<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<cvrfdoc xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1" xmlns:cvrf="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1">
	<DocumentTitle xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-24.03-LTS</DocumentTitle>
	<DocumentType>Security Advisory</DocumentType>
	<DocumentPublisher Type="Vendor">
		<ContactDetails>openeuler-security@openeuler.org</ContactDetails>
		<IssuingAuthority>openEuler security committee</IssuingAuthority>
	</DocumentPublisher>
	<DocumentTracking>
		<Identification>
			<ID>openEuler-SA-2026-1832</ID>
		</Identification>
		<Status>Final</Status>
		<Version>1.0</Version>
		<RevisionHistory>
			<Revision>
				<Number>1.0</Number>
				<Date>2026-04-03</Date>
				<Description>Initial</Description>
			</Revision>
		</RevisionHistory>
		<InitialReleaseDate>2026-04-03</InitialReleaseDate>
		<CurrentReleaseDate>2026-04-03</CurrentReleaseDate>
		<Generator>
			<Engine>openEuler SA Tool V1.0</Engine>
			<Date>2026-04-03</Date>
		</Generator>
	</DocumentTracking>
	<DocumentNotes>
		<Note Title="Synopsis" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">kernel security update</Note>
		<Note Title="Summary" Type="General" Ordinal="2" xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-24.03-LTS</Note>
		<Note Title="Description" Type="General" Ordinal="3" xml:lang="en">The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: fix use-after-free in ksmbd_tree_connect_put under concurrency

Under high concurrency, A tree-connection object (tcon) is freed on
a disconnect path while another path still holds a reference and later
executes *_put()/write on it.(CVE-2025-68817)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks

tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() does not cap any upper limit for the number of
banks. Cap the limit to eight banks so that out of bounds values coming
from external I/O cause on only limited harm.(CVE-2025-71077)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/page_alloc: change all pageblocks migrate type on coalescing

When a page is freed it coalesces with a buddy into a higher order page
while possible.  When the buddy page migrate type differs, it is expected
to be updated to match the one of the page being freed.

However, only the first pageblock of the buddy page is updated, while the
rest of the pageblocks are left unchanged.

That causes warnings in later expand() and other code paths (like below),
since an inconsistency between migration type of the list containing the
page and the page-owned pageblocks migration types is introduced.

[  308.986589] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  308.987227] page type is 0, passed migratetype is 1 (nr=256)
[  308.987275] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5224 at mm/page_alloc.c:812 expand+0x23c/0x270
[  308.987293] Modules linked in: algif_hash(E) af_alg(E) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) nft_chain_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_tables(E) s390_trng(E) vfio_ccw(E) mdev(E) vfio_iommu_type1(E) vfio(E) sch_fq_codel(E) drm(E) i2c_core(E) drm_panel_orientation_quirks(E) loop(E) nfnetlink(E) vsock_loopback(E) vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common(E) vsock(E) ctcm(E) fsm(E) diag288_wdt(E) watchdog(E) zfcp(E) scsi_transport_fc(E) ghash_s390(E) prng(E) aes_s390(E) des_generic(E) des_s390(E) libdes(E) sha3_512_s390(E) sha3_256_s390(E) sha_common(E) paes_s390(E) crypto_engine(E) pkey_cca(E) pkey_ep11(E) zcrypt(E) rng_core(E) pkey_pckmo(E) pkey(E) autofs4(E)
[  308.987439] Unloaded tainted modules: hmac_s390(E):2
[  308.987650] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5224 Comm: mempig_verify Kdump: loaded Tainted: G            E       6.18.0-gcc-bpf-debug #431 PREEMPT
[  308.987657] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[  308.987661] Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 704 (z/VM 7.3.0)
[  308.987666] Krnl PSW : 0404f00180000000 00000349976fa600 (expand+0x240/0x270)
[  308.987676]            R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:3 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
[  308.987682] Krnl GPRS: 0000034980000004 0000000000000005 0000000000000030 000003499a0e6d88
[  308.987688]            0000000000000005 0000034980000005 000002be803ac000 0000023efe6c8300
[  308.987692]            0000000000000008 0000034998d57290 000002be00000100 0000023e00000008
[  308.987696]            0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000349976fa5fc 000002c99b1eb6f0
[  308.987708] Krnl Code: 00000349976fa5f0: c020008a02f2	larl	%r2,000003499883abd4
                          00000349976fa5f6: c0e5ffe3f4b5	brasl	%r14,0000034997378f60
                         #00000349976fa5fc: af000000		mc	0,0
                         &gt;00000349976fa600: a7f4ff4c		brc	15,00000349976fa498
                          00000349976fa604: b9040026		lgr	%r2,%r6
                          00000349976fa608: c0300088317f	larl	%r3,0000034998800906
                          00000349976fa60e: c0e5fffdb6e1	brasl	%r14,00000349976b13d0
                          00000349976fa614: af000000		mc	0,0
[  308.987734] Call Trace:
[  308.987738]  [&lt;00000349976fa600&gt;] expand+0x240/0x270
[  308.987744] ([&lt;00000349976fa5fc&gt;] expand+0x23c/0x270)
[  308.987749]  [&lt;00000349976ff95e&gt;] rmqueue_bulk+0x71e/0x940
[  308.987754]  [&lt;00000349976ffd7e&gt;] __rmqueue_pcplist+0x1fe/0x2a0
[  308.987759]  [&lt;0000034997700966&gt;] rmqueue.isra.0+0xb46/0xf40
[  308.987763]  [&lt;0000034997703ec8&gt;] get_page_from_freelist+0x198/0x8d0
[  308.987768]  [&lt;0000034997706fa8&gt;] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x198/0x400
[  308.987774]  [&lt;00000349977536f8&gt;] alloc_pages_mpol+0xb8/0x220
[  308.987781]  [&lt;0000034997753bf6&gt;] folio_alloc_mpol_noprof+0x26/0xc0
[  308.987786]  [&lt;0000034997753e4c&gt;] vma_alloc_folio_noprof+0x6c/0xa0
[  308.987791]  [&lt;0000034997775b22&gt;] vma_alloc_anon_folio_pmd+0x42/0x240
[  308.987799]  [&lt;000003499777bfea&gt;] __do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x3a/0x210
[  308.987804]  [&lt;00000349976cb0
---truncated---(CVE-2025-71134)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: dsa: properly keep track of conduit reference

Problem description
-------------------

DSA has a mumbo-jumbo of reference handling of the conduit net device
and its kobject which, sadly, is just wrong and doesn&apos;t make sense.

There are two distinct problems.

1. The OF path, which uses of_find_net_device_by_node(), never releases
   the elevated refcount on the conduit&apos;s kobject. Nominally, the OF and
   non-OF paths should result in objects having identical reference
   counts taken, and it is already suspicious that
   dsa_dev_to_net_device() has a put_device() call which is missing in
   dsa_port_parse_of(), but we can actually even verify that an issue
   exists. With CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, if we run this command
   &quot;before&quot; and &quot;after&quot; applying this patch:

(unbind the conduit driver for net device eno2)
echo 0000:00:00.2 &gt; /sys/bus/pci/drivers/fsl_enetc/unbind

we see these lines in the output diff which appear only with the patch
applied:

kobject: &apos;eno2&apos; (ffff002009a3a6b8): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)
kobject: &apos;109&apos; (ffff0020099d59a0): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)

2. After we find the conduit interface one way (OF) or another (non-OF),
   it can get unregistered at any time, and DSA remains with a long-lived,
   but in this case stale, cpu_dp-&gt;conduit pointer. Holding the net
   device&apos;s underlying kobject isn&apos;t actually of much help, it just
   prevents it from being freed (but we never need that kobject
   directly). What helps us to prevent the net device from being
   unregistered is the parallel netdev reference mechanism (dev_hold()
   and dev_put()).

Actually we actually use that netdev tracker mechanism implicitly on
user ports since commit 2f1e8ea726e9 (&quot;net: dsa: link interfaces with
the DSA master to get rid of lockdep warnings&quot;), via netdev_upper_dev_link().
But time still passes at DSA switch probe time between the initial
of_find_net_device_by_node() code and the user port creation time, time
during which the conduit could unregister itself and DSA wouldn&apos;t know
about it.

So we have to run of_find_net_device_by_node() under rtnl_lock() to
prevent that from happening, and release the lock only with the netdev
tracker having acquired the reference.

Do we need to keep the reference until dsa_unregister_switch() /
dsa_switch_shutdown()?
1: Maybe yes. A switch device will still be registered even if all user
   ports failed to probe, see commit 86f8b1c01a0a (&quot;net: dsa: Do not
   make user port errors fatal&quot;), and the cpu_dp-&gt;conduit pointers
   remain valid.  I haven&apos;t audited all call paths to see whether they
   will actually use the conduit in lack of any user port, but if they
   do, it seems safer to not rely on user ports for that reference.
2. Definitely yes. We support changing the conduit which a user port is
   associated to, and we can get into a situation where we&apos;ve moved all
   user ports away from a conduit, thus no longer hold any reference to
   it via the net device tracker. But we shouldn&apos;t let it go nonetheless
   - see the next change in relation to dsa_tree_find_first_conduit()
   and LAG conduits which disappear.
   We have to be prepared to return to the physical conduit, so the CPU
   port must explicitly keep another reference to it. This is also to
   say: the user ports and their CPU ports may not always keep a
   reference to the same conduit net device, and both are needed.

As for the conduit&apos;s kobject for the /sys/class/net/ entry, we don&apos;t
care about it, we can release it as soon as we hold the net device
object itself.

History and blame attribution
-----------------------------

The code has been refactored so many times, it is very difficult to
follow and properly attribute a blame, but I&apos;ll try to make a short
history which I hope to be correct.

We have two distinct probing paths:
- one for OF, introduced in 2016 i
---truncated---(CVE-2025-71152)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: usb: rtl8150: fix memory leak on usb_submit_urb() failure

In async_set_registers(), when usb_submit_urb() fails, the allocated
  async_req structure and URB are not freed, causing a memory leak.

  The completion callback async_set_reg_cb() is responsible for freeing
  these allocations, but it is only called after the URB is successfully
  submitted and completes (successfully or with error). If submission
  fails, the callback never runs and the memory is leaked.

