<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<cvrfdoc xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1" xmlns:cvrf="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1">
	<DocumentTitle xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-24.03-LTS</DocumentTitle>
	<DocumentType>Security Advisory</DocumentType>
	<DocumentPublisher Type="Vendor">
		<ContactDetails>openeuler-security@openeuler.org</ContactDetails>
		<IssuingAuthority>openEuler security committee</IssuingAuthority>
	</DocumentPublisher>
	<DocumentTracking>
		<Identification>
			<ID>openEuler-SA-2026-1759</ID>
		</Identification>
		<Status>Final</Status>
		<Version>1.0</Version>
		<RevisionHistory>
			<Revision>
				<Number>1.0</Number>
				<Date>2026-03-27</Date>
				<Description>Initial</Description>
			</Revision>
		</RevisionHistory>
		<InitialReleaseDate>2026-03-27</InitialReleaseDate>
		<CurrentReleaseDate>2026-03-27</CurrentReleaseDate>
		<Generator>
			<Engine>openEuler SA Tool V1.0</Engine>
			<Date>2026-03-27</Date>
		</Generator>
	</DocumentTracking>
	<DocumentNotes>
		<Note Title="Synopsis" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">kernel security update</Note>
		<Note Title="Summary" Type="General" Ordinal="2" xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-24.03-LTS</Note>
		<Note Title="Description" Type="General" Ordinal="3" xml:lang="en">The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu/s390: Implement blocking domain

This fixes a crash when surprise hot-unplugging a PCI device. This crash
happens because during hot-unplug __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail()
attaching the default domain fails when the platform no longer
recognizes the device as it has already been removed and we end up with
a NULL domain pointer and UAF. This is exactly the case referred to in
the second comment in __iommu_device_set_domain() and just as stated
there if we can instead attach the blocking domain the UAF is prevented
as this can handle the already removed device. Implement the blocking
domain to use this handling.  With this change, the crash is fixed but
we still hit a warning attempting to change DMA ownership on a blocked
device.(CVE-2024-53232)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu: Fix two issues in iommu_copy_struct_from_user()

In the review for iommu_copy_struct_to_user() helper, Matt pointed out that
a NULL pointer should be rejected prior to dereferencing it:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/(CVE-2025-37900)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: Avoid race in open_cached_dir with lease breaks

A pre-existing valid cfid returned from find_or_create_cached_dir might
race with a lease break, meaning open_cached_dir doesn&apos;t consider it
valid, and thinks it&apos;s newly-constructed. This leaks a dentry reference
if the allocation occurs before the queued lease break work runs.

Avoid the race by extending holding the cfid_list_lock across
find_or_create_cached_dir and when the result is checked.(CVE-2025-37954)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net_sched: prio: fix a race in prio_tune()

Gerrard Tai reported a race condition in PRIO, whenever SFQ perturb timer
fires at the wrong time.

The race is as follows:

CPU 0                                 CPU 1
[1]: lock root
[2]: qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
[3]: unlock root
 |
 |                                    [5]: lock root
 |                                    [6]: rehash
 |                                    [7]: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
 |
[4]: qdisc_put()

This can be abused to underflow a parent&apos;s qlen.

Calling qdisc_purge_queue() instead of qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
should fix the race, because all packets will be purged from the qdisc
before releasing the lock.(CVE-2025-38083)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

IB/mlx5: Fix potential deadlock in MR deregistration

The issue arises when kzalloc() is invoked while holding umem_mutex or
any other lock acquired under umem_mutex. This is problematic because
kzalloc() can trigger fs_reclaim_aqcuire(), which may, in turn, invoke
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(). This function can lead to
mlx5_ib_invalidate_range(), which attempts to acquire umem_mutex again,
resulting in a deadlock.

The problematic flow:
             CPU0                      |              CPU1
---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------
mlx5_ib_dereg_mr()                     |
 → revoke_mr()                         |
   → mutex_lock(&amp;umem_odp-&gt;umem_mutex) |
                                       | mlx5_mkey_cache_init()
                                       |  → mutex_lock(&amp;dev-&gt;cache.rb_lock)
                                       |  → mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked()
                                       |    → kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL)
                                       |      → fs_reclaim()
                                       |        → mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start()
                                       |          → mlx5_ib_invalidate_range()
                                       |            → mutex_lock(&amp;umem_odp-&gt;umem_mutex)
   → cache_ent_find_and_store()        |
     → mutex_lock(&amp;dev-&gt;cache.rb_lock) |

Additionally, when kzalloc() is called from within
cache_ent_find_and_store(), we encounter the same deadlock due to
re-acquisition of umem_mutex.

Solve by releasing umem_mutex in dereg_mr() after umr_revoke_mr()
and before acquiring rb_lock. This ensures that we don&apos;t hold
umem_mutex while performing memory allocations that could trigger
the reclaim path.

This change prevents the deadlock by ensuring proper lock ordering and
avoiding holding locks during memory allocation operations that could
trigger the reclaim path.

The following lockdep warning demonstrates the deadlock:

 python3/20557 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888387542128 (&amp;umem_odp-&gt;umem_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x5b/0x550 [mlx5_ib]

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffff82f6b840 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
 unmap_vmas+0x7b/0x1a0

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -&gt; #3 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       fs_reclaim_acquire+0x60/0xd0
       mem_cgroup_css_alloc+0x6f/0x9b0
       cgroup_init_subsys+0xa4/0x240
       cgroup_init+0x1c8/0x510
       start_kernel+0x747/0x760
       x86_64_start_reservations+0x25/0x30
       x86_64_start_kernel+0x73/0x80
       common_startup_64+0x129/0x138

 -&gt; #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       fs_reclaim_acquire+0x91/0xd0
       __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x4d/0x4c0
       mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked+0x75/0x620 [mlx5_ib]
       mlx5_mkey_cache_init+0x186/0x360 [mlx5_ib]
       mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init+0x3c/0x60 [mlx5_ib]
       __mlx5_ib_add+0x4b/0x190 [mlx5_ib]
       mlx5r_probe+0xd9/0x320 [mlx5_ib]
       auxiliary_bus_probe+0x42/0x70
       really_probe+0xdb/0x360
       __driver_probe_device+0x8f/0x130
       driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xb0
       __driver_attach+0xd4/0x1f0
       bus_for_each_dev+0x79/0xd0
       bus_add_driver+0xf0/0x200
       driver_register+0x6e/0xc0
       __auxiliary_driver_register+0x6a/0xc0
       do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x390
       do_init_module+0x88/0x240
       init_module_from_file+0x85/0xc0
       idempotent_init_module+0x104/0x300
       __x64_sys_finit_module+0x68/0xc0
       do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 -&gt; #1 (&amp;dev-&gt;cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __mutex_lock+0x98/0xf10
       __mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x6f2/0x890 [mlx5_ib]
       mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x21/0x110 [mlx5_ib]
       ib_dereg_mr_user+0x85/0x1f0 [ib_core]
  
---truncated---(CVE-2025-38373)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits

Testing by the syzbot fuzzer showed that the HID core gets a
shift-out-of-bounds exception when it tries to convert a 32-bit
quantity to a 0-bit quantity.  Ideally this should never occur, but
there are buggy devices and some might have a report field with size
set to zero; we shouldn&apos;t reject the report or the device just because
of that.

Instead, harden the s32ton() routine so that it returns a reasonable
result instead of crashing when it is called with the number of bits
set to 0 -- the same as what snto32() does.(CVE-2025-38556)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Reject narrower access to pointer ctx fields

The following BPF program, simplified from a syzkaller repro, causes a
kernel warning:

    r0 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 169);
    exit;

With pointer field sk being at offset 168 in __sk_buff. This access is
detected as a narrower read in bpf_skb_is_valid_access because it
doesn&apos;t match offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk). It is therefore allowed
and later proceeds to bpf_convert_ctx_access. Note that for the
&quot;is_narrower_load&quot; case in the convert_ctx_accesses(), the insn-&gt;off
is aligned, so the cnt may not be 0 because it matches the
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk) in the bpf_convert_ctx_access. However,
the target_size stays 0 and the verifier errors with a kernel warning:

    verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion(1)

This patch fixes that to return a proper &quot;invalid bpf_context access
off=X size=Y&quot; error on the load instruction.

The same issue affects multiple other fields in context structures that
allow narrow access. Some other non-affected fields (for sk_msg,
sk_lookup, and sockopt) were also changed to use bpf_ctx_range_ptr for
consistency.

Note this syzkaller crash was reported in the &quot;Closes&quot; link below, which
used to be about a different bug, fixed in
commit fce7bd8e385a (&quot;bpf/verifier: Handle BPF_LOAD_ACQ instructions
in insn_def_regno()&quot;). Because syzbot somehow confused the two bugs,
the new crash and repro didn&apos;t get reported to the mailing list.(CVE-2025-38591)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gfs2: No more self recovery

When a node withdraws and it turns out that it is the only node that has
the filesystem mounted, gfs2 currently tries to replay the local journal
to bring the filesystem back into a consistent state.  Not only is that
a very bad idea, it has also never worked because gfs2_recover_func()
will refuse to do anything during a withdraw.

However, before even getting to this point, gfs2_recover_func()
dereferences sdp-&gt;sd_jdesc-&gt;jd_inode.  This was a use-after-free before
commit 04133b607a78 (&quot;gfs2: Prevent double iput for journal on error&quot;)
and is a NULL pointer dereference since then.

Simply get rid of self recovery to fix that.(CVE-2025-38659)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/net: commit partial buffers on retry

Ring provided buffers are potentially only valid within the single
execution context in which they were acquired. io_uring deals with this
and invalidates them on retry. But on the networking side, if
MSG_WAITALL is set, or if the socket is of the streaming type and too
little was processed, then it will hang on to the buffer rather than
recycle or commit it. This is problematic for two reasons:

1) If someone unregisters the provided buffer ring before a later retry,
   then the req-&gt;buf_list will no longer be valid.

2) If multiple sockers are using the same buffer group, then multiple
   receives can consume the same memory. This can cause data corruption
   in the application, as either receive could land in the same
   userspace buffer.

Fix this by disallowing partial retries from pinning a provided buffer
across multiple executions, if ring provided buffers are used.(CVE-2025-38730)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

media: rainshadow-cec: fix TOCTOU race condition in rain_interrupt()

In the interrupt handler rain_interrupt(), the buffer full check on
rain-&gt;buf_len is performed before acquiring rain-&gt;buf_lock. This
creates a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition, as
rain-&gt;buf_len is concurrently accessed and modified in the work
handler rain_irq_work_handler() under the same lock.

Multiple interrupt invocations can race, with each reading buf_len
before it becomes full and then proceeding. This can lead to both
interrupts attempting to write to the buffer, incrementing buf_len
beyond its capacity (DATA_SIZE) and causing a buffer overflow.

Fix this bug by moving the spin_lock() to before the buffer full
check. This ensures that the check and the subsequent buffer modification
are performed atomically, preventing the race condition. An corresponding
spin_unlock() is added to the overflow path to correctly release the
lock.

This possible bug was found by an experimental static analysis tool
developed by our team.(CVE-2025-39713)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu/amd/pgtbl: Fix possible race while increase page table level

The AMD IOMMU host page table implementation supports dynamic page table levels
(up to 6 levels), starting with a 3-level configuration that expands based on
IOVA address. The kernel maintains a root pointer and current page table level
to enable proper page table walks in alloc_pte()/fetch_pte() operations.

The IOMMU IOVA allocator initially starts with 32-bit address and onces its
exhuasted it switches to 64-bit address (max address is determined based
on IOMMU and device DMA capability). To support larger IOVA, AMD IOMMU
driver increases page table level.

But in unmap path (iommu_v1_unmap_pages()), fetch_pte() reads
pgtable-&gt;[root/mode] without lock. So its possible that in exteme corner case,
when increase_address_space() is updating pgtable-&gt;[root/mode], fetch_pte()
reads wrong page table level (pgtable-&gt;mode). It does compare the value with
level encoded in page table and returns NULL. This will result is
iommu_unmap ops to fail and upper layer may retry/log WARN_ON.

CPU 0                                         CPU 1
------                                       ------
map pages                                    unmap pages
alloc_pte() -&gt; increase_address_space()      iommu_v1_unmap_pages() -&gt; fetch_pte()
  pgtable-&gt;root = pte (new root value)
                                             READ pgtable-&gt;[mode/root]
					       Reads new root, old mode
  Updates mode (pgtable-&gt;mode += 1)

Since Page table level updates are infrequent and already synchronized with a
spinlock, implement seqcount to enable lock-free read operations on the read path.(CVE-2025-39961)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

pinctrl: check the return value of pinmux_ops::get_function_name()

While the API contract in docs doesn&apos;t specify it explicitly, the
generic implementation of the get_function_name() callback from struct
pinmux_ops - pinmux_generic_get_function_name() - can fail and return
NULL. This is already checked in pinmux_check_ops() so add a similar
check in pinmux_func_name_to_selector() instead of passing the returned
pointer right down to strcmp() where the NULL can get dereferenced. This
is normal operation when adding new pinfunctions.(CVE-2025-40030)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/sched: Fix potential double free in drm_sched_job_add_resv_dependencies

When adding dependencies with drm_sched_job_add_dependency(), that
function consumes the fence reference both on success and failure, so in
the latter case the dma_fence_put() on the error path (xarray failed to
expand) is a double free.

Interestingly this bug appears to have been present ever since
commit ebd5f74255b9 (&quot;drm/sched: Add dependency tracking&quot;), since the code
back then looked like this:

drm_sched_job_add_implicit_dependencies():
...
       for (i = 0; i &lt; fence_count; i++) {
               ret = drm_sched_job_add_dependency(job, fences[i]);
               if (ret)
                       break;
       }

       for (; i &lt; fence_count; i++)
               dma_fence_put(fences[i]);

Which means for the failing &apos;i&apos; the dma_fence_put was already a double
free. Possibly there were no users at that time, or the test cases were
insufficient to hit it.

The bug was then only noticed and fixed after
commit 9c2ba265352a (&quot;drm/scheduler: use new iterator in drm_sched_job_add_implicit_dependencies v2&quot;)
landed, with its fixup of
commit 4eaf02d6076c (&quot;drm/scheduler: fix drm_sched_job_add_implicit_dependencies&quot;).

At that point it was a slightly different flavour of a double free, which
commit 963d0b356935 (&quot;drm/scheduler: fix drm_sched_job_add_implicit_dependencies harder&quot;)
noticed and attempted to fix.

But it only moved the double free from happening inside the
drm_sched_job_add_dependency(), when releasing the reference not yet
obtained, to the caller, when releasing the reference already released by
the former in the failure case.

