numeric. Time step. Default 0.05.
omega	Numeric. FBS relaxation parameter. Default 0.3.
tol	Numeric. Convergence tolerance. Default 1e-7.
max_iter	Integer. Maximum FBS iterations. Default 2000.
verbose	Logical. Print convergence info. Default TRUE.

Value

A list with components S, I, R, nS, t_grid, converged, n_iter.

References

Wang, W. (2026). Learning contact policies for SEIR epidemics on networks: A mean-field game approach. [doi:10.5281/zenodo.19381052](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381052).

Examples

```
# Full FBS solve (slow)
res <- sir_mfg_hom(k = 8, beta_k = 4, verbose = FALSE)
plot(res$t_grid, res$I, type = "l", col = "blue",
      xlab = "Time", ylab = "I(t)")
```

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