  Fix this by freeing both the URB and the request structure in the error
  path when usb_submit_urb() fails.(CVE-2025-71154)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Fix bsg_done() causing double free

Kernel panic observed on system,

[5353358.825191] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff5f5e897b024000
[5353358.825194] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[5353358.825195] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[5353358.825196] PGD 100006067 P4D 0
[5353358.825198] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[5353358.825200] CPU: 5 PID: 2132085 Comm: qlafwupdate.sub Kdump: loaded Tainted: G        W    L    -------  ---  5.14.0-503.34.1.el9_5.x86_64 #1
[5353358.825203] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen11/ProLiant DL360 Gen11, BIOS 2.44 01/17/2025
[5353358.825204] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10
[5353358.825211] RSP: 0018:ff591da8f4f6b710 EFLAGS: 00010246
[5353358.825212] RAX: ff5f5e897b024000 RBX: 0000000000007090 RCX: 0000000000001000
[5353358.825213] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ff591da8f4fed090 RDI: ff5f5e897b024000
[5353358.825214] RBP: 0000000000010000 R08: ff5f5e897b024000 R09: 0000000000000000
[5353358.825215] R10: ff46cf8c40517000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000008090
[5353358.825216] R13: ff591da8f4f6b720 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000000
[5353358.825218] FS:  00007f1e88d47740(0000) GS:ff46cf935f940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[5353358.825219] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[5353358.825220] CR2: ff5f5e897b024000 CR3: 0000000231532004 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
[5353358.825221] PKRU: 55555554
[5353358.825222] Call Trace:
[5353358.825223]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[5353358.825224]  ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[5353358.825229]  ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[5353358.825232]  ? sg_copy_buffer+0xc8/0x110
[5353358.825236]  ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
[5353358.825238]  ? page_fault_oops+0x134/0x170
[5353358.825242]  ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x84/0x110
[5353358.825244]  ? exc_page_fault+0xa8/0x150
[5353358.825247]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[5353358.825252]  ? memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10
[5353358.825253]  sg_copy_buffer+0xc8/0x110
[5353358.825259]  qla2x00_process_vendor_specific+0x652/0x1320 [qla2xxx]
[5353358.825317]  qla24xx_bsg_request+0x1b2/0x2d0 [qla2xxx]

Most routines in qla_bsg.c call bsg_done() only for success cases.
However a few invoke it for failure case as well leading to a double
free. Validate before calling bsg_done().(CVE-2025-71238)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: avoid kernel-infoleak from struct iw_point

struct iw_point has a 32bit hole on 64bit arches.

struct iw_point {
  void __user   *pointer;       /* Pointer to the data  (in user space) */
  __u16         length;         /* number of fields or size in bytes */
  __u16         flags;          /* Optional params */
};

Make sure to zero the structure to avoid disclosing 32bits of kernel data
to user space.(CVE-2026-22978)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: provide locking for v4_end_grace

Writing to v4_end_grace can race with server shutdown and result in
memory being accessed after it was freed - reclaim_str_hashtbl in
particularly.

We cannot hold nfsd_mutex across the nfsd4_end_grace() call as that is
held while client_tracking_op-&gt;init() is called and that can wait for
an upcall to nfsdcltrack which can write to v4_end_grace, resulting in a
deadlock.

nfsd4_end_grace() is also called by the landromat work queue and this
doesn&apos;t require locking as server shutdown will stop the work and wait
for it before freeing anything that nfsd4_end_grace() might access.

However, we must be sure that writing to v4_end_grace doesn&apos;t restart
the work item after shutdown has already waited for it.  For this we
add a new flag protected with nn-&gt;client_lock.  It is set only while it
is safe to make client tracking calls, and v4_end_grace only schedules
work while the flag is set with the spinlock held.

So this patch adds a nfsd_net field &quot;client_tracking_active&quot; which is
set as described.  Another field &quot;grace_end_forced&quot;, is set when
v4_end_grace is written.  After this is set, and providing
client_tracking_active is set, the laundromat is scheduled.
This &quot;grace_end_forced&quot; field bypasses other checks for whether the
grace period has finished.

This resolves a race which can result in use-after-free.(CVE-2026-22980)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: replace overzealous BUG_ON in osdmap_apply_incremental()

If the osdmap is (maliciously) corrupted such that the incremental
osdmap epoch is different from what is expected, there is no need to
BUG.  Instead, just declare the incremental osdmap to be invalid.(CVE-2026-22990)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: return the handler error from mon_handle_auth_done()

Currently any error from ceph_auth_handle_reply_done() is propagated
via finish_auth() but isn&apos;t returned from mon_handle_auth_done().  This
results in higher layers learning that (despite the monitor considering
us to be successfully authenticated) something went wrong in the
authentication phase and reacting accordingly, but msgr2 still trying
to proceed with establishing the session in the background.  In the
case of secure mode this can trigger a WARN in setup_crypto() and later
lead to a NULL pointer dereference inside of prepare_auth_signature().(CVE-2026-22992)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: authencesn - reject too-short AAD (assoclen&lt;8) to match ESP/ESN spec

authencesn assumes an ESP/ESN-formatted AAD. When assoclen is shorter than
the minimum expected length, crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt() can advance past
the end of the destination scatterlist and trigger a NULL pointer dereference
in scatterwalk_map_and_copy(), leading to a kernel panic (DoS).

Add a minimum AAD length check to fail fast on invalid inputs.(CVE-2026-23060)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vsock/virtio: fix potential underflow in virtio_transport_get_credit()

The credit calculation in virtio_transport_get_credit() uses unsigned
arithmetic:

  ret = vvs-&gt;peer_buf_alloc - (vvs-&gt;tx_cnt - vvs-&gt;peer_fwd_cnt);

If the peer shrinks its advertised buffer (peer_buf_alloc) while bytes
are in flight, the subtraction can underflow and produce a large
positive value, potentially allowing more data to be queued than the
peer can handle.

Reuse virtio_transport_has_space() which already handles this case and
add a comment to make it clear why we are doing that.

[Stefano: use virtio_transport_has_space() instead of duplicating the code]
[Stefano: tweak the commit message](CVE-2026-23069)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

regmap: Fix race condition in hwspinlock irqsave routine

Previously, the address of the shared member &apos;&amp;map-&gt;spinlock_flags&apos; was
passed directly to &apos;hwspin_lock_timeout_irqsave&apos;. This creates a race
condition where multiple contexts contending for the lock could overwrite
the shared flags variable, potentially corrupting the state for the
current lock owner.

Fix this by using a local stack variable &apos;flags&apos; to store the IRQ state
temporarily.(CVE-2026-23071)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vsock/virtio: cap TX credit to local buffer size

The virtio transports derives its TX credit directly from peer_buf_alloc,
which is set from the remote endpoint&apos;s SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_SIZE value.

On the host side this means that the amount of data we are willing to
queue for a connection is scaled by a guest-chosen buffer size, rather
than the host&apos;s own vsock configuration. A malicious guest can advertise
a large buffer and read slowly, causing the host to allocate a
correspondingly large amount of sk_buff memory.
The same thing would happen in the guest with a malicious host, since
virtio transports share the same code base.

Introduce a small helper, virtio_transport_tx_buf_size(), that
returns min(peer_buf_alloc, buf_alloc), and use it wherever we consume
peer_buf_alloc.

This ensures the effective TX window is bounded by both the peer&apos;s
advertised buffer and our own buf_alloc (already clamped to
buffer_max_size via SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_MAX_SIZE), so a remote peer
cannot force the other to queue more data than allowed by its own
vsock settings.

On an unpatched Ubuntu 22.04 host (~64 GiB RAM), running a PoC with
32 guest vsock connections advertising 2 GiB each and reading slowly
drove Slab/SUnreclaim from ~0.5 GiB to ~57 GiB; the system only
recovered after killing the QEMU process. That said, if QEMU memory is
limited with cgroups, the maximum memory used will be limited.

With this patch applied:

  Before:
    MemFree:        ~61.6 GiB
    Slab:           ~142 MiB
    SUnreclaim:     ~117 MiB

  After 32 high-credit connections:
    MemFree:        ~61.5 GiB
    Slab:           ~178 MiB
    SUnreclaim:     ~152 MiB

Only ~35 MiB increase in Slab/SUnreclaim, no host OOM, and the guest
remains responsive.

Compatibility with non-virtio transports:

  - VMCI uses the AF_VSOCK buffer knobs to size its queue pairs per
    socket based on the local vsk-&gt;buffer_* values; the remote side
    cannot enlarge those queues beyond what the local endpoint
    configured.

  - Hyper-V&apos;s vsock transport uses fixed-size VMBus ring buffers and
    an MTU bound; there is no peer-controlled credit field comparable
    to peer_buf_alloc, and the remote endpoint cannot drive in-flight
    kernel memory above those ring sizes.

  - The loopback path reuses virtio_transport_common.c, so it
    naturally follows the same semantics as the virtio transport.

This change is limited to virtio_transport_common.c and thus affects
virtio-vsock, vhost-vsock, and loopback, bringing them in line with the
&quot;remote window intersected with local policy&quot; behaviour that VMCI and
Hyper-V already effectively have.

[Stefano: small adjustments after changing the previous patch]
[Stefano: tweak the commit message](CVE-2026-23086)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bonding: limit BOND_MODE_8023AD to Ethernet devices

BOND_MODE_8023AD makes sense for ARPHRD_ETHER only.

syzbot reported:

 BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __hw_addr_create net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:63 [inline]
 BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __hw_addr_add_ex+0x25d/0x760 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:118
Read of size 16 at addr ffffffff8bf94040 by task syz.1.3580/19497

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 19497 Comm: syz.1.3580 Tainted: G             L      syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
  print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
  print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482
  kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
  kasan_check_range+0x2b0/0x2c0 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
  __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:105
  __hw_addr_create net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:63 [inline]
  __hw_addr_add_ex+0x25d/0x760 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:118
  __dev_mc_add net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:868 [inline]
  dev_mc_add+0xa1/0x120 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:886
  bond_enslave+0x2b8b/0x3ac0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2180
  do_set_master+0x533/0x6d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2963
  do_setlink+0xcf0/0x41c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3165
  rtnl_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3776 [inline]
  __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3935 [inline]
  rtnl_newlink+0x161c/0x1c90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4072
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7cf/0xb70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x208/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550
  netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 [inline]
  netlink_unicast+0x82f/0x9e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344
  netlink_sendmsg+0x805/0xb30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x820 net/socket.c:2592
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2646
  __sys_sendmsg+0x164/0x220 net/socket.c:2678
  do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:83 [inline]
  __do_fast_syscall_32+0x1dc/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:307
  do_fast_syscall_32+0x34/0x80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:332
 entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

The buggy address belongs to the variable:
 lacpdu_mcast_addr+0x0/0x40(CVE-2026-23099)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipvlan: Make the addrs_lock be per port

Make the addrs_lock be per port, not per ipvlan dev.

Initial code seems to be written in the assumption,
that any address change must occur under RTNL.
But it is not so for the case of IPv6. So

1) Introduce per-port addrs_lock.

2) It was needed to fix places where it was forgotten
to take lock (ipvlan_open/ipvlan_close)

This appears to be a very minor problem though.
Since it&apos;s highly unlikely that ipvlan_add_addr() will
be called on 2 CPU simultaneously. But nevertheless,
this could cause:

1) False-negative of ipvlan_addr_busy(): one interface
iterated through all port-&gt;ipvlans + ipvlan-&gt;addrs
under some ipvlan spinlock, and another added IP
under its own lock. Though this is only possible
for IPv6, since looks like only ipvlan_addr6_event() can be
called without rtnl_lock.

2) Race since ipvlan_ht_addr_add(port) is called under
different ipvlan-&gt;addrs_lock locks

This should not affect performance, since add/remove IP
is a rare situation and spinlock is not taken on fast
paths.(CVE-2026-23103)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: qfq: Use cl_is_active to determine whether class is active in qfq_rm_from_ag

This is more of a preventive patch to make the code more consistent and
to prevent possible exploits that employ child qlen manipulations on qfq.
use cl_is_active instead of relying on the child qdisc&apos;s qlen to determine
class activation.(CVE-2026-23105)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_tables: fix inverted genmask check in nft_map_catchall_activate()

nft_map_catchall_activate() has an inverted element activity check
compared to its non-catchall counterpart nft_mapelem_activate() and
compared to what is logically required.

nft_map_catchall_activate() is called from the abort path to re-activate
catchall map elements that were deactivated during a failed transaction.
It should skip elements that are already active (they don&apos;t need
re-activation) and process elements that are inactive (they need to be
restored). Instead, the current code does the opposite: it skips inactive
elements and processes active ones.