As such it is not easy to identify the right target for the fixes tag so
lets keep it simple and just continue the chain.

While fixing we also improve the comment and explain the reason for taking
the reference and not dropping it.(CVE-2025-40096)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfrm: delete x-&gt;tunnel as we delete x

The ipcomp fallback tunnels currently get deleted (from the various
lists and hashtables) as the last user state that needed that fallback
is destroyed (not deleted). If a reference to that user state still
exists, the fallback state will remain on the hashtables/lists,
triggering the WARN in xfrm_state_fini. Because of those remaining
references, the fix in commit f75a2804da39 (&quot;xfrm: destroy xfrm_state
synchronously on net exit path&quot;) is not complete.

We recently fixed one such situation in TCP due to defered freeing of
skbs (commit 9b6412e6979f (&quot;tcp: drop secpath at the same time as we
currently drop dst&quot;)). This can also happen due to IP reassembly: skbs
with a secpath remain on the reassembly queue until netns
destruction. If we can&apos;t guarantee that the queues are flushed by the
time xfrm_state_fini runs, there may still be references to a (user)
xfrm_state, preventing the timely deletion of the corresponding
fallback state.

Instead of chasing each instance of skbs holding a secpath one by one,
this patch fixes the issue directly within xfrm, by deleting the
fallback state as soon as the last user state depending on it has been
deleted. Destruction will still happen when the final reference is
dropped.

A separate lockdep class for the fallback state is required since
we&apos;re going to lock x-&gt;tunnel while x is locked.(CVE-2025-40215)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fuse: fix livelock in synchronous file put from fuseblk workers

I observed a hang when running generic/323 against a fuseblk server.
This test opens a file, initiates a lot of AIO writes to that file
descriptor, and closes the file descriptor before the writes complete.
Unsurprisingly, the AIO exerciser threads are mostly stuck waiting for
responses from the fuseblk server:

# cat /proc/372265/task/372313/stack
[&lt;0&gt;] request_wait_answer+0x1fe/0x2a0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] __fuse_simple_request+0xd3/0x2b0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] fuse_do_getattr+0xfc/0x1f0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] fuse_file_read_iter+0xbe/0x1c0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] aio_read+0x130/0x1e0
[&lt;0&gt;] io_submit_one+0x542/0x860
[&lt;0&gt;] __x64_sys_io_submit+0x98/0x1a0
[&lt;0&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x37/0xf0
[&lt;0&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

But the /weird/ part is that the fuseblk server threads are waiting for
responses from itself:

# cat /proc/372210/task/372232/stack
[&lt;0&gt;] request_wait_answer+0x1fe/0x2a0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] __fuse_simple_request+0xd3/0x2b0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] fuse_file_put+0x9a/0xd0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] fuse_release+0x36/0x50 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] __fput+0xec/0x2b0
[&lt;0&gt;] task_work_run+0x55/0x90
[&lt;0&gt;] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xe9/0x100
[&lt;0&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
[&lt;0&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

The fuseblk server is fuse2fs so there&apos;s nothing all that exciting in
the server itself.  So why is the fuse server calling fuse_file_put?
The commit message for the fstest sheds some light on that:

&quot;By closing the file descriptor before calling io_destroy, you pretty
much guarantee that the last put on the ioctx will be done in interrupt
context (during I/O completion).

Aha.  AIO fgets a new struct file from the fd when it queues the ioctx.
The completion of the FUSE_WRITE command from userspace causes the fuse
server to call the AIO completion function.  The completion puts the
struct file, queuing a delayed fput to the fuse server task.  When the
fuse server task returns to userspace, it has to run the delayed fput,
which in the case of a fuseblk server, it does synchronously.

Sending the FUSE_RELEASE command sychronously from fuse server threads
is a bad idea because a client program can initiate enough simultaneous
AIOs such that all the fuse server threads end up in delayed_fput, and
now there aren&apos;t any threads left to handle the queued fuse commands.

Fix this by only using asynchronous fputs when closing files, and leave
a comment explaining why.(CVE-2025-40220)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs/notify: call exportfs_encode_fid with s_umount

Calling intotify_show_fdinfo() on fd watching an overlayfs inode, while
the overlayfs is being unmounted, can lead to dereferencing NULL ptr.

This issue was found by syzkaller.

Race Condition Diagram:

Thread 1                           Thread 2
--------                           --------

generic_shutdown_super()
 shrink_dcache_for_umount
  sb-&gt;s_root = NULL

                    |
                    |             vfs_read()
                    |              inotify_fdinfo()
                    |               * inode get from mark *
                    |               show_mark_fhandle(m, inode)
                    |                exportfs_encode_fid(inode, ..)
                    |                 ovl_encode_fh(inode, ..)
                    |                  ovl_check_encode_origin(inode)
                    |                   * deref i_sb-&gt;s_root *
                    |
                    |
                    v
 fsnotify_sb_delete(sb)

Which then leads to:

[   32.133461] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
[   32.134438] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
[   32.135032] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 4468 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.17.0-rc6 #22 PREEMPT(none)

&lt;snip registers, unreliable trace&gt;

[   32.143353] Call Trace:
[   32.143732]  ovl_encode_fh+0xd5/0x170
[   32.144031]  exportfs_encode_inode_fh+0x12f/0x300
[   32.144425]  show_mark_fhandle+0xbe/0x1f0
[   32.145805]  inotify_fdinfo+0x226/0x2d0
[   32.146442]  inotify_show_fdinfo+0x1c5/0x350
[   32.147168]  seq_show+0x530/0x6f0
[   32.147449]  seq_read_iter+0x503/0x12a0
[   32.148419]  seq_read+0x31f/0x410
[   32.150714]  vfs_read+0x1f0/0x9e0
[   32.152297]  ksys_read+0x125/0x240

IOW ovl_check_encode_origin derefs inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_root, after it was set
to NULL in the unmount path.

Fix it by protecting calling exportfs_encode_fid() from
show_mark_fhandle() with s_umount lock.

This form of fix was suggested by Amir in [1].

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAOQ4uxhbDwhb+2Brs1UdkoF0a3NSdBAOQPNfEHjahrgoKJpLEw@mail.gmail.com/(CVE-2025-40237)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gfs2: Fix unlikely race in gdlm_put_lock

In gdlm_put_lock(), there is a small window of time in which the
DFL_UNMOUNT flag has been set but the lockspace hasn&apos;t been released,
yet.  In that window, dlm may still call gdlm_ast() and gdlm_bast().
To prevent it from dereferencing freed glock objects, only free the
glock if the lockspace has actually been released.(CVE-2025-40242)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

devlink: rate: Unset parent pointer in devl_rate_nodes_destroy

The function devl_rate_nodes_destroy is documented to &quot;Unset parent for
all rate objects&quot;. However, it was only calling the driver-specific
`rate_leaf_parent_set` or `rate_node_parent_set` ops and decrementing
the parent&apos;s refcount, without actually setting the
`devlink_rate-&gt;parent` pointer to NULL.

This leaves a dangling pointer in the `devlink_rate` struct, which cause
refcount error in netdevsim[1] and mlx5[2]. In addition, this is
inconsistent with the behavior of `devlink_nl_rate_parent_node_set`,
where the parent pointer is correctly cleared.

This patch fixes the issue by explicitly setting `devlink_rate-&gt;parent`
to NULL after notifying the driver, thus fulfilling the function&apos;s
documented behavior for all rate objects.

[1]
repro steps:
echo 1 &gt; /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device
devlink dev eswitch set netdevsim/netdevsim1 mode switchdev
echo 1 &gt; /sys/bus/netdevsim/devices/netdevsim1/sriov_numvfs
devlink port function rate add netdevsim/netdevsim1/test_node
devlink port function rate set netdevsim/netdevsim1/128 parent test_node
echo 1 &gt; /sys/bus/netdevsim/del_device

dmesg:
refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 1530 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x42/0xe0
CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 1530 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4+ #1 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x42/0xe0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 devl_rate_leaf_destroy+0x8d/0x90
 __nsim_dev_port_del+0x6c/0x70 [netdevsim]
 nsim_dev_reload_destroy+0x11c/0x140 [netdevsim]
 nsim_drv_remove+0x2b/0xb0 [netdevsim]
 device_release_driver_internal+0x194/0x1f0
 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
 device_del+0x159/0x3c0
 device_unregister+0x1a/0x60
 del_device_store+0x111/0x170 [netdevsim]
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12e/0x1e0
 vfs_write+0x215/0x3d0
 ksys_write+0x5f/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x10f0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

[2]
devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:08:00.0 mode switchdev
devlink port add pci/0000:08:00.0 flavour pcisf pfnum 0 sfnum 1000
devlink port function rate add pci/0000:08:00.0/group1
devlink port function rate set pci/0000:08:00.0/32768 parent group1
modprobe -r mlx5_ib mlx5_fwctl mlx5_core

dmesg:
refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 16151 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x42/0xe0
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 16151 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.17.0-rc7_for_upstream_min_debug_2025_10_02_12_44 #1 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x42/0xe0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 devl_rate_leaf_destroy+0x8d/0x90
 mlx5_esw_offloads_devlink_port_unregister+0x33/0x60 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_esw_offloads_unload_rep+0x3f/0x50 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_eswitch_unload_sf_vport+0x40/0x90 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_sf_esw_event+0xc4/0x120 [mlx5_core]
 notifier_call_chain+0x33/0xa0
 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x3b/0x50
 mlx5_eswitch_disable_locked+0x50/0x110 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_eswitch_disable+0x63/0x90 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_unload+0x1d/0x170 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_uninit_one+0xa2/0x130 [mlx5_core]
 remove_one+0x78/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
 pci_device_remove+0x39/0xa0
 device_release_driver_internal+0x194/0x1f0
 unbind_store+0x99/0xa0
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12e/0x1e0
 vfs_write+0x215/0x3d0
 ksys_write+0x5f/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0x53/0x1f0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53(CVE-2025-40251)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs/proc: fix uaf in proc_readdir_de()

Pde is erased from subdir rbtree through rb_erase(), but not set the node
to EMPTY, which may result in uaf access.  We should use RB_CLEAR_NODE()
set the erased node to EMPTY, then pde_subdir_next() will return NULL to
avoid uaf access.

We found an uaf issue while using stress-ng testing, need to run testcase
getdent and tun in the same time.  The steps of the issue is as follows:

1) use getdent to traverse dir /proc/pid/net/dev_snmp6/, and current
   pde is tun3;

2) in the [time windows] unregister netdevice tun3 and tun2, and erase
   them from rbtree.  erase tun3 first, and then erase tun2.  the
   pde(tun2) will be released to slab;

3) continue to getdent process, then pde_subdir_next() will return
   pde(tun2) which is released, it will case uaf access.

CPU 0                                      |    CPU 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
traverse dir /proc/pid/net/dev_snmp6/      |   unregister_netdevice(tun-&gt;dev)   //tun3 tun2
sys_getdents64()                           |
  iterate_dir()                            |
    proc_readdir()                         |
      proc_readdir_de()                    |     snmp6_unregister_dev()
        pde_get(de);                       |       proc_remove()
        read_unlock(&amp;proc_subdir_lock);    |         remove_proc_subtree()
                                           |           write_lock(&amp;proc_subdir_lock);
        [time window]                      |           rb_erase(&amp;root-&gt;subdir_node, &amp;parent-&gt;subdir);
                                           |           write_unlock(&amp;proc_subdir_lock);
        read_lock(&amp;proc_subdir_lock);      |
        next = pde_subdir_next(de);        |
        pde_put(de);                       |
        de = next;    //UAF                |

rbtree of dev_snmp6
                        |
                    pde(tun3)
                     /    \
                  NULL  pde(tun2)(CVE-2025-40271)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/secretmem: fix use-after-free race in fault handler

When a page fault occurs in a secret memory file created with
`memfd_secret(2)`, the kernel will allocate a new folio for it, mark the
underlying page as not-present in the direct map, and add it to the file
mapping.

If two tasks cause a fault in the same page concurrently, both could end
up allocating a folio and removing the page from the direct map, but only
one would succeed in adding the folio to the file mapping.  The task that
failed undoes the effects of its attempt by (a) freeing the folio again
and (b) putting the page back into the direct map.  However, by doing
these two operations in this order, the page becomes available to the
allocator again before it is placed back in the direct mapping.

If another task attempts to allocate the page between (a) and (b), and the
kernel tries to access it via the direct map, it would result in a
supervisor not-present page fault.

Fix the ordering to restore the direct map before the folio is freed.(CVE-2025-40272)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/vmwgfx: Validate command header size against SVGA_CMD_MAX_DATASIZE

This data originates from userspace and is used in buffer offset
calculations which could potentially overflow causing an out-of-bounds
access.(CVE-2025-40277)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix OOB access in parse_adv_monitor_pattern()

In the parse_adv_monitor_pattern() function, the value of
the &apos;length&apos; variable is currently limited to HCI_MAX_EXT_AD_LENGTH(251).
The size of the &apos;value&apos; array in the mgmt_adv_pattern structure is 31.
If the value of &apos;pattern[i].length&apos; is set in the user space
and exceeds 31, the &apos;patterns[i].value&apos; array can be accessed
out of bound when copied.

Increasing the size of the &apos;value&apos; array in
the &apos;mgmt_adv_pattern&apos; structure will break the userspace.
Considering this, and to avoid OOB access revert the limits for &apos;offset&apos;
and &apos;length&apos; back to the value of HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH.

Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center
(linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-40294)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_event: validate skb length for unknown CC opcode

In hci_cmd_complete_evt(), if the command complete event has an unknown
opcode, we assume the first byte of the remaining skb-&gt;data contains the
return status. However, parameter data has previously been pulled in
hci_event_func(), which may leave the skb empty. If so, using skb-&gt;data[0]
for the return status uses un-init memory.

The fix is to check skb-&gt;len before using skb-&gt;data.(CVE-2025-40301)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: bcsp: receive data only if registered

Currently, bcsp_recv() can be called even when the BCSP protocol has not
been registered. This leads to a NULL pointer dereference, as shown in
the following stack trace:

    KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000108-0x000000000000010f]
    RIP: 0010:bcsp_recv+0x13d/0x1740 drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c:590
    Call Trace:
     &lt;TASK&gt;
     hci_uart_tty_receive+0x194/0x220 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c:627
     tiocsti+0x23c/0x2c0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2290
     tty_ioctl+0x626/0xde0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2706
     vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
     __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
     __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
     do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
     do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

To prevent this, ensure that the HCI_UART_REGISTERED flag is set before
processing received data. If the protocol is not registered, return
-EUNATCH.(CVE-2025-40308)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix race in hci_cmd_sync_dequeue_once

hci_cmd_sync_dequeue_once() does lookup and then cancel
the entry under two separate lock sections. Meanwhile,
hci_cmd_sync_work() can also delete the same entry,
leading to double list_del() and &quot;UAF&quot;.