Compare the non-catchall activate callback, which is correct:

  nft_mapelem_activate():
    if (nft_set_elem_active(ext, iter-&gt;genmask))
        return 0;   /* skip active, process inactive */

With the buggy catchall version:

  nft_map_catchall_activate():
    if (!nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask))
        continue;   /* skip inactive, process active */

The consequence is that when a DELSET operation is aborted,
nft_setelem_data_activate() is never called for the catchall element.
For NFT_GOTO verdict elements, this means nft_data_hold() is never
called to restore the chain-&gt;use reference count. Each abort cycle
permanently decrements chain-&gt;use. Once chain-&gt;use reaches zero,
DELCHAIN succeeds and frees the chain while catchall verdict elements
still reference it, resulting in a use-after-free.

This is exploitable for local privilege escalation from an unprivileged
user via user namespaces + nftables on distributions that enable
CONFIG_USER_NS and CONFIG_NF_TABLES.

Fix by removing the negation so the check matches nft_mapelem_activate():
skip active elements, process inactive ones.(CVE-2026-23111)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

l2tp: avoid one data-race in l2tp_tunnel_del_work()

We should read sk-&gt;sk_socket only when dealing with kernel sockets.

syzbot reported the following data-race:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in l2tp_tunnel_del_work / sk_common_release

write to 0xffff88811c182b20 of 8 bytes by task 5365 on cpu 0:
  sk_set_socket include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline]
  sock_orphan include/net/sock.h:2118 [inline]
  sk_common_release+0xae/0x230 net/core/sock.c:4003
  udp_lib_close+0x15/0x20 include/net/udp.h:325
  inet_release+0xce/0xf0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437
  __sock_release net/socket.c:662 [inline]
  sock_close+0x6b/0x150 net/socket.c:1455
  __fput+0x29b/0x650 fs/file_table.c:468
  ____fput+0x1c/0x30 fs/file_table.c:496
  task_work_run+0x131/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:233
  resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
  __exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:44 [inline]
  exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x1fe/0x740 kernel/entry/common.c:75
  __exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:226 [inline]
  syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:256 [inline]
  syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:159 [inline]
  syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:194 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0x1e1/0x2b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

read to 0xffff88811c182b20 of 8 bytes by task 827 on cpu 1:
  l2tp_tunnel_del_work+0x2f/0x1a0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1418
  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
  process_scheduled_works+0x4ce/0x9d0 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
  worker_thread+0x582/0x770 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
  kthread+0x489/0x510 kernel/kthread.c:463
  ret_from_fork+0x149/0x290 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246

value changed: 0xffff88811b818000 -&gt; 0x0000000000000000(CVE-2026-23120)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: annotate data-race in ndisc_router_discovery()

syzbot found that ndisc_router_discovery() could read and write
in6_dev-&gt;ra_mtu without holding a lock [1]

This looks fine, IFLA_INET6_RA_MTU is best effort.

Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to document the race.

Note that we might also reject illegal MTU values
(mtu &lt; IPV6_MIN_MTU || mtu &gt; skb-&gt;dev-&gt;mtu) in a future patch.

[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ndisc_router_discovery / ndisc_router_discovery

read to 0xffff888119809c20 of 4 bytes by task 25817 on cpu 1:
  ndisc_router_discovery+0x151d/0x1c90 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1558
  ndisc_rcv+0x2ad/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1841
  icmpv6_rcv+0xe5a/0x12f0 net/ipv6/icmp.c:989
  ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xb2a/0x10d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
  ip6_input_finish+0xf0/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489
  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
  ip6_input+0x5e/0x140 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500
  ip6_mc_input+0x27c/0x470 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590
  dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline]
  ip6_rcv_finish+0x336/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
...

write to 0xffff888119809c20 of 4 bytes by task 25816 on cpu 0:
  ndisc_router_discovery+0x155a/0x1c90 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1559
  ndisc_rcv+0x2ad/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1841
  icmpv6_rcv+0xe5a/0x12f0 net/ipv6/icmp.c:989
  ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xb2a/0x10d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
  ip6_input_finish+0xf0/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489
  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
  ip6_input+0x5e/0x140 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500
  ip6_mc_input+0x27c/0x470 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590
  dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline]
  ip6_rcv_finish+0x336/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
...

value changed: 0x00000000 -&gt; 0xe5400659(CVE-2026-23124)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netdevsim: fix a race issue related to the operation on bpf_bound_progs list

The netdevsim driver lacks a protection mechanism for operations on the
bpf_bound_progs list. When the nsim_bpf_create_prog() performs
list_add_tail, it is possible that nsim_bpf_destroy_prog() is
simultaneously performs list_del. Concurrent operations on the list may
lead to list corruption and trigger a kernel crash as follows:

[  417.290971] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:62!
[  417.290983] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[  417.290992] CPU: 10 PID: 168 Comm: kworker/10:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.19.0-rc5 #1
[  417.291003] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[  417.291007] Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred
[  417.291021] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa7/0xc0
[  417.291034] Code: a8 ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 89 ca 48 c7 c7 48 a1 eb ae e8 ed fb a8 ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 89 c2 48 c7 c7 80 a1 eb ae e8 d9 fb a8 ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b 48 89 d1 48 c7 c7 d0 a1 eb ae 48 89 f2 48 89 c6 e8 c2 fb a8
[  417.291040] RSP: 0018:ffffb16a40807df8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  417.291046] RAX: 000000000000006d RBX: ffff8e589866f500 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  417.291051] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8e59f7b23180 RDI: ffff8e59f7b23180
[  417.291055] RBP: ffffb16a412c9000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000003
[  417.291059] R10: ffffb16a40807c80 R11: ffffffffaf9edce8 R12: ffff8e594427ac20
[  417.291063] R13: ffff8e59f7b44780 R14: ffff8e58800b7a05 R15: 0000000000000000
[  417.291074] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e59f7b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  417.291079] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  417.291083] CR2: 00007fc4083efe08 CR3: 00000001c3626006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[  417.291088] PKRU: 55555554
[  417.291091] Call Trace:
[  417.291096]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  417.291103]  nsim_bpf_destroy_prog+0x31/0x80 [netdevsim]
[  417.291154]  __bpf_prog_offload_destroy+0x2a/0x80
[  417.291163]  bpf_prog_dev_bound_destroy+0x6f/0xb0
[  417.291171]  bpf_prog_free_deferred+0x18e/0x1a0
[  417.291178]  process_one_work+0x18a/0x3a0
[  417.291188]  worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0
[  417.291197]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  417.291207]  kthread+0xe5/0x120
[  417.291214]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  417.291221]  ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
[  417.291230]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  417.291236]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  417.291246]  &lt;/TASK&gt;

Add a mutex lock, to prevent simultaneous addition and deletion operations
on the list.(CVE-2026-23126)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: ath10k: fix dma_free_coherent() pointer

dma_alloc_coherent() allocates a DMA mapped buffer and stores the
addresses in XXX_unaligned fields.  Those should be reused when freeing
the buffer rather than the aligned addresses.(CVE-2026-23133)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: reset sparse-read state in osd_fault()

When a fault occurs, the connection is abandoned, reestablished, and any
pending operations are retried. The OSD client tracks the progress of a
sparse-read reply using a separate state machine, largely independent of
the messenger&apos;s state.

If a connection is lost mid-payload or the sparse-read state machine
returns an error, the sparse-read state is not reset. The OSD client
will then interpret the beginning of a new reply as the continuation of
the old one. If this makes the sparse-read machinery enter a failure
state, it may never recover, producing loops like:

  libceph:  [0] got 0 extents
  libceph: data len 142248331 != extent len 0
  libceph: osd0 (1)...:6801 socket error on read
  libceph: data len 142248331 != extent len 0
  libceph: osd0 (1)...:6801 socket error on read

Therefore, reset the sparse-read state in osd_fault(), ensuring retries
start from a clean state.(CVE-2026-23136)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

of: unittest: Fix memory leak in unittest_data_add()

In unittest_data_add(), if of_resolve_phandles() fails, the allocated
unittest_data is not freed, leading to a memory leak.

Fix this by using scope-based cleanup helper __free(kfree) for automatic
resource cleanup. This ensures unittest_data is automatically freed when
it goes out of scope in error paths.

For the success path, use retain_and_null_ptr() to transfer ownership
of the memory to the device tree and prevent double freeing.(CVE-2026-23137)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_conncount: update last_gc only when GC has been performed

Currently last_gc is being updated everytime a new connection is
tracked, that means that it is updated even if a GC wasn&apos;t performed.
With a sufficiently high packet rate, it is possible to always bypass
the GC, causing the list to grow infinitely.

Update the last_gc value only when a GC has been actually performed.(CVE-2026-23139)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: fix iloc.bh leak in ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref

The error branch for ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref forget to release the
refcount for iloc.bh. Find this when review code.(CVE-2026-23145)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: fix segmentation of forwarding fraglist GRO

This patch enhances GSO segment handling by properly checking
the SKB_GSO_DODGY flag for frag_list GSO packets, addressing
low throughput issues observed when a station accesses IPv4
servers via hotspots with an IPv6-only upstream interface.

Specifically, it fixes a bug in GSO segmentation when forwarding
GRO packets containing a frag_list. The function skb_segment_list
cannot correctly process GRO skbs that have been converted by XLAT,
since XLAT only translates the header of the head skb. Consequently,
skbs in the frag_list may remain untranslated, resulting in protocol
inconsistencies and reduced throughput.

To address this, the patch explicitly sets the SKB_GSO_DODGY flag
for GSO packets in XLAT&apos;s IPv4/IPv6 protocol translation helpers
(bpf_skb_proto_4_to_6 and bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4). This marks GSO
packets as potentially modified after protocol translation. As a
result, GSO segmentation will avoid using skb_segment_list and
instead falls back to skb_segment for packets with the SKB_GSO_DODGY
flag. This ensures that only safe and fully translated frag_list
packets are processed by skb_segment_list, resolving protocol
inconsistencies and improving throughput when forwarding GRO packets
converted by XLAT.(CVE-2026-23154)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

efivarfs: fix error propagation in efivar_entry_get()

efivar_entry_get() always returns success even if the underlying
__efivar_entry_get() fails, masking errors.

This may result in uninitialized heap memory being copied to userspace
in the efivarfs_file_read() path.

Fix it by returning the error from __efivar_entry_get().(CVE-2026-23156)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mptcp: fix race in mptcp_pm_nl_flush_addrs_doit()

syzbot and Eulgyu Kim reported crashes in mptcp_pm_nl_get_local_id()
and/or mptcp_pm_nl_is_backup()

Root cause is list_splice_init() in mptcp_pm_nl_flush_addrs_doit()
which is not RCU ready.

list_splice_init_rcu() can not be called here while holding pernet-&gt;lock
spinlock.

Many thanks to Eulgyu Kim for providing a repro and testing our patches.(CVE-2026-23169)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: TC, delete flows only for existing peers

When deleting TC steering flows, iterate only over actual devcom
peers instead of assuming all possible ports exist. This avoids
touching non-existent peers and ensures cleanup is limited to
devices the driver is currently connected to.

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
 PGD 133c8a067 P4D 0
 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
 CPU: 19 UID: 0 PID: 2169 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.18.0+ #156 NONE
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_peers_flow+0xbe/0x200 [mlx5_core]
 Code: 00 00 a8 08 74 a8 49 8b 46 18 f6 c4 02 74 9f 4c 8d bf a0 12 00 00 4c 89 ff e8 0e e7 96 e1 49 8b 44 24 08 49 8b 0c 24 4c 89 ff &lt;48&gt; 89 41 08 48 89 08 49 89 2c 24 49 89 5c 24 08 e8 7d ce 96 e1 49
 RSP: 0018:ff11000143867528 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: dead000000000122 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: ff11000143691580 RSI: ff110001026e5000 RDI: ff11000106f3d2a0
 RBP: dead000000000100 R08: 00000000000003fd R09: 0000000000000002
 R10: ff11000101c75690 R11: ff1100085faea178 R12: ff11000115f0ae78
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ff11000115f0a800 R15: ff11000106f3d2a0
 FS:  00007f35236bf740(0000) GS:ff110008dc809000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000157a01001 CR4: 0000000000373eb0
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x46/0x270 [mlx5_core]
  mlx5e_flow_put+0x25/0x50 [mlx5_core]
  mlx5e_delete_flower+0x2a6/0x3e0 [mlx5_core]
  tc_setup_cb_reoffload+0x20/0x80
  fl_reoffload+0x26f/0x2f0 [cls_flower]
  ? mlx5e_tc_reoffload_flows_work+0xc0/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
  ? mlx5e_tc_reoffload_flows_work+0xc0/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
  tcf_block_playback_offloads+0x9e/0x1c0
  tcf_block_unbind+0x7b/0xd0
  tcf_block_setup+0x186/0x1d0
  tcf_block_offload_cmd.isra.0+0xef/0x130
  tcf_block_offload_unbind+0x43/0x70
  __tcf_block_put+0x85/0x160
  ingress_destroy+0x32/0x110 [sch_ingress]
  __qdisc_destroy+0x44/0x100
  qdisc_graft+0x22b/0x610
  tc_get_qdisc+0x183/0x4d0
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2d7/0x3d0
  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x100/0x100
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100
  netlink_unicast+0x249/0x320
  ? __alloc_skb+0x102/0x1f0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x1e3/0x420
  __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x1ef/0x230
  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6c/0xa0
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x7f/0xc0
  ? ___sys_recvmsg+0x8a/0xc0
  ? __sys_sendto+0x119/0x180
  __sys_sendmsg+0x61/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x55/0x640
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7f35238bb764
 Code: 15 b9 86 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bf 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d e5 08 0d 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4c c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 89 55
 RSP: 002b:00007ffed4c35638 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a2efcc75e0 RCX: 00007f35238bb764
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffed4c356a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 00007ffed4c35710 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 00007f3523984b20
 R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffed4c35790
 R13: 000000006947df8f R14: 000055a2efcc75e0 R15: 00007ffed4c35780(CVE-2026-23173)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: aloop: Fix racy access at PCM trigger

The PCM trigger callback of aloop driver tries to check the PCM state
and stop the stream of the tied substream in the corresponding cable.
Since both check and stop operations are performed outside the cable
lock, this may result in UAF when a program attempts to trigger
frequently while opening/closing the tied stream, as spotted by
fuzzers.

For addressing the UAF, this patch changes two things:
- It covers the most of code in loopback_check_format() with
  cable-&gt;lock spinlock, and add the proper NULL checks.  This avoids
  already some racy accesses.
- In addition, now we try to check the state of the capture PCM stream
  that may be stopped in this function, which was the major pain point
  leading to UAF.(CVE-2026-23191)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: Don&apos;t clobber irqfd routing type when deassigning irqfd

When deassigning a KVM_IRQFD, don&apos;t clobber the irqfd&apos;s copy of the IRQ&apos;s
routing entry as doing so breaks kvm_arch_irq_bypass_del_producer() on x86
and arm64, which explicitly look for KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI.  Instead, to
handle a concurrent routing update, verify that the irqfd is still active
before consuming the routing information.  As evidenced by the x86 and
arm64 bugs, and another bug in kvm_arch_update_irqfd_routing() (see below),
clobbering the entry type without notifying arch code is surprising and
error prone.

As a bonus, checking that the irqfd is active provides a convenient
location for documenting _why_ KVM must not consume the routing entry for
an irqfd that is in the process of being deassigned: once the irqfd is
deleted from the list (which happens *before* the eventfd is detached), it
will no longer receive updates via kvm_irq_routing_update(), and so KVM
could deliver an event using stale routing information (relative to
KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING returning to userspace).

As an even better bonus, explicitly checking for the irqfd being active
fixes a similar bug to the one the clobbering is trying to prevent: if an
irqfd is deactivated, and then its routing is changed,
kvm_irq_routing_update() won&apos;t invoke kvm_arch_update_irqfd_routing()
(because the irqfd isn&apos;t in the list).  And so if the irqfd is in bypass
mode, IRQs will continue to be posted using the old routing information.

As for kvm_arch_irq_bypass_del_producer(), clobbering the routing type
results in KVM incorrectly keeping the IRQ in bypass mode, which is
especially problematic on AMD as KVM tracks IRQs that are being posted to
a vCPU in a list whose lifetime is tied to the irqfd.

Without the help of KASAN to detect use-after-free, the most common
sympton on AMD is a NULL pointer deref in amd_iommu_update_ga() due to
the memory for irqfd structure being re-allocated and zeroed, resulting
in irqfd-&gt;irq_bypass_data being NULL when read by
avic_update_iommu_vcpu_affinity():

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 40cf2b9067 P4D 40cf2b9067 PUD 408362a067 PMD 0
  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 40383 Comm: vfio_irq_test
  Tainted: G     U  W  O        6.19.0-smp--5dddc257e6b2-irqfd #31 NONE
  Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.78.2-0 09/05/2025
  RIP: 0010:amd_iommu_update_ga+0x19/0xe0
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   avic_update_iommu_vcpu_affinity+0x3d/0x90 [kvm_amd]
   __avic_vcpu_load+0xf4/0x130 [kvm_amd]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x89/0x210 [kvm]
   vcpu_load+0x30/0x40 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x45/0x620 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x571/0x6a0 [kvm]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0x6d/0xb0
   do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x9d0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  RIP: 0033:0x46893b
    &lt;/TASK&gt;
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

If AVIC is inhibited when the irfd is deassigned, the bug will manifest as
list corruption, e.g. on the next irqfd assignment.

  list_add corruption. next-&gt;prev should be prev (ffff8d474d5cd588),
                       but was 0000000000000000. (next=ffff8d8658f86530).
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:31!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 128 UID: 0 PID: 80818 Comm: vfio_irq_test
  Tainted: G     U  W  O        6.19.0-smp--f19dc4d680ba-irqfd #28 NONE
  Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.78.2-0 09/05/2025
  RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x97/0xc0
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   avic_pi_update_irte+0x28e/0x2b0 [kvm_amd]
   kvm_pi_update_irte+0xbf/0x190 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_irq_bypass_add_producer+0x72/0x90 [kvm]
   irq_bypass_register_consumer+0xcd/0x170 [irqbypa
---truncated---(CVE-2026-23198)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: cls_u32: use skb_header_pointer_careful()

skb_header_pointer() does not fully validate negative @offset values.

Use skb_header_pointer_careful() instead.

GangMin Kim provided a report and a repro fooling u32_classify():

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in u32_classify+0x1180/0x11b0
net/sched/cls_u32.c:221(CVE-2026-23204)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: usb-audio: Prevent excessive number of frames

In this case, the user constructed the parameters with maxpacksize 40
for rate 22050 / pps 1000, and packsize[0] 22 packsize[1] 23. The buffer
size for each data URB is maxpacksize * packets, which in this example
is 40 * 6 = 240; When the user performs a write operation to send audio
data into the ALSA PCM playback stream, the calculated number of frames
is packsize[0] * packets = 264, which exceeds the allocated URB buffer
size, triggering the out-of-bounds (OOB) issue reported by syzbot [1].

Added a check for the number of single data URB frames when calculating
the number of frames to prevent [1].

[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_to_urb+0x261/0x460 sound/usb/pcm.c:1487
Write of size 264 at addr ffff88804337e800 by task syz.0.17/5506
Call Trace:
 copy_to_urb+0x261/0x460 sound/usb/pcm.c:1487
 prepare_playback_urb+0x953/0x13d0 sound/usb/pcm.c:1611
 prepare_outbound_urb+0x377/0xc50 sound/usb/endpoint.c:333(CVE-2026-23208)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bonding: annotate data-races around slave-&gt;last_rx

slave-&gt;last_rx and slave-&gt;target_last_arp_rx[...] can be read and written
locklessly. Add READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

syzbot reported:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in bond_rcv_validate / bond_rcv_validate

write to 0xffff888149f0d428 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1:
  bond_rcv_validate+0x202/0x7a0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3335
  bond_handle_frame+0xde/0x5e0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1533
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x5b1/0x1950 net/core/dev.c:6039
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6150 [inline]
  __netif_receive_skb+0x59/0x270 net/core/dev.c:6265
  netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:6351 [inline]
  netif_receive_skb+0x4b/0x2d0 net/core/dev.c:6410
...

write to 0xffff888149f0d428 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
  bond_rcv_validate+0x202/0x7a0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3335
  bond_handle_frame+0xde/0x5e0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1533
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x5b1/0x1950 net/core/dev.c:6039
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6150 [inline]
  __netif_receive_skb+0x59/0x270 net/core/dev.c:6265
  netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:6351 [inline]
  netif_receive_skb+0x4b/0x2d0 net/core/dev.c:6410
  br_netif_receive_skb net/bridge/br_input.c:30 [inline]
  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
...

value changed: 0x0000000100005365 -&gt; 0x0000000100005366(CVE-2026-23212)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bus: fsl-mc: fix use-after-free in driver_override_show()

The driver_override_show() function reads the driver_override string
without holding the device_lock. However, driver_override_store() uses
driver_set_override(), which modifies and frees the string while holding
the device_lock.

This can result in a concurrent use-after-free if the string is freed
by the store function while being read by the show function.

Fix this by holding the device_lock around the read operation.(CVE-2026-23221)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: split cached_fid bitfields to avoid shared-byte RMW races

is_open, has_lease and on_list are stored in the same bitfield byte in
struct cached_fid but are updated in different code paths that may run
concurrently. Bitfield assignments generate byte read–modify–write
operations (e.g. `orb $mask, addr` on x86_64), so updating one flag can
restore stale values of the others.