Fix this by holding cmd_sync_work_lock across both
lookup and cancel, so that the entry cannot be removed
concurrently.(CVE-2025-40318)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

futex: Don&apos;t leak robust_list pointer on exec race

sys_get_robust_list() and compat_get_robust_list() use ptrace_may_access()
to check if the calling task is allowed to access another task&apos;s
robust_list pointer. This check is racy against a concurrent exec() in the
target process.

During exec(), a task may transition from a non-privileged binary to a
privileged one (e.g., setuid binary) and its credentials/memory mappings
may change. If get_robust_list() performs ptrace_may_access() before
this transition, it may erroneously allow access to sensitive information
after the target becomes privileged.

A racy access allows an attacker to exploit a window during which
ptrace_may_access() passes before a target process transitions to a
privileged state via exec().

For example, consider a non-privileged task T that is about to execute a
setuid-root binary. An attacker task A calls get_robust_list(T) while T
is still unprivileged. Since ptrace_may_access() checks permissions
based on current credentials, it succeeds. However, if T begins exec
immediately afterwards, it becomes privileged and may change its memory
mappings. Because get_robust_list() proceeds to access T-&gt;robust_list
without synchronizing with exec() it may read user-space pointers from a
now-privileged process.

This violates the intended post-exec access restrictions and could
expose sensitive memory addresses or be used as a primitive in a larger
exploit chain. Consequently, the race can lead to unauthorized
disclosure of information across privilege boundaries and poses a
potential security risk.

Take a read lock on signal-&gt;exec_update_lock prior to invoking
ptrace_may_access() and accessing the robust_list/compat_robust_list.
This ensures that the target task&apos;s exec state remains stable during the
check, allowing for consistent and synchronized validation of
credentials.(CVE-2025-40341)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvme-fc: use lock accessing port_state and rport state

nvme_fc_unregister_remote removes the remote port on a lport object at
any point in time when there is no active association. This races with
with the reconnect logic, because nvme_fc_create_association is not
taking a lock to check the port_state and atomically increase the
active count on the rport.(CVE-2025-40342)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvmet-fc: avoid scheduling association deletion twice

When forcefully shutting down a port via the configfs interface,
nvmet_port_subsys_drop_link() first calls nvmet_port_del_ctrls() and
then nvmet_disable_port(). Both functions will eventually schedule all
remaining associations for deletion.

The current implementation checks whether an association is about to be
removed, but only after the work item has already been scheduled. As a
result, it is possible for the first scheduled work item to free all
resources, and then for the same work item to be scheduled again for
deletion.

Because the association list is an RCU list, it is not possible to take
a lock and remove the list entry directly, so it cannot be looked up
again. Instead, a flag (terminating) must be used to determine whether
the association is already in the process of being deleted.(CVE-2025-40343)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

arch_topology: Fix incorrect error check in topology_parse_cpu_capacity()

Fix incorrect use of PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO() in topology_parse_cpu_capacity()
which causes the code to proceed with NULL clock pointers. The current
logic uses !PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cpu_clk) which evaluates to true for both
valid pointers and NULL, leading to potential NULL pointer dereference
in clk_get_rate().

Per include/linux/err.h documentation, PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(ptr) returns:
&quot;The error code within @ptr if it is an error pointer; 0 otherwise.&quot;

This means PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO() returns 0 for both valid pointers AND NULL
pointers. Therefore !PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cpu_clk) evaluates to true (proceed)
when cpu_clk is either valid or NULL, causing clk_get_rate(NULL) to be
called when of_clk_get() returns NULL.

Replace with !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(cpu_clk) which only proceeds for valid
pointers, preventing potential NULL pointer dereference in clk_get_rate().(CVE-2025-40346)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

hfsplus: fix KMSAN uninit-value issue in hfsplus_delete_cat()

The syzbot reported issue in hfsplus_delete_cat():

[   70.682285][ T9333] =====================================================
[   70.682943][ T9333] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hfsplus_subfolders_dec+0x1d7/0x220
[   70.683640][ T9333]  hfsplus_subfolders_dec+0x1d7/0x220
[   70.684141][ T9333]  hfsplus_delete_cat+0x105d/0x12b0
[   70.684621][ T9333]  hfsplus_rmdir+0x13d/0x310
[   70.685048][ T9333]  vfs_rmdir+0x5ba/0x810
[   70.685447][ T9333]  do_rmdir+0x964/0xea0
[   70.685833][ T9333]  __x64_sys_rmdir+0x71/0xb0
[   70.686260][ T9333]  x64_sys_call+0xcd8/0x3cf0
[   70.686695][ T9333]  do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0
[   70.687119][ T9333]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   70.687646][ T9333]
[   70.687856][ T9333] Uninit was stored to memory at:
[   70.688311][ T9333]  hfsplus_subfolders_inc+0x1c2/0x1d0
[   70.688779][ T9333]  hfsplus_create_cat+0x148e/0x1800
[   70.689231][ T9333]  hfsplus_mknod+0x27f/0x600
[   70.689730][ T9333]  hfsplus_mkdir+0x5a/0x70
[   70.690146][ T9333]  vfs_mkdir+0x483/0x7a0
[   70.690545][ T9333]  do_mkdirat+0x3f2/0xd30
[   70.690944][ T9333]  __x64_sys_mkdir+0x9a/0xf0
[   70.691380][ T9333]  x64_sys_call+0x2f89/0x3cf0
[   70.691816][ T9333]  do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0
[   70.692229][ T9333]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   70.692773][ T9333]
[   70.692990][ T9333] Uninit was stored to memory at:
[   70.693469][ T9333]  hfsplus_subfolders_inc+0x1c2/0x1d0
[   70.693960][ T9333]  hfsplus_create_cat+0x148e/0x1800
[   70.694438][ T9333]  hfsplus_fill_super+0x21c1/0x2700
[   70.694911][ T9333]  mount_bdev+0x37b/0x530
[   70.695320][ T9333]  hfsplus_mount+0x4d/0x60
[   70.695729][ T9333]  legacy_get_tree+0x113/0x2c0
[   70.696167][ T9333]  vfs_get_tree+0xb3/0x5c0
[   70.696588][ T9333]  do_new_mount+0x73e/0x1630
[   70.697013][ T9333]  path_mount+0x6e3/0x1eb0
[   70.697425][ T9333]  __se_sys_mount+0x733/0x830
[   70.697857][ T9333]  __x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x150
[   70.698269][ T9333]  x64_sys_call+0x2691/0x3cf0
[   70.698704][ T9333]  do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0
[   70.699117][ T9333]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   70.699730][ T9333]
[   70.699946][ T9333] Uninit was created at:
[   70.700378][ T9333]  __alloc_pages_noprof+0x714/0xe60
[   70.700843][ T9333]  alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x2a2/0x9b0
[   70.701331][ T9333]  alloc_pages_noprof+0xf8/0x1f0
[   70.701774][ T9333]  allocate_slab+0x30e/0x1390
[   70.702194][ T9333]  ___slab_alloc+0x1049/0x33a0
[   70.702635][ T9333]  kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x5ce/0xb20
[   70.703153][ T9333]  hfsplus_alloc_inode+0x5a/0xd0
[   70.703598][ T9333]  alloc_inode+0x82/0x490
[   70.703984][ T9333]  iget_locked+0x22e/0x1320
[   70.704428][ T9333]  hfsplus_iget+0x5c/0xba0
[   70.704827][ T9333]  hfsplus_btree_open+0x135/0x1dd0
[   70.705291][ T9333]  hfsplus_fill_super+0x1132/0x2700
[   70.705776][ T9333]  mount_bdev+0x37b/0x530
[   70.706171][ T9333]  hfsplus_mount+0x4d/0x60
[   70.706579][ T9333]  legacy_get_tree+0x113/0x2c0
[   70.707019][ T9333]  vfs_get_tree+0xb3/0x5c0
[   70.707444][ T9333]  do_new_mount+0x73e/0x1630
[   70.707865][ T9333]  path_mount+0x6e3/0x1eb0
[   70.708270][ T9333]  __se_sys_mount+0x733/0x830
[   70.708711][ T9333]  __x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x150
[   70.709158][ T9333]  x64_sys_call+0x2691/0x3cf0
[   70.709630][ T9333]  do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0
[   70.710053][ T9333]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   70.710611][ T9333]
[   70.710842][ T9333] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9333 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-dirty #17
[   70.711568][ T9333] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   70.712490][ T9333] =====================================================
[   70.713085][ T9333] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[   70.713618][ T9333] Kernel panic - not syncing: kmsan.panic set ...
[   70.714159][ T9333] 
---truncated---(CVE-2025-40351)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

riscv: stacktrace: Disable KASAN checks for non-current tasks

Unwinding the stack of a task other than current, KASAN would report
&quot;BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in walk_stackframe+0x41c/0x460&quot;

There is a same issue on x86 and has been resolved by the commit
84936118bdf3 (&quot;x86/unwind: Disable KASAN checks for non-current tasks&quot;)
The solution could be applied to RISC-V too.

This patch also can solve the issue:
https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2025/q4/23

[(CVE-2025-40358)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

perf/x86/intel: Fix KASAN global-out-of-bounds warning

When running &quot;perf mem record&quot; command on CWF, the below KASAN
global-out-of-bounds warning is seen.

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in cmt_latency_data+0x176/0x1b0
  Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffb721d000 by task dtlb/9850

  Call Trace:

   kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
   cmt_latency_data+0x176/0x1b0
   setup_arch_pebs_sample_data+0xf49/0x2560
   intel_pmu_drain_arch_pebs+0x577/0xb00
   handle_pmi_common+0x6c4/0xc80

The issue is caused by below code in __grt_latency_data(). The code
tries to access x86_hybrid_pmu structure which doesn&apos;t exist on
non-hybrid platform like CWF.

        WARN_ON_ONCE(hybrid_pmu(event-&gt;pmu)-&gt;pmu_type == hybrid_big)

So add is_hybrid() check before calling this WARN_ON_ONCE to fix the
global-out-of-bounds access issue.(CVE-2025-40359)

Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.(CVE-2025-40361)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/fpu: Ensure XFD state on signal delivery

Sean reported [1] the following splat when running KVM tests:

   WARNING: CPU: 232 PID: 15391 at xfd_validate_state+0x65/0x70
   Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    fpu__clear_user_states+0x9c/0x100
    arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x142/0x210
    exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x55/0x100
    do_syscall_64+0x205/0x2c0
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Chao further identified [2] a reproducible scenario involving signal
delivery: a non-AMX task is preempted by an AMX-enabled task which
modifies the XFD MSR.

When the non-AMX task resumes and reloads XSTATE with init values,
a warning is triggered due to a mismatch between fpstate::xfd and the
CPU&apos;s current XFD state. fpu__clear_user_states() does not currently
re-synchronize the XFD state after such preemption.

Invoke xfd_update_state() which detects and corrects the mismatch if
there is a dynamic feature.

This also benefits the sigreturn path, as fpu__restore_sig() may call
fpu__clear_user_states() when the sigframe is inaccessible.

[ dhansen: minor changelog munging ](CVE-2025-68171)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ftrace: Fix softlockup in ftrace_module_enable

A soft lockup was observed when loading amdgpu module.
If a module has a lot of tracable functions, multiple calls
to kallsyms_lookup can spend too much time in RCU critical
section and with disabled preemption, causing kernel panic.
This is the same issue that was fixed in
commit d0b24b4e91fc (&quot;ftrace: Prevent RCU stall on PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY
kernels&quot;) and commit 42ea22e754ba (&quot;ftrace: Add cond_resched() to
ftrace_graph_set_hash()&quot;).

Fix it the same way by adding cond_resched() in ftrace_module_enable.(CVE-2025-68173)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

amd/amdkfd: enhance kfd process check in switch partition

current switch partition only check if kfd_processes_table is empty.
kfd_prcesses_table entry is deleted in kfd_process_notifier_release, but
kfd_process tear down is in kfd_process_wq_release.

consider two processes:

Process A (workqueue) -&gt; kfd_process_wq_release -&gt; Access kfd_node member
Process B switch partition -&gt; amdgpu_xcp_pre_partition_switch -&gt; amdgpu_amdkfd_device_fini_sw
-&gt; kfd_node tear down.

Process A and B may trigger a race as shown in dmesg log.

This patch is to resolve the race by adding an atomic kfd_process counter
kfd_processes_count, it increment as create kfd process, decrement as
finish kfd_process_wq_release.

v2: Put kfd_processes_count per kfd_dev, move decrement to kfd_process_destroy_pdds
and bug fix. (Philip Yang)

[3966658.307702] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[3966658.350818]  i10nm_edac
[3966658.356318] CPU: 124 PID: 38435 Comm: kworker/124:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted
[3966658.356890] Workqueue: kfd_process_wq kfd_process_wq_release [amdgpu]
[3966658.362839]  nfit
[3966658.366457] RIP: 0010:kfd_get_num_sdma_engines+0x17/0x40 [amdgpu]
[3966658.366460] Code: 00 00 e9 ac 81 02 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 4f 08 48 8b b7 00 01 00 00 8b 81 58 26 03 00 99 &lt;f7&gt; be b8 01 00 00 80 b9 70 2e 00 00 00 74 0b 83 f8 02 ba 02 00 00
[3966658.380967]  x86_pkg_temp_thermal
[3966658.391529] RSP: 0018:ffffc900a0edfdd8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[3966658.391531] RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8974e593b800 RCX: ffff888645900000
[3966658.391531] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888129154400 RDI: ffff888129151c00
[3966658.391532] RBP: ffff8883ad79d400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8890d2750af4
[3966658.391532] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: 0000000000000018 R12: 0000000000000000
[3966658.391533] R13: ffff8883ad79d400 R14: ffffe87ff662ba00 R15: ffff8974e593b800
[3966658.391533] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88fe7f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[3966658.391534] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[3966658.391534] CR2: 0000000000d71000 CR3: 000000dd0e970004 CR4: 0000000002770ee0
[3966658.391535] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[3966658.391535] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[3966658.391536] PKRU: 55555554
[3966658.391536] Call Trace:
[3966658.391674]  deallocate_sdma_queue+0x38/0xa0 [amdgpu]
[3966658.391762]  process_termination_cpsch+0x1ed/0x480 [amdgpu]
[3966658.399754]  intel_powerclamp
[3966658.402831]  kfd_process_dequeue_from_all_devices+0x5b/0xc0 [amdgpu]
[3966658.402908]  kfd_process_wq_release+0x1a/0x1a0 [amdgpu]
[3966658.410516]  coretemp
[3966658.434016]  process_one_work+0x1ad/0x380
[3966658.434021]  worker_thread+0x49/0x310
[3966658.438963]  kvm_intel
[3966658.446041]  ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
[3966658.446045]  kthread+0x118/0x140
[3966658.446047]  ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
[3966658.446050]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[3966658.446053] Modules linked in: kpatch_20765354(OEK)
[3966658.455310]  kvm
[3966658.464534]  mptcp_diag xsk_diag raw_diag unix_diag af_packet_diag netlink_diag udp_diag act_pedit act_mirred act_vlan cls_flower kpatch_21951273(OEK) kpatch_18424469(OEK) kpatch_19749756(OEK)
[3966658.473462]  idxd_mdev
[3966658.482306]  kpatch_17971294(OEK) sch_ingress xt_conntrack amdgpu(OE) amdxcp(OE) amddrm_buddy(OE) amd_sched(OE) amdttm(OE) amdkcl(OE) intel_ifs iptable_mangle tcm_loop target_core_pscsi tcp_diag target_core_file inet_diag target_core_iblock target_core_user target_core_mod coldpgs kpatch_18383292(OEK) ip6table_nat ip6table_filter ip6_tables ip_set_hash_ipportip ip_set_hash_ipportnet ip_set_hash_ipport ip_set_bitmap_port xt_comment iptable_nat nf_nat iptable_filter ip_tables ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 sn_core_odd(OE) i40e overlay binfmt_misc tun bonding(OE) aisqos(OE) aisqo
---truncated---(CVE-2025-68174)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

PCI: cadence: Check for the existence of cdns_pcie::ops before using it

cdns_pcie::ops might not be populated by all the Cadence glue drivers. This
is going to be true for the upcoming Sophgo platform which doesn&apos;t set the
ops.