A possible interleaving is:
    CPU1: load old byte (has_lease=1, on_list=1)
    CPU2: clear both flags (store 0)
    CPU1: RMW store (old | IS_OPEN) -&gt; reintroduces cleared bits

To avoid this class of races, convert these flags to separate bool
fields.(CVE-2026-23230)</Note>
		<Note Title="Topic" Type="General" Ordinal="4" xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4/openEuler-24.03-LTS/openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3.

openEuler Security has rated this update as having a security impact of high. A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score,which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section.</Note>
		<Note Title="Severity" Type="General" Ordinal="5" xml:lang="en">High</Note>
		<Note Title="Affected Component" Type="General" Ordinal="6" xml:lang="en">kernel</Note>
	</DocumentNotes>
	<DocumentReferences>
		<Reference Type="Self">
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
		</Reference>
		<Reference Type="openEuler CVE">
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68817</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71077</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71134</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71152</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71154</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71238</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-22978</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-22980</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-22990</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-22992</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23060</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23069</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23071</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23086</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23099</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23103</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23105</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23111</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23120</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23124</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23126</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23133</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23136</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23137</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23139</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23145</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23154</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23156</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23169</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23173</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23191</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23198</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23204</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23208</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23212</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23221</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23230</URL>
		</Reference>
		<Reference Type="Other">
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68817</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71077</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71134</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71152</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71154</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71238</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22978</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22980</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22990</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22992</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23060</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23069</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23071</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23086</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23099</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23103</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23105</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23111</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23120</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23124</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23126</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23133</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23136</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23137</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23139</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23145</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23154</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23156</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23169</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23173</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23191</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23198</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23204</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23208</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23212</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23221</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23230</URL>
		</Reference>
	</DocumentReferences>
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			<FullProductName ProductID="openEuler-24.03-LTS" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">openEuler-24.03-LTS</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="x86_64">
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			<FullProductName ProductID="bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-source-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-source-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">perf-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">python3-perf-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
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		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="aarch64">
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			<FullProductName ProductID="bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-source-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-source-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">perf-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">python3-perf-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.0.128.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
	</ProductTree>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="1" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: fix use-after-free in ksmbd_tree_connect_put under concurrency

Under high concurrency, A tree-connection object (tcon) is freed on
a disconnect path while another path still holds a reference and later
executes *_put()/write on it.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68817</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="2" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks

tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() does not cap any upper limit for the number of
banks. Cap the limit to eight banks so that out of bounds values coming
from external I/O cause on only limited harm.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71077</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="3" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/page_alloc: change all pageblocks migrate type on coalescing

When a page is freed it coalesces with a buddy into a higher order page
while possible.  When the buddy page migrate type differs, it is expected
to be updated to match the one of the page being freed.

However, only the first pageblock of the buddy page is updated, while the
rest of the pageblocks are left unchanged.

That causes warnings in later expand() and other code paths (like below),
since an inconsistency between migration type of the list containing the
page and the page-owned pageblocks migration types is introduced.

[  308.986589] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  308.987227] page type is 0, passed migratetype is 1 (nr=256)
[  308.987275] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5224 at mm/page_alloc.c:812 expand+0x23c/0x270
[  308.987293] Modules linked in: algif_hash(E) af_alg(E) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) nft_chain_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_tables(E) s390_trng(E) vfio_ccw(E) mdev(E) vfio_iommu_type1(E) vfio(E) sch_fq_codel(E) drm(E) i2c_core(E) drm_panel_orientation_quirks(E) loop(E) nfnetlink(E) vsock_loopback(E) vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common(E) vsock(E) ctcm(E) fsm(E) diag288_wdt(E) watchdog(E) zfcp(E) scsi_transport_fc(E) ghash_s390(E) prng(E) aes_s390(E) des_generic(E) des_s390(E) libdes(E) sha3_512_s390(E) sha3_256_s390(E) sha_common(E) paes_s390(E) crypto_engine(E) pkey_cca(E) pkey_ep11(E) zcrypt(E) rng_core(E) pkey_pckmo(E) pkey(E) autofs4(E)
[  308.987439] Unloaded tainted modules: hmac_s390(E):2
[  308.987650] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5224 Comm: mempig_verify Kdump: loaded Tainted: G            E       6.18.0-gcc-bpf-debug #431 PREEMPT
[  308.987657] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[  308.987661] Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 704 (z/VM 7.3.0)
[  308.987666] Krnl PSW : 0404f00180000000 00000349976fa600 (expand+0x240/0x270)
[  308.987676]            R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:3 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
[  308.987682] Krnl GPRS: 0000034980000004 0000000000000005 0000000000000030 000003499a0e6d88
[  308.987688]            0000000000000005 0000034980000005 000002be803ac000 0000023efe6c8300
[  308.987692]            0000000000000008 0000034998d57290 000002be00000100 0000023e00000008
[  308.987696]            0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000349976fa5fc 000002c99b1eb6f0
[  308.987708] Krnl Code: 00000349976fa5f0: c020008a02f2	larl	%r2,000003499883abd4
                          00000349976fa5f6: c0e5ffe3f4b5	brasl	%r14,0000034997378f60
                         #00000349976fa5fc: af000000		mc	0,0
                         &gt;00000349976fa600: a7f4ff4c		brc	15,00000349976fa498
                          00000349976fa604: b9040026		lgr	%r2,%r6
                          00000349976fa608: c0300088317f	larl	%r3,0000034998800906
                          00000349976fa60e: c0e5fffdb6e1	brasl	%r14,00000349976b13d0
                          00000349976fa614: af000000		mc	0,0
[  308.987734] Call Trace:
[  308.987738]  [&lt;00000349976fa600&gt;] expand+0x240/0x270
[  308.987744] ([&lt;00000349976fa5fc&gt;] expand+0x23c/0x270)
[  308.987749]  [&lt;00000349976ff95e&gt;] rmqueue_bulk+0x71e/0x940
[  308.987754]  [&lt;00000349976ffd7e&gt;] __rmqueue_pcplist+0x1fe/0x2a0
[  308.987759]  [&lt;0000034997700966&gt;] rmqueue.isra.0+0xb46/0xf40
[  308.987763]  [&lt;0000034997703ec8&gt;] get_page_from_freelist+0x198/0x8d0
[  308.987768]  [&lt;0000034997706fa8&gt;] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x198/0x400
[  308.987774]  [&lt;00000349977536f8&gt;] alloc_pages_mpol+0xb8/0x220
[  308.987781]  [&lt;0000034997753bf6&gt;] folio_alloc_mpol_noprof+0x26/0xc0
[  308.987786]  [&lt;0000034997753e4c&gt;] vma_alloc_folio_noprof+0x6c/0xa0
[  308.987791]  [&lt;0000034997775b22&gt;] vma_alloc_anon_folio_pmd+0x42/0x240
[  308.987799]  [&lt;000003499777bfea&gt;] __do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x3a/0x210
[  308.987804]  [&lt;00000349976cb0
---truncated---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71134</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="4" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: dsa: properly keep track of conduit reference

Problem description
-------------------

DSA has a mumbo-jumbo of reference handling of the conduit net device
and its kobject which, sadly, is just wrong and doesn&apos;t make sense.

There are two distinct problems.

1. The OF path, which uses of_find_net_device_by_node(), never releases
   the elevated refcount on the conduit&apos;s kobject. Nominally, the OF and
   non-OF paths should result in objects having identical reference
   counts taken, and it is already suspicious that
   dsa_dev_to_net_device() has a put_device() call which is missing in
   dsa_port_parse_of(), but we can actually even verify that an issue
   exists. With CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, if we run this command
   &quot;before&quot; and &quot;after&quot; applying this patch:

(unbind the conduit driver for net device eno2)
echo 0000:00:00.2 &gt; /sys/bus/pci/drivers/fsl_enetc/unbind

we see these lines in the output diff which appear only with the patch
applied:

kobject: &apos;eno2&apos; (ffff002009a3a6b8): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)
kobject: &apos;109&apos; (ffff0020099d59a0): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)

2. After we find the conduit interface one way (OF) or another (non-OF),
   it can get unregistered at any time, and DSA remains with a long-lived,
   but in this case stale, cpu_dp-&gt;conduit pointer. Holding the net
   device&apos;s underlying kobject isn&apos;t actually of much help, it just
   prevents it from being freed (but we never need that kobject
   directly). What helps us to prevent the net device from being
   unregistered is the parallel netdev reference mechanism (dev_hold()
   and dev_put()).

Actually we actually use that netdev tracker mechanism implicitly on
user ports since commit 2f1e8ea726e9 (&quot;net: dsa: link interfaces with
the DSA master to get rid of lockdep warnings&quot;), via netdev_upper_dev_link().
But time still passes at DSA switch probe time between the initial
of_find_net_device_by_node() code and the user port creation time, time
during which the conduit could unregister itself and DSA wouldn&apos;t know
about it.

So we have to run of_find_net_device_by_node() under rtnl_lock() to
prevent that from happening, and release the lock only with the netdev
tracker having acquired the reference.

Do we need to keep the reference until dsa_unregister_switch() /
dsa_switch_shutdown()?
1: Maybe yes. A switch device will still be registered even if all user
   ports failed to probe, see commit 86f8b1c01a0a (&quot;net: dsa: Do not
   make user port errors fatal&quot;), and the cpu_dp-&gt;conduit pointers
   remain valid.  I haven&apos;t audited all call paths to see whether they
   will actually use the conduit in lack of any user port, but if they
   do, it seems safer to not rely on user ports for that reference.
2. Definitely yes. We support changing the conduit which a user port is
   associated to, and we can get into a situation where we&apos;ve moved all
   user ports away from a conduit, thus no longer hold any reference to
   it via the net device tracker. But we shouldn&apos;t let it go nonetheless
   - see the next change in relation to dsa_tree_find_first_conduit()
   and LAG conduits which disappear.
   We have to be prepared to return to the physical conduit, so the CPU
   port must explicitly keep another reference to it. This is also to
   say: the user ports and their CPU ports may not always keep a
   reference to the same conduit net device, and both are needed.

As for the conduit&apos;s kobject for the /sys/class/net/ entry, we don&apos;t
care about it, we can release it as soon as we hold the net device
object itself.

History and blame attribution
-----------------------------

The code has been refactored so many times, it is very difficult to
follow and properly attribute a blame, but I&apos;ll try to make a short
history which I hope to be correct.

We have two distinct probing paths:
- one for OF, introduced in 2016 i
---truncated---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71152</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="5" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: usb: rtl8150: fix memory leak on usb_submit_urb() failure

In async_set_registers(), when usb_submit_urb() fails, the allocated
  async_req structure and URB are not freed, causing a memory leak.

  The completion callback async_set_reg_cb() is responsible for freeing
  these allocations, but it is only called after the URB is successfully
  submitted and completes (successfully or with error). If submission
  fails, the callback never runs and the memory is leaked.

  Fix this by freeing both the URB and the request structure in the error
  path when usb_submit_urb() fails.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71154</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="6" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Fix bsg_done() causing double free

Kernel panic observed on system,

[5353358.825191] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff5f5e897b024000
[5353358.825194] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[5353358.825195] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[5353358.825196] PGD 100006067 P4D 0
[5353358.825198] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[5353358.825200] CPU: 5 PID: 2132085 Comm: qlafwupdate.sub Kdump: loaded Tainted: G        W    L    -------  ---  5.14.0-503.34.1.el9_5.x86_64 #1
[5353358.825203] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen11/ProLiant DL360 Gen11, BIOS 2.44 01/17/2025
[5353358.825204] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10
[5353358.825211] RSP: 0018:ff591da8f4f6b710 EFLAGS: 00010246
[5353358.825212] RAX: ff5f5e897b024000 RBX: 0000000000007090 RCX: 0000000000001000
[5353358.825213] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ff591da8f4fed090 RDI: ff5f5e897b024000
[5353358.825214] RBP: 0000000000010000 R08: ff5f5e897b024000 R09: 0000000000000000
[5353358.825215] R10: ff46cf8c40517000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000008090
[5353358.825216] R13: ff591da8f4f6b720 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000000
[5353358.825218] FS:  00007f1e88d47740(0000) GS:ff46cf935f940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[5353358.825219] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[5353358.825220] CR2: ff5f5e897b024000 CR3: 0000000231532004 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
[5353358.825221] PKRU: 55555554
[5353358.825222] Call Trace:
[5353358.825223]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[5353358.825224]  ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[5353358.825229]  ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[5353358.825232]  ? sg_copy_buffer+0xc8/0x110
[5353358.825236]  ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
[5353358.825238]  ? page_fault_oops+0x134/0x170
[5353358.825242]  ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x84/0x110
[5353358.825244]  ? exc_page_fault+0xa8/0x150
[5353358.825247]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[5353358.825252]  ? memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10
[5353358.825253]  sg_copy_buffer+0xc8/0x110
[5353358.825259]  qla2x00_process_vendor_specific+0x652/0x1320 [qla2xxx]
[5353358.825317]  qla24xx_bsg_request+0x1b2/0x2d0 [qla2xxx]

Most routines in qla_bsg.c call bsg_done() only for success cases.
However a few invoke it for failure case as well leading to a double
free. Validate before calling bsg_done().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71238</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="7" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: avoid kernel-infoleak from struct iw_point

struct iw_point has a 32bit hole on 64bit arches.

struct iw_point {
  void __user   *pointer;       /* Pointer to the data  (in user space) */
  __u16         length;         /* number of fields or size in bytes */
  __u16         flags;          /* Optional params */
};

Make sure to zero the structure to avoid disclosing 32bits of kernel data
to user space.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-22978</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Low</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>3.3</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="8" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: provide locking for v4_end_grace

Writing to v4_end_grace can race with server shutdown and result in
memory being accessed after it was freed - reclaim_str_hashtbl in
particularly.

We cannot hold nfsd_mutex across the nfsd4_end_grace() call as that is
held while client_tracking_op-&gt;init() is called and that can wait for
an upcall to nfsdcltrack which can write to v4_end_grace, resulting in a
deadlock.

nfsd4_end_grace() is also called by the landromat work queue and this
doesn&apos;t require locking as server shutdown will stop the work and wait
for it before freeing anything that nfsd4_end_grace() might access.

However, we must be sure that writing to v4_end_grace doesn&apos;t restart
the work item after shutdown has already waited for it.  For this we
add a new flag protected with nn-&gt;client_lock.  It is set only while it
is safe to make client tracking calls, and v4_end_grace only schedules
work while the flag is set with the spinlock held.

So this patch adds a nfsd_net field &quot;client_tracking_active&quot; which is
set as described.  Another field &quot;grace_end_forced&quot;, is set when
v4_end_grace is written.  After this is set, and providing
client_tracking_active is set, the laundromat is scheduled.
This &quot;grace_end_forced&quot; field bypasses other checks for whether the
grace period has finished.

This resolves a race which can result in use-after-free.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-22980</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="9" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: replace overzealous BUG_ON in osdmap_apply_incremental()

If the osdmap is (maliciously) corrupted such that the incremental
osdmap epoch is different from what is expected, there is no need to
BUG.  Instead, just declare the incremental osdmap to be invalid.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-22990</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="10" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: return the handler error from mon_handle_auth_done()

Currently any error from ceph_auth_handle_reply_done() is propagated
via finish_auth() but isn&apos;t returned from mon_handle_auth_done().  This
results in higher layers learning that (despite the monitor considering
us to be successfully authenticated) something went wrong in the
authentication phase and reacting accordingly, but msgr2 still trying
to proceed with establishing the session in the background.  In the
case of secure mode this can trigger a WARN in setup_crypto() and later
lead to a NULL pointer dereference inside of prepare_auth_signature().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-22992</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="11" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: authencesn - reject too-short AAD (assoclen&lt;8) to match ESP/ESN spec

authencesn assumes an ESP/ESN-formatted AAD. When assoclen is shorter than
the minimum expected length, crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt() can advance past
the end of the destination scatterlist and trigger a NULL pointer dereference
in scatterwalk_map_and_copy(), leading to a kernel panic (DoS).

Add a minimum AAD length check to fail fast on invalid inputs.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23060</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="12" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vsock/virtio: fix potential underflow in virtio_transport_get_credit()

The credit calculation in virtio_transport_get_credit() uses unsigned
arithmetic:

  ret = vvs-&gt;peer_buf_alloc - (vvs-&gt;tx_cnt - vvs-&gt;peer_fwd_cnt);

If the peer shrinks its advertised buffer (peer_buf_alloc) while bytes
are in flight, the subtraction can underflow and produce a large
positive value, potentially allowing more data to be queued than the
peer can handle.

Reuse virtio_transport_has_space() which already handles this case and
add a comment to make it clear why we are doing that.

[Stefano: use virtio_transport_has_space() instead of duplicating the code]
[Stefano: tweak the commit message]</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23069</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="13" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

regmap: Fix race condition in hwspinlock irqsave routine

Previously, the address of the shared member &apos;&amp;map-&gt;spinlock_flags&apos; was
passed directly to &apos;hwspin_lock_timeout_irqsave&apos;. This creates a race
condition where multiple contexts contending for the lock could overwrite
the shared flags variable, potentially corrupting the state for the
current lock owner.

Fix this by using a local stack variable &apos;flags&apos; to store the IRQ state
temporarily.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23071</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="14" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vsock/virtio: cap TX credit to local buffer size

The virtio transports derives its TX credit directly from peer_buf_alloc,
which is set from the remote endpoint&apos;s SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_SIZE value.

On the host side this means that the amount of data we are willing to
queue for a connection is scaled by a guest-chosen buffer size, rather
than the host&apos;s own vsock configuration. A malicious guest can advertise
a large buffer and read slowly, causing the host to allocate a
correspondingly large amount of sk_buff memory.
The same thing would happen in the guest with a malicious host, since
virtio transports share the same code base.

Introduce a small helper, virtio_transport_tx_buf_size(), that
returns min(peer_buf_alloc, buf_alloc), and use it wherever we consume
peer_buf_alloc.

This ensures the effective TX window is bounded by both the peer&apos;s
advertised buffer and our own buf_alloc (already clamped to
buffer_max_size via SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_MAX_SIZE), so a remote peer
cannot force the other to queue more data than allowed by its own
vsock settings.

On an unpatched Ubuntu 22.04 host (~64 GiB RAM), running a PoC with
32 guest vsock connections advertising 2 GiB each and reading slowly
drove Slab/SUnreclaim from ~0.5 GiB to ~57 GiB; the system only
recovered after killing the QEMU process. That said, if QEMU memory is
limited with cgroups, the maximum memory used will be limited.

With this patch applied:

  Before:
    MemFree:        ~61.6 GiB
    Slab:           ~142 MiB
    SUnreclaim:     ~117 MiB

  After 32 high-credit connections:
    MemFree:        ~61.5 GiB
    Slab:           ~178 MiB
    SUnreclaim:     ~152 MiB

Only ~35 MiB increase in Slab/SUnreclaim, no host OOM, and the guest
remains responsive.

Compatibility with non-virtio transports:

  - VMCI uses the AF_VSOCK buffer knobs to size its queue pairs per
    socket based on the local vsk-&gt;buffer_* values; the remote side
    cannot enlarge those queues beyond what the local endpoint
    configured.

  - Hyper-V&apos;s vsock transport uses fixed-size VMBus ring buffers and
    an MTU bound; there is no peer-controlled credit field comparable
    to peer_buf_alloc, and the remote endpoint cannot drive in-flight
    kernel memory above those ring sizes.

  - The loopback path reuses virtio_transport_common.c, so it
    naturally follows the same semantics as the virtio transport.

This change is limited to virtio_transport_common.c and thus affects
virtio-vsock, vhost-vsock, and loopback, bringing them in line with the
&quot;remote window intersected with local policy&quot; behaviour that VMCI and
Hyper-V already effectively have.

[Stefano: small adjustments after changing the previous patch]
[Stefano: tweak the commit message]</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23086</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="15" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bonding: limit BOND_MODE_8023AD to Ethernet devices

BOND_MODE_8023AD makes sense for ARPHRD_ETHER only.

syzbot reported:

 BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __hw_addr_create net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:63 [inline]
 BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __hw_addr_add_ex+0x25d/0x760 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:118
Read of size 16 at addr ffffffff8bf94040 by task syz.1.3580/19497

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 19497 Comm: syz.1.3580 Tainted: G             L      syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
  print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
  print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482
  kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
  kasan_check_range+0x2b0/0x2c0 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
  __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:105
  __hw_addr_create net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:63 [inline]
  __hw_addr_add_ex+0x25d/0x760 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:118
  __dev_mc_add net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:868 [inline]
  dev_mc_add+0xa1/0x120 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:886
  bond_enslave+0x2b8b/0x3ac0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2180
  do_set_master+0x533/0x6d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2963
  do_setlink+0xcf0/0x41c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3165
  rtnl_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3776 [inline]
  __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3935 [inline]
  rtnl_newlink+0x161c/0x1c90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4072
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7cf/0xb70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x208/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550
  netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 [inline]
  netlink_unicast+0x82f/0x9e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344
  netlink_sendmsg+0x805/0xb30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x820 net/socket.c:2592
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2646
  __sys_sendmsg+0x164/0x220 net/socket.c:2678
  do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:83 [inline]
  __do_fast_syscall_32+0x1dc/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:307
  do_fast_syscall_32+0x34/0x80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:332
 entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

The buggy address belongs to the variable:
 lacpdu_mcast_addr+0x0/0x40</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23099</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="16" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipvlan: Make the addrs_lock be per port

Make the addrs_lock be per port, not per ipvlan dev.

Initial code seems to be written in the assumption,
that any address change must occur under RTNL.
But it is not so for the case of IPv6. So

1) Introduce per-port addrs_lock.

2) It was needed to fix places where it was forgotten
to take lock (ipvlan_open/ipvlan_close)

This appears to be a very minor problem though.
Since it&apos;s highly unlikely that ipvlan_add_addr() will
be called on 2 CPU simultaneously. But nevertheless,
this could cause:

1) False-negative of ipvlan_addr_busy(): one interface
iterated through all port-&gt;ipvlans + ipvlan-&gt;addrs
under some ipvlan spinlock, and another added IP
under its own lock. Though this is only possible
for IPv6, since looks like only ipvlan_addr6_event() can be
called without rtnl_lock.