Hence, add a check to prevent NULL pointer dereference.

[mani: reworded subject and description](CVE-2025-68176)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tcp: use dst_dev_rcu() in tcp_fastopen_active_disable_ofo_check()

Use RCU to avoid a pair of atomic operations and a potential
UAF on dst_dev()-&gt;flags.(CVE-2025-68188)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Add bpf_prog_run_data_pointers()

syzbot found that cls_bpf_classify() is able to change
tc_skb_cb(skb)-&gt;drop_reason triggering a warning in sk_skb_reason_drop().

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5965 at net/core/skbuff.c:1192 __sk_skb_reason_drop net/core/skbuff.c:1189 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5965 at net/core/skbuff.c:1192 sk_skb_reason_drop+0x76/0x170 net/core/skbuff.c:1214

struct tc_skb_cb has been added in commit ec624fe740b4 (&quot;net/sched:
Extend qdisc control block with tc control block&quot;), which added a wrong
interaction with db58ba459202 (&quot;bpf: wire in data and data_end for
cls_act_bpf&quot;).

drop_reason was added later.

Add bpf_prog_run_data_pointers() helper to save/restore the net_sched
storage colliding with BPF data_meta/data_end.(CVE-2025-68200)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nft_ct: add seqadj extension for natted connections

Sequence adjustment may be required for FTP traffic with PASV/EPSV modes.
due to need to re-write packet payload (IP, port) on the ftp control
connection. This can require changes to the TCP length and expected
seq / ack_seq.

The easiest way to reproduce this issue is with PASV mode.
Example ruleset:
table inet ftp_nat {
        ct helper ftp_helper {
                type &quot;ftp&quot; protocol tcp
                l3proto inet
        }

        chain prerouting {
                type filter hook prerouting priority 0; policy accept;
                tcp dport 21 ct state new ct helper set &quot;ftp_helper&quot;
        }
}
table ip nat {
        chain prerouting {
                type nat hook prerouting priority -100; policy accept;
                tcp dport 21 dnat ip prefix to ip daddr map {
			192.168.100.1 : 192.168.13.2/32 }
        }

        chain postrouting {
                type nat hook postrouting priority 100 ; policy accept;
                tcp sport 21 snat ip prefix to ip saddr map {
			192.168.13.2 : 192.168.100.1/32 }
        }
}

Note that the ftp helper gets assigned *after* the dnat setup.

The inverse (nat after helper assign) is handled by an existing
check in nf_nat_setup_info() and will not show the problem.

Topoloy:

 +-------------------+     +----------------------------------+
 | FTP: 192.168.13.2 | &lt;-&gt; | NAT: 192.168.13.3, 192.168.100.1 |
 +-------------------+     +----------------------------------+
                                      |
                         +-----------------------+
                         | Client: 192.168.100.2 |
                         +-----------------------+

ftp nat changes do not work as expected in this case:
Connected to 192.168.100.1.
[..]
ftp&gt; epsv
EPSV/EPRT on IPv4 off.
ftp&gt; ls
227 Entering passive mode (192,168,100,1,209,129).
421 Service not available, remote server has closed connection.

Kernel logs:
Missing nfct_seqadj_ext_add() setup call
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_seqadj.c:41
[..]
 __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet+0x100/0x160 [nf_nat]
 nf_nat_ftp+0x142/0x280 [nf_nat_ftp]
 help+0x4d1/0x880 [nf_conntrack_ftp]
 nf_confirm+0x122/0x2e0 [nf_conntrack]
 nf_hook_slow+0x3c/0xb0
 ..

Fix this by adding the required extension when a conntrack helper is assigned
to a connection that has a nat binding.(CVE-2025-68206)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: account for current allocated stack depth in widen_imprecise_scalars()

The usage pattern for widen_imprecise_scalars() looks as follows:

    prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, ...);
    queued_st = push_stack(...);
    widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st);

Where prev_st is an ancestor of the queued_st in the explored states
tree. This ancestor is not guaranteed to have same allocated stack
depth as queued_st. E.g. in the following case:

    def main():
      for i in 1..2:
        foo(i)        // same callsite, differnt param

    def foo(i):
      if i == 1:
        use 128 bytes of stack
      iterator based loop

Here, for a second &apos;foo&apos; call prev_st-&gt;allocated_stack is 128,
while queued_st-&gt;allocated_stack is much smaller.
widen_imprecise_scalars() needs to take this into account and avoid
accessing bpf_verifier_state-&gt;frame[*]-&gt;stack out of bounds.(CVE-2025-68208)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

timers: Fix NULL function pointer race in timer_shutdown_sync()

There is a race condition between timer_shutdown_sync() and timer
expiration that can lead to hitting a WARN_ON in expire_timers().

The issue occurs when timer_shutdown_sync() clears the timer function
to NULL while the timer is still running on another CPU. The race
scenario looks like this:

CPU0					CPU1
					&lt;SOFTIRQ&gt;
					lock_timer_base()
					expire_timers()
					base-&gt;running_timer = timer;
					unlock_timer_base()
					[call_timer_fn enter]
					mod_timer()
					...
timer_shutdown_sync()
lock_timer_base()
// For now, will not detach the timer but only clear its function to NULL
if (base-&gt;running_timer != timer)
	ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true);
if (shutdown)
	timer-&gt;function = NULL;
unlock_timer_base()
					[call_timer_fn exit]
					lock_timer_base()
					base-&gt;running_timer = NULL;
					unlock_timer_base()
					...
					// Now timer is pending while its function set to NULL.
					// next timer trigger
					&lt;SOFTIRQ&gt;
					expire_timers()
					WARN_ON_ONCE(!fn) // hit
					...
lock_timer_base()
// Now timer will detach
if (base-&gt;running_timer != timer)
	ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true);
if (shutdown)
	timer-&gt;function = NULL;
unlock_timer_base()

The problem is that timer_shutdown_sync() clears the timer function
regardless of whether the timer is currently running. This can leave a
pending timer with a NULL function pointer, which triggers the
WARN_ON_ONCE(!fn) check in expire_timers().

Fix this by only clearing the timer function when actually detaching the
timer. If the timer is running, leave the function pointer intact, which is
safe because the timer will be properly detached when it finishes running.(CVE-2025-68214)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nouveau/firmware: Add missing kfree() of nvkm_falcon_fw::boot

nvkm_falcon_fw::boot is allocated, but no one frees it. This causes a
kmemleak warning.

Make sure this data is deallocated.(CVE-2025-68235)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: SVM: Don&apos;t skip unrelated instruction if INT3/INTO is replaced

When re-injecting a soft interrupt from an INT3, INT0, or (select) INTn
instruction, discard the exception and retry the instruction if the code
stream is changed (e.g. by a different vCPU) between when the CPU
executes the instruction and when KVM decodes the instruction to get the
next RIP.

As effectively predicted by commit 6ef88d6e36c2 (&quot;KVM: SVM: Re-inject
INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction&quot;), failure to verify that
the correct INTn instruction was decoded can effectively clobber guest
state due to decoding the wrong instruction and thus specifying the
wrong next RIP.

The bug most often manifests as &quot;Oops: int3&quot; panics on static branch
checks in Linux guests.  Enabling or disabling a static branch in Linux
uses the kernel&apos;s &quot;text poke&quot; code patching mechanism.  To modify code
while other CPUs may be executing that code, Linux (temporarily)
replaces the first byte of the original instruction with an int3 (opcode
0xcc), then patches in the new code stream except for the first byte,
and finally replaces the int3 with the first byte of the new code
stream.  If a CPU hits the int3, i.e. executes the code while it&apos;s being
modified, then the guest kernel must look up the RIP to determine how to
handle the #BP, e.g. by emulating the new instruction.  If the RIP is
incorrect, then this lookup fails and the guest kernel panics.

The bug reproduces almost instantly by hacking the guest kernel to
repeatedly check a static branch[1] while running a drgn script[2] on
the host to constantly swap out the memory containing the guest&apos;s TSS.

[1]: https://gist.github.com/osandov/44d17c51c28c0ac998ea0334edf90b5a
[2]: https://gist.github.com/osandov/10e45e45afa29b11e0c7209247afc00b(CVE-2025-68259)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: add i_data_sem protection in ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock()

Fix a race between inline data destruction and block mapping.

The function ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock() changes the inode data
layout by clearing EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA and setting EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS.
At the same time, another thread may execute ext4_map_blocks(), which
tests EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS to decide whether to call ext4_ext_map_blocks()
or ext4_ind_map_blocks().

Without i_data_sem protection, ext4_ind_map_blocks() may receive inode
with EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS flag and triggering assert.

kernel BUG at fs/ext4/indirect.c:546!
EXT4-fs (loop2): unmounting filesystem.
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ext4_ind_map_blocks.cold+0x2b/0x5a fs/ext4/indirect.c:546

Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ext4_map_blocks+0xb9b/0x16f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:681
 _ext4_get_block+0x242/0x590 fs/ext4/inode.c:822
 ext4_block_write_begin+0x48b/0x12c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:1124
 ext4_write_begin+0x598/0xef0 fs/ext4/inode.c:1255
 ext4_da_write_begin+0x21e/0x9c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:3000
 generic_perform_write+0x259/0x5d0 mm/filemap.c:3846
 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x15b/0x470 fs/ext4/file.c:285
 ext4_file_write_iter+0x8e0/0x17f0 fs/ext4/file.c:679
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2271 [inline]
 do_iter_readv_writev+0x212/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:735
 do_iter_write+0x186/0x710 fs/read_write.c:861
 vfs_iter_write+0x70/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902
 iter_file_splice_write+0x73b/0xc90 fs/splice.c:685
 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:763 [inline]
 direct_splice_actor+0x10f/0x170 fs/splice.c:950
 splice_direct_to_actor+0x33a/0xa10 fs/splice.c:896
 do_splice_direct+0x1a9/0x280 fs/splice.c:1002
 do_sendfile+0xb13/0x12c0 fs/read_write.c:1255
 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cf/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1309
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8(CVE-2025-68261)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: refresh inline data size before write operations

The cached ei-&gt;i_inline_size can become stale between the initial size
check and when ext4_update_inline_data()/ext4_create_inline_data() use
it. Although ext4_get_max_inline_size() reads the correct value at the
time of the check, concurrent xattr operations can modify i_inline_size
before ext4_write_lock_xattr() is acquired.

This causes ext4_update_inline_data() and ext4_create_inline_data() to
work with stale capacity values, leading to a BUG_ON() crash in
ext4_write_inline_data():

  kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inline.c:1331!
  BUG_ON(pos + len &gt; EXT4_I(inode)-&gt;i_inline_size);

The race window:
1. ext4_get_max_inline_size() reads i_inline_size = 60 (correct)
2. Size check passes for 50-byte write
3. [Another thread adds xattr, i_inline_size changes to 40]
4. ext4_write_lock_xattr() acquires lock
5. ext4_update_inline_data() uses stale i_inline_size = 60
6. Attempts to write 50 bytes but only 40 bytes actually available
7. BUG_ON() triggers

Fix this by recalculating i_inline_size via ext4_find_inline_data_nolock()
immediately after acquiring xattr_sem. This ensures ext4_update_inline_data()
and ext4_create_inline_data() work with current values that are protected
from concurrent modifications.

This is similar to commit a54c4613dac1 (&quot;ext4: fix race writing to an
inline_data file while its xattrs are changing&quot;) which fixed i_inline_off
staleness. This patch addresses the related i_inline_size staleness issue.(CVE-2025-68264)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime

The namespaces can access the controller&apos;s admin request_queue, and
stale references on the namespaces may exist after tearing down the
controller. Ensure the admin request_queue is active by moving the
controller&apos;s &apos;put&apos; to after all controller references have been released
to ensure no one is can access the request_queue. This fixes a reported
use-after-free bug:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88c0a53819f8 by task nvme/3287
  CPU: 67 UID: 0 PID: 3287 Comm: nvme Tainted: G            E       6.13.2-ga1582f1a031e #15
  Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
  Hardware name: Jabil /EGS 2S MB1, BIOS 1.00 06/18/2025
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0x4f/0x60
   print_report+0xc4/0x620
   ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x70/0xb0
   ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x30
   ? blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0
   kasan_report+0xab/0xe0
   ? blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0
   blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0
   ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x75/0x1d0
   ? blk_queue_start_drain+0x70/0x70
   ? irq_work_queue+0x18/0x20
   ? vprintk_emit.part.0+0x1cc/0x350
   ? wake_up_klogd_work_func+0x60/0x60
   blk_mq_alloc_request+0x2b7/0x6b0
   ? __blk_mq_alloc_requests+0x1060/0x1060
   ? __switch_to+0x5b7/0x1060
   nvme_submit_user_cmd+0xa9/0x330
   nvme_user_cmd.isra.0+0x240/0x3f0
   ? force_sigsegv+0xe0/0xe0
   ? nvme_user_cmd64+0x400/0x400
   ? vfs_fileattr_set+0x9b0/0x9b0
   ? cgroup_update_frozen_flag+0x24/0x1c0
   ? cgroup_leave_frozen+0x204/0x330
   ? nvme_ioctl+0x7c/0x2c0
   blkdev_ioctl+0x1a8/0x4d0
   ? blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1930/0x1930
   ? fdget+0x54/0x380
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x190
   do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  RIP: 0033:0x7f765f703b0b
  Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d dd 52 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  RSP: 002b:00007ffe2cefe808 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe2cefe860 RCX: 00007f765f703b0b
  RDX: 00007ffe2cefe860 RSI: 00000000c0484e41 RDI: 0000000000000003
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 00007f765f611d50 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003
  R13: 00000000c0484e41 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007ffe2cefea60
   &lt;/TASK&gt;(CVE-2025-68265)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: fix crash in process_v2_sparse_read() for encrypted directories

The crash in process_v2_sparse_read() for fscrypt-encrypted directories
has been reported. Issue takes place for Ceph msgr2 protocol in secure
mode. It can be reproduced by the steps:

sudo mount -t ceph :/ /mnt/cephfs/ -o name=admin,fs=cephfs,ms_mode=secure

(1) mkdir /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3
(2) cp area_decrypted.tar /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3
(3) fscrypt encrypt --source=raw_key --key=./my.key /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3
(4) fscrypt lock /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3
(5) fscrypt unlock --key=my.key /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3
(6) cat /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3/area_decrypted.tar
(7) Issue has been triggered

[  408.072247] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  408.072251] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 392 at net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:865
ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x4b39/0x72f0
[  408.072267] Modules linked in: intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common
intel_uncore_frequency_common intel_pmc_core pmt_telemetry pmt_discovery
pmt_class intel_pmc_ssram_telemetry intel_vsec kvm_intel joydev kvm irqbypass
polyval_clmulni ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel rapl input_leds psmouse
serio_raw i2c_piix4 vga16fb bochs vgastate i2c_smbus floppy mac_hid qemu_fw_cfg
pata_acpi sch_fq_codel rbd msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore
[  408.072304] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 392 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc7+
[  408.072307] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.17.0-5.fc42 04/01/2014
[  408.072310] Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn
[  408.072314] RIP: 0010:ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x4b39/0x72f0
[  408.072317] Code: c7 c1 20 f0 d4 ae 50 31 d2 48 c7 c6 60 27 d5 ae 48 c7 c7 f8
8e 6f b0 68 60 38 d5 ae e8 00 47 61 fe 48 83 c4 18 e9 ac fc ff ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b e9 06
fe ff ff 4c 8b 9d 98 fd ff ff 0f 84 64 e7 ff ff 89 85
[  408.072319] RSP: 0018:ffff88811c3e7a30 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  408.072322] RAX: ffffed1024874c6f RBX: ffffea00042c2b40 RCX: 0000000000000f38
[  408.072324] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  408.072325] RBP: ffff88811c3e7ca8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000000000c8
[  408.072326] R10: 00000000000000c8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000000c8
[  408.072327] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8881243a6030 R15: 0000000000003000
[  408.072329] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88823eadf000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  408.072331] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  408.072332] CR2: 000000c0003c6000 CR3: 000000010c106005 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
[  408.072336] PKRU: 55555554
[  408.072337] Call Trace:
[  408.072338]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  408.072340]  ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10
[  408.072344]  ? __pfx_ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x10/0x10
[  408.072347]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x40
[  408.072349]  ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x15d/0x830
[  408.072353]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  408.072357]  ? mutex_lock+0x84/0xe0
[  408.072359]  ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[  408.072361]  ceph_con_workfn+0x27e/0x10e0
[  408.072364]  ? metric_delayed_work+0x311/0x2c50
[  408.072367]  process_one_work+0x611/0xe20
[  408.072371]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  408.072373]  worker_thread+0x7e3/0x1580
[  408.072375]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[  408.072378]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  408.072381]  kthread+0x381/0x7a0
[  408.072383]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
[  408.072385]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  408.072387]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  408.072389]  ? recalc_sigpending+0x160/0x220
[  408.072392]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xe/0x50
[  408.072394]  ? calculate_sigpending+0x78/0xb0
[  408.072395]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  408.072397]  ret_from_fork+0x2b6/0x380
[  408.072400]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  408.072402]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  408.072406]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
[  408.072407] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  408.072418] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical
address 0xdffffc00000000
---truncated---(CVE-2025-68297)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

PCI/AER: Fix NULL pointer access by aer_info

The kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL) may return NULL, so all accesses to aer_info-&gt;xxx
will result in kernel panic. Fix it.(CVE-2025-68309)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: uas: fix urb unmapping issue when the uas device is remove during ongoing data transfer

When a UAS device is unplugged during data transfer, there is
a probability of a system panic occurring. The root cause is
an access to an invalid memory address during URB callback handling.
Specifically, this happens when the dma_direct_unmap_sg() function
is called within the usb_hcd_unmap_urb_for_dma() interface, but the
sg-&gt;dma_address field is 0 and the sg data structure has already been
freed.

The SCSI driver sends transfer commands by invoking uas_queuecommand_lck()
in uas.c, using the uas_submit_urbs() function to submit requests to USB.
Within the uas_submit_urbs() implementation, three URBs (sense_urb,
data_urb, and cmd_urb) are sequentially submitted. Device removal may
occur at any point during uas_submit_urbs execution, which may result
in URB submission failure. However, some URBs might have been successfully
submitted before the failure, and uas_submit_urbs will return the -ENODEV
error code in this case. The current error handling directly calls
scsi_done(). In the SCSI driver, this eventually triggers scsi_complete()
to invoke scsi_end_request() for releasing the sgtable. The successfully
submitted URBs, when being unlinked to giveback, call
usb_hcd_unmap_urb_for_dma() in hcd.c, leading to exceptions during sg
unmapping operations since the sg data structure has already been freed.

This patch modifies the error condition check in the uas_submit_urbs()
function. When a UAS device is removed but one or more URBs have already
been successfully submitted to USB, it avoids immediately invoking
scsi_done() and save the cmnd to devinfo-&gt;cmnd array. If the successfully
submitted URBs is completed before devinfo-&gt;resetting being set, then
the scsi_done() function will be called within uas_try_complete() after
all pending URB operations are finalized. Otherwise, the scsi_done()
function will be called within uas_zap_pending(), which is executed after
usb_kill_anchored_urbs().

The error handling only takes effect when uas_queuecommand_lck() calls
uas_submit_urbs() and returns the error value -ENODEV . In this case,
the device is disconnected, and the flow proceeds to uas_disconnect(),
where uas_zap_pending() is invoked to call uas_try_complete().(CVE-2025-68331)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

jbd2: avoid bug_on in jbd2_journal_get_create_access() when file system corrupted

There&apos;s issue when file system corrupted:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:1289!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 2031 Comm: mkdir Not tainted 6.18.0-rc1-next
RIP: 0010:jbd2_journal_get_create_access+0x3b6/0x4d0
RSP: 0018:ffff888117aafa30 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811a86b000 RCX: ffffffff89a63534
RDX: 1ffff110200ec602 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888100763010
RBP: ffff888100763000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888100763028
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff88812c432000 R14: ffff88812c608000 R15: ffff888120bfc000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f91d6970c99 CR3: 00000001159c4000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __ext4_journal_get_create_access+0x42/0x170
 ext4_getblk+0x319/0x6f0
 ext4_bread+0x11/0x100
 ext4_append+0x1e6/0x4a0
 ext4_init_new_dir+0x145/0x1d0
 ext4_mkdir+0x326/0x920
 vfs_mkdir+0x45c/0x740
 do_mkdirat+0x234/0x2f0
 __x64_sys_mkdir+0xd6/0x120
 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0xfa0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The above issue occurs with us in errors=continue mode when accompanied by
storage failures. There have been many inconsistencies in the file system
data.
In the case of file system data inconsistency, for example, if the block
bitmap of a referenced block is not set, it can lead to the situation where
a block being committed is allocated and used again. As a result, the
following condition will not be satisfied then trigger BUG_ON. Of course,
it is entirely possible to construct a problematic image that can trigger
this BUG_ON through specific operations. In fact, I have constructed such
an image and easily reproduced this issue.
Therefore, J_ASSERT() holds true only under ideal conditions, but it may
not necessarily be satisfied in exceptional scenarios. Using J_ASSERT()
directly in abnormal situations would cause the system to crash, which is
clearly not what we want. So here we directly trigger a JBD abort instead
of immediately invoking BUG_ON.(CVE-2025-68337)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

NFSv4/pNFS: Clear NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT in pnfs_mark_layout_stateid_invalid

Fixes a crash when layout is null during this call stack:

write_inode
    -&gt; nfs4_write_inode
        -&gt; pnfs_layoutcommit_inode

pnfs_set_layoutcommit relies on the lseg refcount to keep the layout
around. Need to clear NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT otherwise we might attempt
to reference a null layout.(CVE-2025-68349)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

regulator: core: Protect regulator_supply_alias_list with regulator_list_mutex

regulator_supply_alias_list was accessed without any locking in
regulator_supply_alias(), regulator_register_supply_alias(), and
regulator_unregister_supply_alias(). Concurrent registration,
unregistration and lookups can race, leading to:

1 use-after-free if an alias entry is removed while being read,
2 duplicate entries when two threads register the same alias,
3 inconsistent alias mappings observed by consumers.

Protect all traversals, insertions and deletions on
regulator_supply_alias_list with the existing regulator_list_mutex.(CVE-2025-68354)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gfs2: Prevent recursive memory reclaim

Function new_inode() returns a new inode with inode-&gt;i_mapping-&gt;gfp_mask
set to GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE.  This value includes the __GFP_FS flag, so
allocations in that address space can recurse into filesystem memory
reclaim.  We don&apos;t want that to happen because it can consume a
significant amount of stack memory.

Worse than that is that it can also deadlock: for example, in several
places, gfs2_unstuff_dinode() is called inside filesystem transactions.
This calls filemap_grab_folio(), which can allocate a new folio, which
can trigger memory reclaim.  If memory reclaim recurses into the
filesystem and starts another transaction, a deadlock will ensue.

To fix these kinds of problems, prevent memory reclaim from recursing
into filesystem code by making sure that the gfp_mask of inode address
spaces doesn&apos;t include __GFP_FS.

The &quot;meta&quot; and resource group address spaces were already using GFP_NOFS
as their gfp_mask (which doesn&apos;t include __GFP_FS).  The default value
of GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE is less restrictive than GFP_NOFS, though.  To
avoid being overly limiting, use the default value and only knock off
the __GFP_FS flag.  I&apos;m not sure if this will actually make a
difference, but it also shouldn&apos;t hurt.

This patch is loosely based on commit ad22c7a043c2 (&quot;xfs: prevent stack
overflows from page cache allocation&quot;).

Fixes xfstest generic/273.(CVE-2025-68356)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: rtl818x: rtl8187: Fix potential buffer underflow in rtl8187_rx_cb()

The rtl8187_rx_cb() calculates the rx descriptor header address
by subtracting its size from the skb tail pointer.
However, it does not validate if the received packet
(skb-&gt;len from urb-&gt;actual_length) is large enough to contain this
header.

If a truncated packet is received, this will lead to a buffer
underflow, reading memory before the start of the skb data area,
and causing a kernel panic.

Add length checks for both rtl8187 and rtl8187b descriptor headers
before attempting to access them, dropping the packet cleanly if the
check fails.(CVE-2025-68362)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Check skb-&gt;transport_header is set in bpf_skb_check_mtu

The bpf_skb_check_mtu helper needs to use skb-&gt;transport_header when
the BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS flag is used:

	bpf_skb_check_mtu(skb, ifindex, &amp;mtu_len, 0, BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS)

The transport_header is not always set. There is a WARN_ON_ONCE
report when CONFIG_DEBUG_NET is enabled + skb-&gt;gso_size is set +
bpf_prog_test_run is used:

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2216 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3071
 skb_gso_validate_network_len
 bpf_skb_check_mtu
 bpf_prog_3920e25740a41171_tc_chk_segs_flag # A test in the next patch
 bpf_test_run
 bpf_prog_test_run_skb

For a normal ingress skb (not test_run), skb_reset_transport_header
is performed but there is plan to avoid setting it as described in
commit 2170a1f09148 (&quot;net: no longer reset transport_header in __netif_receive_skb_core()&quot;).

This patch fixes the bpf helper by checking
skb_transport_header_was_set(). The check is done just before
skb-&gt;transport_header is used, to avoid breaking the existing bpf prog.
The WARN_ON_ONCE is limited to bpf_prog_test_run, so targeting bpf-next.(CVE-2025-68363)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

coresight: ETR: Fix ETR buffer use-after-free issue

When ETR is enabled as CS_MODE_SYSFS, if the buffer size is changed
and enabled again, currently sysfs_buf will point to the newly
allocated memory(buf_new) and free the old memory(buf_old). But the
etr_buf that is being used by the ETR remains pointed to buf_old, not
updated to buf_new. In this case, it will result in a memory
use-after-free issue.

Fix this by checking ETR&apos;s mode before updating and releasing buf_old,
if the mode is CS_MODE_SYSFS, then skip updating and releasing it.(CVE-2025-68376)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix stackmap overflow check in __bpf_get_stackid()

Syzkaller reported a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write in __bpf_get_stackid()
when copying stack trace data. The issue occurs when the perf trace
 contains more stack entries than the stack map bucket can hold,
 leading to an out-of-bounds write in the bucket&apos;s data array.(CVE-2025-68378)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: asymmetric_keys - prevent overflow in asymmetric_key_generate_id

Use check_add_overflow() to guard against potential integer overflows
when adding the binary blob lengths and the size of an asymmetric_key_id
structure and return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW) accordingly. This prevents a
possible buffer overflow when copying data from potentially malicious
X.509 certificate fields that can be arbitrarily large, such as ASN.1
INTEGER serial numbers, issuer names, etc.(CVE-2025-68724)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Do not let BPF test infra emit invalid GSO types to stack

Yinhao et al. reported that their fuzzer tool was able to trigger a
skb_warn_bad_offload() from netif_skb_features() -&gt; gso_features_check().
When a BPF program - triggered via BPF test infra - pushes the packet
to the loopback device via bpf_clone_redirect() then mentioned offload
warning can be seen. GSO-related features are then rightfully disabled.