2) Race since ipvlan_ht_addr_add(port) is called under
different ipvlan-&gt;addrs_lock locks

This should not affect performance, since add/remove IP
is a rare situation and spinlock is not taken on fast
paths.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23103</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="17" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: qfq: Use cl_is_active to determine whether class is active in qfq_rm_from_ag

This is more of a preventive patch to make the code more consistent and
to prevent possible exploits that employ child qlen manipulations on qfq.
use cl_is_active instead of relying on the child qdisc&apos;s qlen to determine
class activation.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23105</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="18" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_tables: fix inverted genmask check in nft_map_catchall_activate()

nft_map_catchall_activate() has an inverted element activity check
compared to its non-catchall counterpart nft_mapelem_activate() and
compared to what is logically required.

nft_map_catchall_activate() is called from the abort path to re-activate
catchall map elements that were deactivated during a failed transaction.
It should skip elements that are already active (they don&apos;t need
re-activation) and process elements that are inactive (they need to be
restored). Instead, the current code does the opposite: it skips inactive
elements and processes active ones.

Compare the non-catchall activate callback, which is correct:

  nft_mapelem_activate():
    if (nft_set_elem_active(ext, iter-&gt;genmask))
        return 0;   /* skip active, process inactive */

With the buggy catchall version:

  nft_map_catchall_activate():
    if (!nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask))
        continue;   /* skip inactive, process active */

The consequence is that when a DELSET operation is aborted,
nft_setelem_data_activate() is never called for the catchall element.
For NFT_GOTO verdict elements, this means nft_data_hold() is never
called to restore the chain-&gt;use reference count. Each abort cycle
permanently decrements chain-&gt;use. Once chain-&gt;use reaches zero,
DELCHAIN succeeds and frees the chain while catchall verdict elements
still reference it, resulting in a use-after-free.

This is exploitable for local privilege escalation from an unprivileged
user via user namespaces + nftables on distributions that enable
CONFIG_USER_NS and CONFIG_NF_TABLES.

Fix by removing the negation so the check matches nft_mapelem_activate():
skip active elements, process inactive ones.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23111</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="19" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

l2tp: avoid one data-race in l2tp_tunnel_del_work()

We should read sk-&gt;sk_socket only when dealing with kernel sockets.

syzbot reported the following data-race:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in l2tp_tunnel_del_work / sk_common_release

write to 0xffff88811c182b20 of 8 bytes by task 5365 on cpu 0:
  sk_set_socket include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline]
  sock_orphan include/net/sock.h:2118 [inline]
  sk_common_release+0xae/0x230 net/core/sock.c:4003
  udp_lib_close+0x15/0x20 include/net/udp.h:325
  inet_release+0xce/0xf0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437
  __sock_release net/socket.c:662 [inline]
  sock_close+0x6b/0x150 net/socket.c:1455
  __fput+0x29b/0x650 fs/file_table.c:468
  ____fput+0x1c/0x30 fs/file_table.c:496
  task_work_run+0x131/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:233
  resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
  __exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:44 [inline]
  exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x1fe/0x740 kernel/entry/common.c:75
  __exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:226 [inline]
  syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:256 [inline]
  syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:159 [inline]
  syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:194 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0x1e1/0x2b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

read to 0xffff88811c182b20 of 8 bytes by task 827 on cpu 1:
  l2tp_tunnel_del_work+0x2f/0x1a0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1418
  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
  process_scheduled_works+0x4ce/0x9d0 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
  worker_thread+0x582/0x770 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
  kthread+0x489/0x510 kernel/kthread.c:463
  ret_from_fork+0x149/0x290 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246

value changed: 0xffff88811b818000 -&gt; 0x0000000000000000</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23120</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="20" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: annotate data-race in ndisc_router_discovery()

syzbot found that ndisc_router_discovery() could read and write
in6_dev-&gt;ra_mtu without holding a lock [1]

This looks fine, IFLA_INET6_RA_MTU is best effort.

Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to document the race.

Note that we might also reject illegal MTU values
(mtu &lt; IPV6_MIN_MTU || mtu &gt; skb-&gt;dev-&gt;mtu) in a future patch.

[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ndisc_router_discovery / ndisc_router_discovery

read to 0xffff888119809c20 of 4 bytes by task 25817 on cpu 1:
  ndisc_router_discovery+0x151d/0x1c90 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1558
  ndisc_rcv+0x2ad/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1841
  icmpv6_rcv+0xe5a/0x12f0 net/ipv6/icmp.c:989
  ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xb2a/0x10d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
  ip6_input_finish+0xf0/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489
  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
  ip6_input+0x5e/0x140 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500
  ip6_mc_input+0x27c/0x470 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590
  dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline]
  ip6_rcv_finish+0x336/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
...

write to 0xffff888119809c20 of 4 bytes by task 25816 on cpu 0:
  ndisc_router_discovery+0x155a/0x1c90 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1559
  ndisc_rcv+0x2ad/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1841
  icmpv6_rcv+0xe5a/0x12f0 net/ipv6/icmp.c:989
  ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xb2a/0x10d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
  ip6_input_finish+0xf0/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489
  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
  ip6_input+0x5e/0x140 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500
  ip6_mc_input+0x27c/0x470 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590
  dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline]
  ip6_rcv_finish+0x336/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
...

value changed: 0x00000000 -&gt; 0xe5400659</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23124</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="21" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netdevsim: fix a race issue related to the operation on bpf_bound_progs list

The netdevsim driver lacks a protection mechanism for operations on the
bpf_bound_progs list. When the nsim_bpf_create_prog() performs
list_add_tail, it is possible that nsim_bpf_destroy_prog() is
simultaneously performs list_del. Concurrent operations on the list may
lead to list corruption and trigger a kernel crash as follows:

[  417.290971] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:62!
[  417.290983] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[  417.290992] CPU: 10 PID: 168 Comm: kworker/10:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.19.0-rc5 #1
[  417.291003] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[  417.291007] Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred
[  417.291021] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa7/0xc0
[  417.291034] Code: a8 ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 89 ca 48 c7 c7 48 a1 eb ae e8 ed fb a8 ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 89 c2 48 c7 c7 80 a1 eb ae e8 d9 fb a8 ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b 48 89 d1 48 c7 c7 d0 a1 eb ae 48 89 f2 48 89 c6 e8 c2 fb a8
[  417.291040] RSP: 0018:ffffb16a40807df8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  417.291046] RAX: 000000000000006d RBX: ffff8e589866f500 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  417.291051] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8e59f7b23180 RDI: ffff8e59f7b23180
[  417.291055] RBP: ffffb16a412c9000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000003
[  417.291059] R10: ffffb16a40807c80 R11: ffffffffaf9edce8 R12: ffff8e594427ac20
[  417.291063] R13: ffff8e59f7b44780 R14: ffff8e58800b7a05 R15: 0000000000000000
[  417.291074] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e59f7b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  417.291079] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  417.291083] CR2: 00007fc4083efe08 CR3: 00000001c3626006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[  417.291088] PKRU: 55555554
[  417.291091] Call Trace:
[  417.291096]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  417.291103]  nsim_bpf_destroy_prog+0x31/0x80 [netdevsim]
[  417.291154]  __bpf_prog_offload_destroy+0x2a/0x80
[  417.291163]  bpf_prog_dev_bound_destroy+0x6f/0xb0
[  417.291171]  bpf_prog_free_deferred+0x18e/0x1a0
[  417.291178]  process_one_work+0x18a/0x3a0
[  417.291188]  worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0
[  417.291197]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  417.291207]  kthread+0xe5/0x120
[  417.291214]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  417.291221]  ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
[  417.291230]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  417.291236]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  417.291246]  &lt;/TASK&gt;

Add a mutex lock, to prevent simultaneous addition and deletion operations
on the list.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23126</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="22" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: ath10k: fix dma_free_coherent() pointer

dma_alloc_coherent() allocates a DMA mapped buffer and stores the
addresses in XXX_unaligned fields.  Those should be reused when freeing
the buffer rather than the aligned addresses.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23133</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="23" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: reset sparse-read state in osd_fault()

When a fault occurs, the connection is abandoned, reestablished, and any
pending operations are retried. The OSD client tracks the progress of a
sparse-read reply using a separate state machine, largely independent of
the messenger&apos;s state.

If a connection is lost mid-payload or the sparse-read state machine
returns an error, the sparse-read state is not reset. The OSD client
will then interpret the beginning of a new reply as the continuation of
the old one. If this makes the sparse-read machinery enter a failure
state, it may never recover, producing loops like:

  libceph:  [0] got 0 extents
  libceph: data len 142248331 != extent len 0
  libceph: osd0 (1)...:6801 socket error on read
  libceph: data len 142248331 != extent len 0
  libceph: osd0 (1)...:6801 socket error on read

Therefore, reset the sparse-read state in osd_fault(), ensuring retries
start from a clean state.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23136</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="24" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

of: unittest: Fix memory leak in unittest_data_add()

In unittest_data_add(), if of_resolve_phandles() fails, the allocated
unittest_data is not freed, leading to a memory leak.

Fix this by using scope-based cleanup helper __free(kfree) for automatic
resource cleanup. This ensures unittest_data is automatically freed when
it goes out of scope in error paths.

For the success path, use retain_and_null_ptr() to transfer ownership
of the memory to the device tree and prevent double freeing.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23137</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="25" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_conncount: update last_gc only when GC has been performed

Currently last_gc is being updated everytime a new connection is
tracked, that means that it is updated even if a GC wasn&apos;t performed.
With a sufficiently high packet rate, it is possible to always bypass
the GC, causing the list to grow infinitely.

Update the last_gc value only when a GC has been actually performed.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23139</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="26" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: fix iloc.bh leak in ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref

The error branch for ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref forget to release the
refcount for iloc.bh. Find this when review code.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23145</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="27" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: fix segmentation of forwarding fraglist GRO

This patch enhances GSO segment handling by properly checking
the SKB_GSO_DODGY flag for frag_list GSO packets, addressing
low throughput issues observed when a station accesses IPv4
servers via hotspots with an IPv6-only upstream interface.

Specifically, it fixes a bug in GSO segmentation when forwarding
GRO packets containing a frag_list. The function skb_segment_list
cannot correctly process GRO skbs that have been converted by XLAT,
since XLAT only translates the header of the head skb. Consequently,
skbs in the frag_list may remain untranslated, resulting in protocol
inconsistencies and reduced throughput.

To address this, the patch explicitly sets the SKB_GSO_DODGY flag
for GSO packets in XLAT&apos;s IPv4/IPv6 protocol translation helpers
(bpf_skb_proto_4_to_6 and bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4). This marks GSO
packets as potentially modified after protocol translation. As a
result, GSO segmentation will avoid using skb_segment_list and
instead falls back to skb_segment for packets with the SKB_GSO_DODGY
flag. This ensures that only safe and fully translated frag_list
packets are processed by skb_segment_list, resolving protocol
inconsistencies and improving throughput when forwarding GRO packets
converted by XLAT.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23154</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="28" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

efivarfs: fix error propagation in efivar_entry_get()

efivar_entry_get() always returns success even if the underlying
__efivar_entry_get() fails, masking errors.

This may result in uninitialized heap memory being copied to userspace
in the efivarfs_file_read() path.

Fix it by returning the error from __efivar_entry_get().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23156</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="29" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mptcp: fix race in mptcp_pm_nl_flush_addrs_doit()

syzbot and Eulgyu Kim reported crashes in mptcp_pm_nl_get_local_id()
and/or mptcp_pm_nl_is_backup()

Root cause is list_splice_init() in mptcp_pm_nl_flush_addrs_doit()
which is not RCU ready.

list_splice_init_rcu() can not be called here while holding pernet-&gt;lock
spinlock.