We get into this situation due to convert___skb_to_skb() setting
gso_segs and gso_size but not gso_type. Technically, it makes sense
that this warning triggers since the GSO properties are malformed due
to the gso_type. Potentially, the gso_type could be marked non-trustworthy
through setting it at least to SKB_GSO_DODGY without any other specific
assumptions, but that also feels wrong given we should not go further
into the GSO engine in the first place.

The checks were added in 121d57af308d (&quot;gso: validate gso_type in GSO
handlers&quot;) because there were malicious (syzbot) senders that combine
a protocol with a non-matching gso_type. If we would want to drop such
packets, gso_features_check() currently only returns feature flags via
netif_skb_features(), so one location for potentially dropping such skbs
could be validate_xmit_unreadable_skb(), but then otoh it would be
an additional check in the fast-path for a very corner case. Given
bpf_clone_redirect() is the only place where BPF test infra could emit
such packets, lets reject them right there.(CVE-2025-68725)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

isdn: mISDN: hfcsusb: fix memory leak in hfcsusb_probe()

In hfcsusb_probe(), the memory allocated for ctrl_urb gets leaked when
setup_instance() fails with an error code. Fix that by freeing the urb
before freeing the hw structure. Also change the error paths to use the
goto ladder style.

Compile tested only. Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool.(CVE-2025-68734)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Fix improper freeing of purex item

In qla2xxx_process_purls_iocb(), an item is allocated via
qla27xx_copy_multiple_pkt(), which internally calls
qla24xx_alloc_purex_item().

The qla24xx_alloc_purex_item() function may return a pre-allocated item
from a per-adapter pool for small allocations, instead of dynamically
allocating memory with kzalloc().

An error handling path in qla2xxx_process_purls_iocb() incorrectly uses
kfree() to release the item. If the item was from the pre-allocated
pool, calling kfree() on it is a bug that can lead to memory corruption.

Fix this by using the correct deallocation function,
qla24xx_free_purex_item(), which properly handles both dynamically
allocated and pre-allocated items.(CVE-2025-68741)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Free special fields when update [lru_,]percpu_hash maps

As [lru_,]percpu_hash maps support BPF_KPTR_{REF,PERCPU}, missing
calls to &apos;bpf_obj_free_fields()&apos; in &apos;pcpu_copy_value()&apos; could cause the
memory referenced by BPF_KPTR_{REF,PERCPU} fields to be held until the
map gets freed.

Fix this by calling &apos;bpf_obj_free_fields()&apos; after
&apos;copy_map_value[,_long]()&apos; in &apos;pcpu_copy_value()&apos;.(CVE-2025-68744)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Clear cmds after chip reset

Commit aefed3e5548f (&quot;scsi: qla2xxx: target: Fix offline port handling
and host reset handling&quot;) caused two problems:

1. Commands sent to FW, after chip reset got stuck and never freed as FW
   is not going to respond to them anymore.

2. BUG_ON(cmd-&gt;sg_mapped) in qlt_free_cmd().  Commit 26f9ce53817a
   (&quot;scsi: qla2xxx: Fix missed DMA unmap for aborted commands&quot;)
   attempted to fix this, but introduced another bug under different
   circumstances when two different CPUs were racing to call
   qlt_unmap_sg() at the same time: BUG_ON(!valid_dma_direction(dir)) in
   dma_unmap_sg_attrs().

So revert &quot;scsi: qla2xxx: Fix missed DMA unmap for aborted commands&quot; and
partially revert &quot;scsi: qla2xxx: target: Fix offline port handling and
host reset handling&quot; at __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds.(CVE-2025-68745)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

block: Use RCU in blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset() instead of set-&gt;tag_list_lock

blk_mq_{add,del}_queue_tag_set() functions add and remove queues from
tagset, the functions make sure that tagset and queues are marked as
shared when two or more queues are attached to the same tagset.
Initially a tagset starts as unshared and when the number of added
queues reaches two, blk_mq_add_queue_tag_set() marks it as shared along
with all the queues attached to it. When the number of attached queues
drops to 1 blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set() need to mark both the tagset and
the remaining queues as unshared.

Both functions need to freeze current queues in tagset before setting on
unsetting BLK_MQ_F_TAG_QUEUE_SHARED flag. While doing so, both functions
hold set-&gt;tag_list_lock mutex, which makes sense as we do not want
queues to be added or deleted in the process. This used to work fine
until commit 98d81f0df70c (&quot;nvme: use blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset&quot;)
made the nvme driver quiesce tagset instead of quiscing individual
queues. blk_mq_quiesce_tagset() does the job and quiesce the queues in
set-&gt;tag_list while holding set-&gt;tag_list_lock also.

This results in deadlock between two threads with these stacktraces:

  __schedule+0x47c/0xbb0
  ? timerqueue_add+0x66/0xb0
  schedule+0x1c/0xa0
  schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10
  __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x271/0x600
  blk_mq_quiesce_tagset+0x25/0xc0
  nvme_dev_disable+0x9c/0x250
  nvme_timeout+0x1fc/0x520
  blk_mq_handle_expired+0x5c/0x90
  bt_iter+0x7e/0x90
  blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x27e/0x550
  ? __blk_mq_complete_request_remote+0x10/0x10
  ? __blk_mq_complete_request_remote+0x10/0x10
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x1c0/0x210
  blk_mq_timeout_work+0x12d/0x170
  process_one_work+0x12e/0x2d0
  worker_thread+0x288/0x3a0
  ? rescuer_thread+0x480/0x480
  kthread+0xb8/0xe0
  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
  ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

  __schedule+0x47c/0xbb0
  ? xas_find+0x161/0x1a0
  schedule+0x1c/0xa0
  blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x3d/0x70
  ? destroy_sched_domains_rcu+0x30/0x30
  blk_mq_update_tag_set_shared+0x44/0x80
  blk_mq_exit_queue+0x141/0x150
  del_gendisk+0x25a/0x2d0
  nvme_ns_remove+0xc9/0x170
  nvme_remove_namespaces+0xc7/0x100
  nvme_remove+0x62/0x150
  pci_device_remove+0x23/0x60
  device_release_driver_internal+0x159/0x200
  unbind_store+0x99/0xa0
  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x112/0x1e0
  vfs_write+0x2b1/0x3d0
  ksys_write+0x4e/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

The top stacktrace is showing nvme_timeout() called to handle nvme
command timeout. timeout handler is trying to disable the controller and
as a first step, it needs to blk_mq_quiesce_tagset() to tell blk-mq not
to call queue callback handlers. The thread is stuck waiting for
set-&gt;tag_list_lock as it tries to walk the queues in set-&gt;tag_list.

The lock is held by the second thread in the bottom stack which is
waiting for one of queues to be frozen. The queue usage counter will
drop to zero after nvme_timeout() finishes, and this will not happen
because the thread will wait for this mutex forever.

Given that [un]quiescing queue is an operation that does not need to
sleep, update blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset() to use RCU instead of taking
set-&gt;tag_list_lock, update blk_mq_{add,del}_queue_tag_set() to use RCU
safe list operations. Also, delete INIT_LIST_HEAD(&amp;q-&gt;tag_set_list)
in blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set() because we can not re-initialize it while
the list is being traversed under RCU. The deleted queue will not be
added/deleted to/from a tagset and it will be freed in blk_free_queue()
after the end of RCU grace period.(CVE-2025-68756)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sched/deadline: only set free_cpus for online runqueues

Commit 16b269436b72 (&quot;sched/deadline: Modify cpudl::free_cpus
to reflect rd-&gt;online&quot;) introduced the cpudl_set/clear_freecpu
functions to allow the cpu_dl::free_cpus mask to be manipulated
by the deadline scheduler class rq_on/offline callbacks so the
mask would also reflect this state.

Commit 9659e1eeee28 (&quot;sched/deadline: Remove cpu_active_mask
from cpudl_find()&quot;) removed the check of the cpu_active_mask to
save some processing on the premise that the cpudl::free_cpus
mask already reflected the runqueue online state.

Unfortunately, there are cases where it is possible for the
cpudl_clear function to set the free_cpus bit for a CPU when the
deadline runqueue is offline. When this occurs while a CPU is
connected to the default root domain the flag may retain the bad
state after the CPU has been unplugged. Later, a different CPU
that is transitioning through the default root domain may push a
deadline task to the powered down CPU when cpudl_find sees its
free_cpus bit is set. If this happens the task will not have the
opportunity to run.

One example is outlined here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/(CVE-2025-68780)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: target: Reset t_task_cdb pointer in error case

If allocation of cmd-&gt;t_task_cdb fails, it remains NULL but is later
dereferenced in the &apos;err&apos; path.

In case of error, reset NULL t_task_cdb value to point at the default
fixed-size buffer.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-68782)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iomap: adjust read range correctly for non-block-aligned positions

iomap_adjust_read_range() assumes that the position and length passed in
are block-aligned. This is not always the case however, as shown in the
syzbot generated case for erofs. This causes too many bytes to be
skipped for uptodate blocks, which results in returning the incorrect
position and length to read in. If all the blocks are uptodate, this
underflows length and returns a position beyond the folio.

Fix the calculation to also take into account the block offset when
calculating how many bytes can be skipped for uptodate blocks.(CVE-2025-68794)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

NFSD: NFSv4 file creation neglects setting ACL

An NFSv4 client that sets an ACL with a named principal during file
creation retrieves the ACL afterwards, and finds that it is only a
default ACL (based on the mode bits) and not the ACL that was
requested during file creation. This violates RFC 8881 section
6.4.1.3: &quot;the ACL attribute is set as given&quot;.

The issue occurs in nfsd_create_setattr(), which calls
nfsd_attrs_valid() to determine whether to call nfsd_setattr().
However, nfsd_attrs_valid() checks only for iattr changes and
security labels, but not POSIX ACLs. When only an ACL is present,
the function returns false, nfsd_setattr() is skipped, and the
POSIX ACL is never applied to the inode.

Subsequently, when the client retrieves the ACL, the server finds
no POSIX ACL on the inode and returns one generated from the file&apos;s
mode bits rather than returning the originally-specified ACL.(CVE-2025-68803)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring: fix filename leak in __io_openat_prep()

 __io_openat_prep() allocates a struct filename using getname(). However,
for the condition of the file being installed in the fixed file table as
well as having O_CLOEXEC flag set, the function returns early. At that
point, the request doesn&apos;t have REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP flag set. Due to this,
the memory for the newly allocated struct filename is not cleaned up,
causing a memory leak.

Fix this by setting the REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP for the request just after the
successful getname() call, so that when the request is torn down, the
filename will be cleaned up, along with other resources needing cleanup.(CVE-2025-68814)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5: fw_tracer, Validate format string parameters

Add validation for format string parameters in the firmware tracer to
prevent potential security vulnerabilities and crashes from malformed
format strings received from firmware.

The firmware tracer receives format strings from the device firmware and
uses them to format trace messages. Without proper validation, bad
firmware could provide format strings with invalid format specifiers
(e.g., %s, %p, %n) that could lead to crashes, or other undefined
behavior.

Add mlx5_tracer_validate_params() to validate that all format specifiers
in trace strings are limited to safe integer/hex formats (%x, %d, %i,
%u, %llx, %lx, etc.). Reject strings containing other format types that
could be used to access arbitrary memory or cause crashes.
Invalid format strings are added to the trace output for visibility with
&quot;BAD_FORMAT: &quot; prefix.(CVE-2025-68816)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: Revert &quot;scsi: qla2xxx: Perform lockless command completion in abort path&quot;

This reverts commit 0367076b0817d5c75dfb83001ce7ce5c64d803a9.

The commit being reverted added code to __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds() to
call sp-&gt;done() without holding a spinlock.  But unlike the older code
below it, this new code failed to check sp-&gt;cmd_type and just assumed
TYPE_SRB, which results in a jump to an invalid pointer in target-mode
with TYPE_TGT_CMD:

qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-d034:8: qla24xx_do_nack_work create sess success
  0000000009f7a79b
qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-5003:8: ISP System Error - mbx1=1ff5h mbx2=10h
  mbx3=0h mbx4=0h mbx5=191h mbx6=0h mbx7=0h.
qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-d01e:8: -&gt; fwdump no buffer
qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-f03a:8: qla_target(0): System error async event
  0x8002 occurred
qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-00af:8: Performing ISP error recovery -
  ha=0000000058183fda.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP
CPU: 2 PID: 9446 Comm: qla2xxx_8_dpc Tainted: G           O       6.1.133 #1
Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPL-F, BIOS 4.2 12/15/2023
RIP: 0010:0x0
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001f93dc8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000282 RBX: 0000000000000355 RCX: ffff88810d16a000
RDX: ffff88810dbadaa8 RSI: 0000000000080000 RDI: ffff888169dc38c0
RBP: ffff888169dc38c0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000045
R10: ffffffffa034bdf0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810800bb40
R13: 0000000000001aa8 R14: ffff888100136610 R15: ffff8881070f7400
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bf80080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000010c8ff006 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ? __die+0x4d/0x8b
 ? page_fault_oops+0x91/0x180
 ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit_regs+0x38/0x1a0
 ? exc_page_fault+0x391/0x5e0
 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
 __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0xcb/0x3e0 [qla2xxx_scst]
 qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0x50/0x70 [qla2xxx_scst]
 qla2x00_abort_isp_cleanup+0x3b7/0x4b0 [qla2xxx_scst]
 qla2x00_abort_isp+0xfd/0x860 [qla2xxx_scst]
 qla2x00_do_dpc+0x581/0xa40 [qla2xxx_scst]
 kthread+0xa8/0xd0
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Then commit 4475afa2646d (&quot;scsi: qla2xxx: Complete command early within
lock&quot;) added the spinlock back, because not having the lock caused a
race and a crash.  But qla2x00_abort_srb() in the switch below already
checks for qla2x00_chip_is_down() and handles it the same way, so the
code above the switch is now redundant and still buggy in target-mode.
Remove it.(CVE-2025-68818)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

shmem: fix recovery on rename failures

maple_tree insertions can fail if we are seriously short on memory;
simple_offset_rename() does not recover well if it runs into that.
The same goes for simple_offset_rename_exchange().

Moreover, shmem_whiteout() expects that if it succeeds, the caller will
progress to d_move(), i.e. that shmem_rename2() won&apos;t fail past the
successful call of shmem_whiteout().

Not hard to fix, fortunately - mtree_store() can&apos;t fail if the index we
are trying to store into is already present in the tree as a singleton.

For simple_offset_rename_exchange() that&apos;s enough - we just need to be
careful about the order of operations.

For simple_offset_rename() solution is to preinsert the target into the
tree for new_dir; the rest can be done without any potentially failing
operations.

That preinsertion has to be done in shmem_rename2() rather than in
simple_offset_rename() itself - otherwise we&apos;d need to deal with the
possibility of failure after successful shmem_whiteout().(CVE-2025-71072)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: x86: Fix VM hard lockup after prolonged inactivity with periodic HV timer

When advancing the target expiration for the guest&apos;s APIC timer in periodic
mode, set the expiration to &quot;now&quot; if the target expiration is in the past
(similar to what is done in update_target_expiration()).  Blindly adding
the period to the previous target expiration can result in KVM generating
a practically unbounded number of hrtimer IRQs due to programming an
expired timer over and over.  In extreme scenarios, e.g. if userspace
pauses/suspends a VM for an extended duration, this can even cause hard
lockups in the host.

Currently, the bug only affects Intel CPUs when using the hypervisor timer
(HV timer), a.k.a. the VMX preemption timer.  Unlike the software timer,
a.k.a. hrtimer, which KVM keeps running even on exits to userspace, the
HV timer only runs while the guest is active.  As a result, if the vCPU
does not run for an extended duration, there will be a huge gap between
the target expiration and the current time the vCPU resumes running.
Because the target expiration is incremented by only one period on each
timer expiration, this leads to a series of timer expirations occurring
rapidly after the vCPU/VM resumes.

More critically, when the vCPU first triggers a periodic HV timer
expiration after resuming, advancing the expiration by only one period
will result in a target expiration in the past.  As a result, the delta
may be calculated as a negative value.  When the delta is converted into
an absolute value (tscdeadline is an unsigned u64), the resulting value
can overflow what the HV timer is capable of programming.  I.e. the large
value will exceed the VMX Preemption Timer&apos;s maximum bit width of
cpu_preemption_timer_multi + 32, and thus cause KVM to switch from the
HV timer to the software timer (hrtimers).

After switching to the software timer, periodic timer expiration callbacks
may be executed consecutively within a single clock interrupt handler,
because hrtimers honors KVM&apos;s request for an expiration in the past and
immediately re-invokes KVM&apos;s callback after reprogramming.  And because
the interrupt handler runs with IRQs disabled, restarting KVM&apos;s hrtimer
over and over until the target expiration is advanced to &quot;now&quot; can result
in a hard lockup.

E.g. the following hard lockup was triggered in the host when running a
Windows VM (only relevant because it used the APIC timer in periodic mode)
after resuming the VM from a long suspend (in the host).

  NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 45
  ...
  RIP: 0010:advance_periodic_target_expiration+0x4d/0x80 [kvm]
  ...
  RSP: 0018:ff4f88f5d98d8ef0 EFLAGS: 00000046
  RAX: fff0103f91be678e RBX: fff0103f91be678e RCX: 00843a7d9e127bcc
  RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0052ca4003697505 RDI: ff440d5bfbdbd500
  RBP: ff440d5956f99200 R08: ff2ff2a42deb6a84 R09: 000000000002a6c0
  R10: 0122d794016332b3 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff440db1af39cfc0
  R13: ff440db1af39cfc0 R14: ffffffffc0d4a560 R15: ff440db1af39d0f8
  FS:  00007f04a6ffd700(0000) GS:ff440db1af380000(0000) knlGS:000000e38a3b8000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 000000d5651feff8 CR3: 000000684e038002 CR4: 0000000000773ee0
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
   &lt;IRQ&gt;
   apic_timer_fn+0x31/0x50 [kvm]
   __hrtimer_run_queues+0x100/0x280
   hrtimer_interrupt+0x100/0x210
   ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x19/0x160
   smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6a/0x130
   apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
   &lt;/IRQ&gt;

Moreover, if the suspend duration of the virtual machine is not long enough
to trigger a hard lockup in this scenario, since commit 98c25ead5eda
(&quot;KVM: VMX: Move preemption timer &lt;=&gt; hrtimer dance to common x86&quot;), KVM
will continue using the software timer until the guest reprograms the APIC
timer in some way.  Since the periodic timer does not require frequent APIC
timer register programming, the guest may continue to use the software
timer in 
---truncated---(CVE-2025-71104)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: make decode_pool() more resilient against corrupted osdmaps

If the osdmap is (maliciously) corrupted such that the encoded length
of ceph_pg_pool envelope is less than what is expected for a particular
encoding version, out-of-bounds reads may ensue because the only bounds
check that is there is based on that length value.

This patch adds explicit bounds checks for each field that is decoded
or skipped.(CVE-2025-71116)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: seqiv - Do not use req-&gt;iv after crypto_aead_encrypt

As soon as crypto_aead_encrypt is called, the underlying request
may be freed by an asynchronous completion.  Thus dereferencing
req-&gt;iv after it returns is invalid.

Instead of checking req-&gt;iv against info, create a new variable
unaligned_info and use it for that purpose instead.(CVE-2025-71131)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KEYS: trusted: Fix a memory leak in tpm2_load_cmd

&apos;tpm2_load_cmd&apos; allocates a tempoary blob indirectly via &apos;tpm2_key_decode&apos;
but it is not freed in the failure paths. Address this by wrapping the blob
into with a cleanup helper.(CVE-2025-71147)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/poll: correctly handle io_poll_add() return value on update

When the core of io_uring was updated to handle completions
consistently and with fixed return codes, the POLL_REMOVE opcode
with updates got slightly broken. If a POLL_ADD is pending and
then POLL_REMOVE is used to update the events of that request, if that
update causes the POLL_ADD to now trigger, then that completion is lost
and a CQE is never posted.

Additionally, ensure that if an update does cause an existing POLL_ADD
to complete, that the completion value isn&apos;t always overwritten with
-ECANCELED. For that case, whatever io_poll_add() set the value to
should just be retained.(CVE-2025-71149)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: Fix refcount leak when invalid session is found on session lookup

When a session is found but its state is not SMB2_SESSION_VALID, It
indicates that no valid session was found, but it is missing to decrement
the reference count acquired by the session lookup, which results in
a reference count leak. This patch fixes the issue by explicitly calling
ksmbd_user_session_put to release the reference to the session.(CVE-2025-71150)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: Don&apos;t store mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink priv

mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile
attaching fails, mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink private is used to
reference the netdev and mdev associated with that struct. Instead,
store netdev directly into mlx5e_dev and get mdev from the containing
mlx5_adev aux device structure.

This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due
to change profile failure.

$ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev
Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads.
dmesg:
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq &quot;mlx5e&quot;: -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq &quot;mlx5e&quot;: -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12

$ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==&gt; oops

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000520
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 521 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ #117 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_remove+0x68/0x130
RSP: 0018:ffffc900034838f0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff88810283c380 RBX: ffff888101874400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff888102d789c0 R08: ffff8881007137f0 R09: ffff888100264e10
R10: ffffc90003483898 R11: ffffc900034838a0 R12: ffff888100d261a0
R13: ffff888100d261a0 R14: ffff8881018749a0 R15: ffff888101874400
FS:  00007f8565fea740(0000) GS:ffff88856a759000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000520 CR3: 000000010b11a004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200
 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
 device_del+0x160/0x3d0
 ? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90
 mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0
 mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70
 mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220
 devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260
 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140(CVE-2026-22996)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvme-tcp: fix NULL pointer dereferences in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec

Commit efa56305908b (&quot;nvmet-tcp: Fix a kernel panic when host sends an invalid H2C PDU length&quot;)
added ttag bounds checking and data_offset
validation in nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu(), but it did not validate
whether the command&apos;s data structures (cmd-&gt;req.sg and cmd-&gt;iov) have
been properly initialized before processing H2C_DATA PDUs.

The nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() function dereferences these pointers
without NULL checks. This can be triggered by sending H2C_DATA PDU
immediately after the ICREQ/ICRESP handshake, before
sending a CONNECT command or NVMe write command.

Attack vectors that trigger NULL pointer dereferences:
1. H2C_DATA PDU sent before CONNECT → both pointers NULL
2. H2C_DATA PDU for READ command → cmd-&gt;req.sg allocated, cmd-&gt;iov NULL
3. H2C_DATA PDU for uninitialized command slot → both pointers NULL

The fix validates both cmd-&gt;req.sg and cmd-&gt;iov before calling
nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(). Both checks are required because:
- Uninitialized commands: both NULL
- READ commands: cmd-&gt;req.sg allocated, cmd-&gt;iov NULL
- WRITE commands: both allocated(CVE-2026-22998)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: Fix crash on profile change rollback failure

mlx5e_netdev_change_profile can fail to attach a new profile and can
fail to rollback to old profile, in such case, we could end up with a
dangling netdev with a fully reset netdev_priv. A retry to change
profile, e.g. another attempt to call mlx5e_netdev_change_profile via
switchdev mode change, will crash trying to access the now NULL
priv-&gt;mdev.

This fix allows mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() to handle previous
failures and an empty priv, by not assuming priv is valid.

Pass netdev and mdev to all flows requiring
mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() and avoid passing priv.
In mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() check if current priv is valid, and if
not, just attach the new profile without trying to access the old one.

This fixes the following oops, when enabling switchdev mode for the 2nd
time after first time failure:

 ## Enabling switchdev mode first time:

mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq &quot;mlx5e&quot;: -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq &quot;mlx5e&quot;: -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12
                                                                         ^^^^^^^^
mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0)

 ## retry: Enabling switchdev mode 2nd time:

mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4+ #91 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x3c/0x90
Code: 50 00 00 f0 80 4f 78 02 48 8b bf e8 07 00 00 48 85 ff 74 16 48 8b 73 78 48 d1 ee 83 e6 01 83 f6 01 40 0f b6 f6 e8 c4 42 00 00 &lt;48&gt; 8b 45 38 48 85 c0 74 08 48 89 df e8 cc 47 40 1e 48 8b bb f0 07
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000673890 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881036a89c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888113f63800 RSI: ffffffff822fe720 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000002dcd R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc900006738e8 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8881036a89c0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007fdfb8384740(0000) GS:ffff88856a9d6000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 0000000112ae0005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0x45/0xb0
 mlx5e_vport_rep_load+0x27b/0x2d0
 mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_load+0x72/0xf0
 esw_offloads_enable+0x5d0/0x970
 mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x349/0x430
 ? is_mp_supported+0x57/0xb0
 mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x26b/0x430
 devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x6f/0xf0
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140
 genl_rcv_msg+0x18b/0x290
 ? __pfx_devlink_nl_pre_doit+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_devlink_nl_post_doit+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x52/0x100
 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
 netlink_unicast+0x282/0x3e0
 ? __alloc_skb+0xd6/0x190
 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430
 __sys_sendto+0x213/0x220
 ? __sys_recvmsg+0x6a/0xd0
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1f0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fdfb8495047(CVE-2026-23000)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/fpu: Clear XSTATE_BV[i] in guest XSAVE state whenever XFD[i]=1

When loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in
response to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to
be restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn&apos;t attempt to load state for
features that are disabled via the guest&apos;s XFD.  Because the kernel
executes XRSTOR with the guest&apos;s XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1
will cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel.

E.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #171 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
   switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   &lt;/TASK&gt;
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1,
and a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler&apos;s
call to fpu_update_guest_xfd().

and if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #168 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
   fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120
   kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   &lt;/TASK&gt;
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

The new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture.  Per Intel&apos;s SDM,
XSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as &apos;0&apos; for components that are disabled via XFD
(and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state
component):

  If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i,
  the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1;
  instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was
  in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE
  header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the
  state component (the other instructions do not save state component i).

Alternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using
a constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for
a struct fpu_guest.  However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled
features can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar
scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()&apos;s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the
outgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the
first WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD.

Therefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above
interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on
preemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM
ABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features.

[Move clea
---truncated---(CVE-2026-23005)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: Pass netdev to mlx5e_destroy_netdev instead of priv

mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile
attaching fails.

Pass netdev to mlx5e_destroy_netdev() to guarantee it will work on a
valid netdev.

On mlx5e_remove: Check validity of priv-&gt;profile, before attempting
to cleanup any resources that might be not there.

This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due
to change profile failure.

$ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev
Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads.
dmesg:
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq &quot;mlx5e&quot;: -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq &quot;mlx5e&quot;: -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12

$ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==&gt; oops

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000370
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ #115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_dcbnl_dscp_app+0x23/0x100
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000083f8b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff8881126fc380 RBX: ffff8881015ac400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8881035109c0
RBP: ffff8881035109c0 R08: ffff888101e3e838 R09: ffff888100264e10
R10: ffffc9000083f898 R11: ffffc9000083f8a0 R12: ffff888101b921a0
R13: ffff888101b921a0 R14: ffff8881015ac9a0 R15: ffff8881015ac400
FS:  00007f789a3c8740(0000) GS:ffff88856aa59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000370 CR3: 000000010b6c0001 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 mlx5e_remove+0x57/0x110
 device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200
 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
 device_del+0x160/0x3d0
 ? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90
 mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0
 mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70
 mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220
 devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260
 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140(CVE-2026-23035)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tracing: Add recursion protection in kernel stack trace recording

A bug was reported about an infinite recursion caused by tracing the rcu
events with the kernel stack trace trigger enabled. The stack trace code
called back into RCU which then called the stack trace again.

Expand the ftrace recursion protection to add a set of bits to protect
events from recursion. Each bit represents the context that the event is
in (normal, softirq, interrupt and NMI).

Have the stack trace code use the interrupt context to protect against
recursion.