Many thanks to Eulgyu Kim for providing a repro and testing our patches.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23169</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="30" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: TC, delete flows only for existing peers

When deleting TC steering flows, iterate only over actual devcom
peers instead of assuming all possible ports exist. This avoids
touching non-existent peers and ensures cleanup is limited to
devices the driver is currently connected to.

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
 PGD 133c8a067 P4D 0
 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
 CPU: 19 UID: 0 PID: 2169 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.18.0+ #156 NONE
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_peers_flow+0xbe/0x200 [mlx5_core]
 Code: 00 00 a8 08 74 a8 49 8b 46 18 f6 c4 02 74 9f 4c 8d bf a0 12 00 00 4c 89 ff e8 0e e7 96 e1 49 8b 44 24 08 49 8b 0c 24 4c 89 ff &lt;48&gt; 89 41 08 48 89 08 49 89 2c 24 49 89 5c 24 08 e8 7d ce 96 e1 49
 RSP: 0018:ff11000143867528 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: dead000000000122 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: ff11000143691580 RSI: ff110001026e5000 RDI: ff11000106f3d2a0
 RBP: dead000000000100 R08: 00000000000003fd R09: 0000000000000002
 R10: ff11000101c75690 R11: ff1100085faea178 R12: ff11000115f0ae78
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ff11000115f0a800 R15: ff11000106f3d2a0
 FS:  00007f35236bf740(0000) GS:ff110008dc809000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000157a01001 CR4: 0000000000373eb0
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x46/0x270 [mlx5_core]
  mlx5e_flow_put+0x25/0x50 [mlx5_core]
  mlx5e_delete_flower+0x2a6/0x3e0 [mlx5_core]
  tc_setup_cb_reoffload+0x20/0x80
  fl_reoffload+0x26f/0x2f0 [cls_flower]
  ? mlx5e_tc_reoffload_flows_work+0xc0/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
  ? mlx5e_tc_reoffload_flows_work+0xc0/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
  tcf_block_playback_offloads+0x9e/0x1c0
  tcf_block_unbind+0x7b/0xd0
  tcf_block_setup+0x186/0x1d0
  tcf_block_offload_cmd.isra.0+0xef/0x130
  tcf_block_offload_unbind+0x43/0x70
  __tcf_block_put+0x85/0x160
  ingress_destroy+0x32/0x110 [sch_ingress]
  __qdisc_destroy+0x44/0x100
  qdisc_graft+0x22b/0x610
  tc_get_qdisc+0x183/0x4d0
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2d7/0x3d0
  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x100/0x100
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100
  netlink_unicast+0x249/0x320
  ? __alloc_skb+0x102/0x1f0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x1e3/0x420
  __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x1ef/0x230
  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6c/0xa0
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x7f/0xc0
  ? ___sys_recvmsg+0x8a/0xc0
  ? __sys_sendto+0x119/0x180
  __sys_sendmsg+0x61/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x55/0x640
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7f35238bb764
 Code: 15 b9 86 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bf 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d e5 08 0d 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4c c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 89 55
 RSP: 002b:00007ffed4c35638 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a2efcc75e0 RCX: 00007f35238bb764
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffed4c356a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 00007ffed4c35710 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 00007f3523984b20
 R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffed4c35790
 R13: 000000006947df8f R14: 000055a2efcc75e0 R15: 00007ffed4c35780</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23173</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="31" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: aloop: Fix racy access at PCM trigger

The PCM trigger callback of aloop driver tries to check the PCM state
and stop the stream of the tied substream in the corresponding cable.
Since both check and stop operations are performed outside the cable
lock, this may result in UAF when a program attempts to trigger
frequently while opening/closing the tied stream, as spotted by
fuzzers.

For addressing the UAF, this patch changes two things:
- It covers the most of code in loopback_check_format() with
  cable-&gt;lock spinlock, and add the proper NULL checks.  This avoids
  already some racy accesses.
- In addition, now we try to check the state of the capture PCM stream
  that may be stopped in this function, which was the major pain point
  leading to UAF.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23191</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.0</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="32" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: Don&apos;t clobber irqfd routing type when deassigning irqfd

When deassigning a KVM_IRQFD, don&apos;t clobber the irqfd&apos;s copy of the IRQ&apos;s
routing entry as doing so breaks kvm_arch_irq_bypass_del_producer() on x86
and arm64, which explicitly look for KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI.  Instead, to
handle a concurrent routing update, verify that the irqfd is still active
before consuming the routing information.  As evidenced by the x86 and
arm64 bugs, and another bug in kvm_arch_update_irqfd_routing() (see below),
clobbering the entry type without notifying arch code is surprising and
error prone.

As a bonus, checking that the irqfd is active provides a convenient
location for documenting _why_ KVM must not consume the routing entry for
an irqfd that is in the process of being deassigned: once the irqfd is
deleted from the list (which happens *before* the eventfd is detached), it
will no longer receive updates via kvm_irq_routing_update(), and so KVM
could deliver an event using stale routing information (relative to
KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING returning to userspace).

As an even better bonus, explicitly checking for the irqfd being active
fixes a similar bug to the one the clobbering is trying to prevent: if an
irqfd is deactivated, and then its routing is changed,
kvm_irq_routing_update() won&apos;t invoke kvm_arch_update_irqfd_routing()
(because the irqfd isn&apos;t in the list).  And so if the irqfd is in bypass
mode, IRQs will continue to be posted using the old routing information.

As for kvm_arch_irq_bypass_del_producer(), clobbering the routing type
results in KVM incorrectly keeping the IRQ in bypass mode, which is
especially problematic on AMD as KVM tracks IRQs that are being posted to
a vCPU in a list whose lifetime is tied to the irqfd.

Without the help of KASAN to detect use-after-free, the most common
sympton on AMD is a NULL pointer deref in amd_iommu_update_ga() due to
the memory for irqfd structure being re-allocated and zeroed, resulting
in irqfd-&gt;irq_bypass_data being NULL when read by
avic_update_iommu_vcpu_affinity():

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 40cf2b9067 P4D 40cf2b9067 PUD 408362a067 PMD 0
  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 40383 Comm: vfio_irq_test
  Tainted: G     U  W  O        6.19.0-smp--5dddc257e6b2-irqfd #31 NONE
  Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.78.2-0 09/05/2025
  RIP: 0010:amd_iommu_update_ga+0x19/0xe0
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   avic_update_iommu_vcpu_affinity+0x3d/0x90 [kvm_amd]
   __avic_vcpu_load+0xf4/0x130 [kvm_amd]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x89/0x210 [kvm]
   vcpu_load+0x30/0x40 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x45/0x620 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x571/0x6a0 [kvm]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0x6d/0xb0
   do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x9d0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  RIP: 0033:0x46893b
    &lt;/TASK&gt;
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

If AVIC is inhibited when the irfd is deassigned, the bug will manifest as
list corruption, e.g. on the next irqfd assignment.

  list_add corruption. next-&gt;prev should be prev (ffff8d474d5cd588),
                       but was 0000000000000000. (next=ffff8d8658f86530).
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:31!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 128 UID: 0 PID: 80818 Comm: vfio_irq_test
  Tainted: G     U  W  O        6.19.0-smp--f19dc4d680ba-irqfd #28 NONE
  Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.78.2-0 09/05/2025
  RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x97/0xc0
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   avic_pi_update_irte+0x28e/0x2b0 [kvm_amd]
   kvm_pi_update_irte+0xbf/0x190 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_irq_bypass_add_producer+0x72/0x90 [kvm]
   irq_bypass_register_consumer+0xcd/0x170 [irqbypa
---truncated---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23198</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="33" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: cls_u32: use skb_header_pointer_careful()

skb_header_pointer() does not fully validate negative @offset values.

Use skb_header_pointer_careful() instead.

GangMin Kim provided a report and a repro fooling u32_classify():

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in u32_classify+0x1180/0x11b0
net/sched/cls_u32.c:221</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23204</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="34" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: usb-audio: Prevent excessive number of frames

In this case, the user constructed the parameters with maxpacksize 40
for rate 22050 / pps 1000, and packsize[0] 22 packsize[1] 23. The buffer
size for each data URB is maxpacksize * packets, which in this example
is 40 * 6 = 240; When the user performs a write operation to send audio
data into the ALSA PCM playback stream, the calculated number of frames
is packsize[0] * packets = 264, which exceeds the allocated URB buffer
size, triggering the out-of-bounds (OOB) issue reported by syzbot [1].

Added a check for the number of single data URB frames when calculating
the number of frames to prevent [1].

[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_to_urb+0x261/0x460 sound/usb/pcm.c:1487
Write of size 264 at addr ffff88804337e800 by task syz.0.17/5506
Call Trace:
 copy_to_urb+0x261/0x460 sound/usb/pcm.c:1487
 prepare_playback_urb+0x953/0x13d0 sound/usb/pcm.c:1611
 prepare_outbound_urb+0x377/0xc50 sound/usb/endpoint.c:333</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23208</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="35" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bonding: annotate data-races around slave-&gt;last_rx

slave-&gt;last_rx and slave-&gt;target_last_arp_rx[...] can be read and written
locklessly. Add READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

syzbot reported:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in bond_rcv_validate / bond_rcv_validate

write to 0xffff888149f0d428 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1:
  bond_rcv_validate+0x202/0x7a0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3335
  bond_handle_frame+0xde/0x5e0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1533
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x5b1/0x1950 net/core/dev.c:6039
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6150 [inline]
  __netif_receive_skb+0x59/0x270 net/core/dev.c:6265
  netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:6351 [inline]
  netif_receive_skb+0x4b/0x2d0 net/core/dev.c:6410
...

write to 0xffff888149f0d428 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
  bond_rcv_validate+0x202/0x7a0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3335
  bond_handle_frame+0xde/0x5e0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1533
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x5b1/0x1950 net/core/dev.c:6039
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6150 [inline]
  __netif_receive_skb+0x59/0x270 net/core/dev.c:6265
  netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:6351 [inline]
  netif_receive_skb+0x4b/0x2d0 net/core/dev.c:6410
  br_netif_receive_skb net/bridge/br_input.c:30 [inline]
  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
...

value changed: 0x0000000100005365 -&gt; 0x0000000100005366</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23212</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="36" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bus: fsl-mc: fix use-after-free in driver_override_show()

The driver_override_show() function reads the driver_override string
without holding the device_lock. However, driver_override_store() uses
driver_set_override(), which modifies and frees the string while holding
the device_lock.

This can result in a concurrent use-after-free if the string is freed
by the store function while being read by the show function.

Fix this by holding the device_lock around the read operation.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23221</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="37" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: split cached_fid bitfields to avoid shared-byte RMW races

is_open, has_lease and on_list are stored in the same bitfield byte in
struct cached_fid but are updated in different code paths that may run
concurrently. Bitfield assignments generate byte read–modify–write
operations (e.g. `orb $mask, addr` on x86_64), so updating one flag can
restore stale values of the others.

A possible interleaving is:
    CPU1: load old byte (has_lease=1, on_list=1)
    CPU2: clear both flags (store 0)
    CPU1: RMW store (old | IS_OPEN) -&gt; reintroduces cleared bits

To avoid this class of races, convert these flags to separate bool
fields.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-03</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23230</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-03</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1832</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
</cvrfdoc>