Note, the bug showed an issue in both the RCU code as well as the tracing
stacktrace code. This only handles the tracing stack trace side of the
bug. The RCU fix will be handled separately.(CVE-2026-23138)</Note>
		<Note Title="Topic" Type="General" Ordinal="4" xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4/openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3/openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4/openEuler-24.03-LTS.

openEuler Security has rated this update as having a security impact of high. A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score,which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section.</Note>
		<Note Title="Severity" Type="General" Ordinal="5" xml:lang="en">High</Note>
		<Note Title="Affected Component" Type="General" Ordinal="6" xml:lang="en">kernel</Note>
	</DocumentNotes>
	<DocumentReferences>
		<Reference Type="Self">
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
		</Reference>
		<Reference Type="openEuler CVE">
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-53232</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-37900</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-37954</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-38083</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-38373</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-38556</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-38591</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-38659</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-38730</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-39713</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-39961</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40030</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40096</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40215</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40220</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40237</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40242</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40251</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40271</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40272</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40277</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40294</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40301</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40308</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40318</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40341</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40342</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40343</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40346</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40351</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40358</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40359</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-40361</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68171</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68173</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68174</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68176</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68188</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68200</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68206</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68208</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68214</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68235</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68259</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68261</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68264</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68265</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68297</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68309</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68331</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68337</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68349</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68354</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68356</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68362</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68363</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68376</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68378</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68724</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68725</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68734</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68741</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68744</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68745</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68756</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68780</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68782</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68794</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68803</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68814</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68816</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68818</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71072</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71104</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71116</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71131</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71147</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71149</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71150</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-22996</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-22998</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23000</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23005</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23035</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23138</URL>
		</Reference>
		<Reference Type="Other">
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53232</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37900</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37954</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38083</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38373</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38556</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38591</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38659</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38730</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39713</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39961</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40030</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40096</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40215</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40220</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40237</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40242</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40251</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40271</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40272</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40277</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40294</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40301</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40308</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40318</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40341</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40342</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40343</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40346</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40351</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40358</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40359</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40361</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68171</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68173</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68174</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68176</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68188</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68200</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68206</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68208</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68214</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68235</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68259</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68261</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68264</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68265</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68297</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68309</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68331</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68337</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68349</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68354</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68356</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68362</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68363</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68376</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68378</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68724</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68725</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68734</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68741</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68744</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68745</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68756</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68780</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68782</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68794</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68803</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68814</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68816</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68818</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71072</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71104</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71116</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71131</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71147</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71149</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71150</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22996</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22998</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23000</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23005</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23035</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23138</URL>
		</Reference>
	</DocumentReferences>
	<ProductTree xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/prod/1.1">
		<Branch Type="Product Name" Name="openEuler">
			<FullProductName ProductID="openEuler-24.03-LTS" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">openEuler-24.03-LTS</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="aarch64">
			<FullProductName ProductID="bpftool-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">bpftool-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-devel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-devel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-headers-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-headers-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-source-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-source-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-tools-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">perf-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">python3-perf-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="x86_64">
			<FullProductName ProductID="bpftool-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">bpftool-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-devel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-devel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-headers-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-headers-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-source-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-source-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-tools-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">perf-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">python3-perf-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="src">
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS">kernel-6.6.0-144.0.0.127.oe2403.src.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
	</ProductTree>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="1" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu/s390: Implement blocking domain

This fixes a crash when surprise hot-unplugging a PCI device. This crash
happens because during hot-unplug __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail()
attaching the default domain fails when the platform no longer
recognizes the device as it has already been removed and we end up with
a NULL domain pointer and UAF. This is exactly the case referred to in
the second comment in __iommu_device_set_domain() and just as stated
there if we can instead attach the blocking domain the UAF is prevented
as this can handle the already removed device. Implement the blocking
domain to use this handling.  With this change, the crash is fixed but
we still hit a warning attempting to change DMA ownership on a blocked
device.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-53232</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="2" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu: Fix two issues in iommu_copy_struct_from_user()

In the review for iommu_copy_struct_to_user() helper, Matt pointed out that
a NULL pointer should be rejected prior to dereferencing it:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-37900</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="3" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: Avoid race in open_cached_dir with lease breaks

A pre-existing valid cfid returned from find_or_create_cached_dir might
race with a lease break, meaning open_cached_dir doesn&apos;t consider it
valid, and thinks it&apos;s newly-constructed. This leaks a dentry reference
if the allocation occurs before the queued lease break work runs.

Avoid the race by extending holding the cfid_list_lock across
find_or_create_cached_dir and when the result is checked.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-37954</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="4" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net_sched: prio: fix a race in prio_tune()

Gerrard Tai reported a race condition in PRIO, whenever SFQ perturb timer
fires at the wrong time.

The race is as follows:

CPU 0                                 CPU 1
[1]: lock root
[2]: qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
[3]: unlock root
 |
 |                                    [5]: lock root
 |                                    [6]: rehash
 |                                    [7]: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
 |
[4]: qdisc_put()

This can be abused to underflow a parent&apos;s qlen.

Calling qdisc_purge_queue() instead of qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
should fix the race, because all packets will be purged from the qdisc
before releasing the lock.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-38083</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="5" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

IB/mlx5: Fix potential deadlock in MR deregistration

The issue arises when kzalloc() is invoked while holding umem_mutex or
any other lock acquired under umem_mutex. This is problematic because
kzalloc() can trigger fs_reclaim_aqcuire(), which may, in turn, invoke
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(). This function can lead to
mlx5_ib_invalidate_range(), which attempts to acquire umem_mutex again,
resulting in a deadlock.

The problematic flow:
             CPU0                      |              CPU1
---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------
mlx5_ib_dereg_mr()                     |
 → revoke_mr()                         |
   → mutex_lock(&amp;umem_odp-&gt;umem_mutex) |
                                       | mlx5_mkey_cache_init()
                                       |  → mutex_lock(&amp;dev-&gt;cache.rb_lock)
                                       |  → mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked()
                                       |    → kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL)
                                       |      → fs_reclaim()
                                       |        → mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start()
                                       |          → mlx5_ib_invalidate_range()
                                       |            → mutex_lock(&amp;umem_odp-&gt;umem_mutex)
   → cache_ent_find_and_store()        |
     → mutex_lock(&amp;dev-&gt;cache.rb_lock) |

Additionally, when kzalloc() is called from within
cache_ent_find_and_store(), we encounter the same deadlock due to
re-acquisition of umem_mutex.

Solve by releasing umem_mutex in dereg_mr() after umr_revoke_mr()
and before acquiring rb_lock. This ensures that we don&apos;t hold
umem_mutex while performing memory allocations that could trigger
the reclaim path.

This change prevents the deadlock by ensuring proper lock ordering and
avoiding holding locks during memory allocation operations that could
trigger the reclaim path.

The following lockdep warning demonstrates the deadlock:

 python3/20557 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888387542128 (&amp;umem_odp-&gt;umem_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x5b/0x550 [mlx5_ib]

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffff82f6b840 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
 unmap_vmas+0x7b/0x1a0

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -&gt; #3 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       fs_reclaim_acquire+0x60/0xd0
       mem_cgroup_css_alloc+0x6f/0x9b0
       cgroup_init_subsys+0xa4/0x240
       cgroup_init+0x1c8/0x510
       start_kernel+0x747/0x760
       x86_64_start_reservations+0x25/0x30
       x86_64_start_kernel+0x73/0x80
       common_startup_64+0x129/0x138

 -&gt; #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       fs_reclaim_acquire+0x91/0xd0
       __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x4d/0x4c0
       mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked+0x75/0x620 [mlx5_ib]
       mlx5_mkey_cache_init+0x186/0x360 [mlx5_ib]
       mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init+0x3c/0x60 [mlx5_ib]
       __mlx5_ib_add+0x4b/0x190 [mlx5_ib]
       mlx5r_probe+0xd9/0x320 [mlx5_ib]
       auxiliary_bus_probe+0x42/0x70
       really_probe+0xdb/0x360
       __driver_probe_device+0x8f/0x130
       driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xb0
       __driver_attach+0xd4/0x1f0
       bus_for_each_dev+0x79/0xd0
       bus_add_driver+0xf0/0x200
       driver_register+0x6e/0xc0
       __auxiliary_driver_register+0x6a/0xc0
       do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x390
       do_init_module+0x88/0x240
       init_module_from_file+0x85/0xc0
       idempotent_init_module+0x104/0x300
       __x64_sys_finit_module+0x68/0xc0
       do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 -&gt; #1 (&amp;dev-&gt;cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __mutex_lock+0x98/0xf10
       __mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x6f2/0x890 [mlx5_ib]
       mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x21/0x110 [mlx5_ib]
       ib_dereg_mr_user+0x85/0x1f0 [ib_core]
  
---truncated---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-38373</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="6" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits

Testing by the syzbot fuzzer showed that the HID core gets a
shift-out-of-bounds exception when it tries to convert a 32-bit
quantity to a 0-bit quantity.  Ideally this should never occur, but
there are buggy devices and some might have a report field with size
set to zero; we shouldn&apos;t reject the report or the device just because
of that.

Instead, harden the s32ton() routine so that it returns a reasonable
result instead of crashing when it is called with the number of bits
set to 0 -- the same as what snto32() does.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-38556</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="7" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Reject narrower access to pointer ctx fields

The following BPF program, simplified from a syzkaller repro, causes a
kernel warning:

    r0 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 169);
    exit;

With pointer field sk being at offset 168 in __sk_buff. This access is
detected as a narrower read in bpf_skb_is_valid_access because it
doesn&apos;t match offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk). It is therefore allowed
and later proceeds to bpf_convert_ctx_access. Note that for the
&quot;is_narrower_load&quot; case in the convert_ctx_accesses(), the insn-&gt;off
is aligned, so the cnt may not be 0 because it matches the
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk) in the bpf_convert_ctx_access. However,
the target_size stays 0 and the verifier errors with a kernel warning:

    verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion(1)

This patch fixes that to return a proper &quot;invalid bpf_context access
off=X size=Y&quot; error on the load instruction.

The same issue affects multiple other fields in context structures that
allow narrow access. Some other non-affected fields (for sk_msg,
sk_lookup, and sockopt) were also changed to use bpf_ctx_range_ptr for
consistency.

Note this syzkaller crash was reported in the &quot;Closes&quot; link below, which
used to be about a different bug, fixed in
commit fce7bd8e385a (&quot;bpf/verifier: Handle BPF_LOAD_ACQ instructions
in insn_def_regno()&quot;). Because syzbot somehow confused the two bugs,
the new crash and repro didn&apos;t get reported to the mailing list.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-38591</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="8" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gfs2: No more self recovery

When a node withdraws and it turns out that it is the only node that has
the filesystem mounted, gfs2 currently tries to replay the local journal
to bring the filesystem back into a consistent state.  Not only is that
a very bad idea, it has also never worked because gfs2_recover_func()
will refuse to do anything during a withdraw.

However, before even getting to this point, gfs2_recover_func()
dereferences sdp-&gt;sd_jdesc-&gt;jd_inode.  This was a use-after-free before
commit 04133b607a78 (&quot;gfs2: Prevent double iput for journal on error&quot;)
and is a NULL pointer dereference since then.

Simply get rid of self recovery to fix that.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-38659</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="9" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/net: commit partial buffers on retry

Ring provided buffers are potentially only valid within the single
execution context in which they were acquired. io_uring deals with this
and invalidates them on retry. But on the networking side, if
MSG_WAITALL is set, or if the socket is of the streaming type and too
little was processed, then it will hang on to the buffer rather than
recycle or commit it. This is problematic for two reasons:

1) If someone unregisters the provided buffer ring before a later retry,
   then the req-&gt;buf_list will no longer be valid.

2) If multiple sockers are using the same buffer group, then multiple
   receives can consume the same memory. This can cause data corruption
   in the application, as either receive could land in the same
   userspace buffer.

Fix this by disallowing partial retries from pinning a provided buffer
across multiple executions, if ring provided buffers are used.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-38730</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="10" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

media: rainshadow-cec: fix TOCTOU race condition in rain_interrupt()

In the interrupt handler rain_interrupt(), the buffer full check on
rain-&gt;buf_len is performed before acquiring rain-&gt;buf_lock. This
creates a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition, as
rain-&gt;buf_len is concurrently accessed and modified in the work
handler rain_irq_work_handler() under the same lock.

Multiple interrupt invocations can race, with each reading buf_len
before it becomes full and then proceeding. This can lead to both
interrupts attempting to write to the buffer, incrementing buf_len
beyond its capacity (DATA_SIZE) and causing a buffer overflow.

Fix this bug by moving the spin_lock() to before the buffer full
check. This ensures that the check and the subsequent buffer modification
are performed atomically, preventing the race condition. An corresponding
spin_unlock() is added to the overflow path to correctly release the
lock.

This possible bug was found by an experimental static analysis tool
developed by our team.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-39713</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="11" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu/amd/pgtbl: Fix possible race while increase page table level

The AMD IOMMU host page table implementation supports dynamic page table levels
(up to 6 levels), starting with a 3-level configuration that expands based on
IOVA address. The kernel maintains a root pointer and current page table level
to enable proper page table walks in alloc_pte()/fetch_pte() operations.

The IOMMU IOVA allocator initially starts with 32-bit address and onces its
exhuasted it switches to 64-bit address (max address is determined based
on IOMMU and device DMA capability). To support larger IOVA, AMD IOMMU
driver increases page table level.

But in unmap path (iommu_v1_unmap_pages()), fetch_pte() reads
pgtable-&gt;[root/mode] without lock. So its possible that in exteme corner case,
when increase_address_space() is updating pgtable-&gt;[root/mode], fetch_pte()
reads wrong page table level (pgtable-&gt;mode). It does compare the value with
level encoded in page table and returns NULL. This will result is
iommu_unmap ops to fail and upper layer may retry/log WARN_ON.

CPU 0                                         CPU 1
------                                       ------
map pages                                    unmap pages
alloc_pte() -&gt; increase_address_space()      iommu_v1_unmap_pages() -&gt; fetch_pte()
  pgtable-&gt;root = pte (new root value)
                                             READ pgtable-&gt;[mode/root]
					       Reads new root, old mode
  Updates mode (pgtable-&gt;mode += 1)

Since Page table level updates are infrequent and already synchronized with a
spinlock, implement seqcount to enable lock-free read operations on the read path.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-39961</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="12" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

pinctrl: check the return value of pinmux_ops::get_function_name()

While the API contract in docs doesn&apos;t specify it explicitly, the
generic implementation of the get_function_name() callback from struct
pinmux_ops - pinmux_generic_get_function_name() - can fail and return
NULL. This is already checked in pinmux_check_ops() so add a similar
check in pinmux_func_name_to_selector() instead of passing the returned
pointer right down to strcmp() where the NULL can get dereferenced. This
is normal operation when adding new pinfunctions.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40030</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="13" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/sched: Fix potential double free in drm_sched_job_add_resv_dependencies

When adding dependencies with drm_sched_job_add_dependency(), that
function consumes the fence reference both on success and failure, so in
the latter case the dma_fence_put() on the error path (xarray failed to
expand) is a double free.

Interestingly this bug appears to have been present ever since
commit ebd5f74255b9 (&quot;drm/sched: Add dependency tracking&quot;), since the code
back then looked like this:

drm_sched_job_add_implicit_dependencies():
...
       for (i = 0; i &lt; fence_count; i++) {
               ret = drm_sched_job_add_dependency(job, fences[i]);
               if (ret)
                       break;
       }

       for (; i &lt; fence_count; i++)
               dma_fence_put(fences[i]);

Which means for the failing &apos;i&apos; the dma_fence_put was already a double
free. Possibly there were no users at that time, or the test cases were
insufficient to hit it.

The bug was then only noticed and fixed after
commit 9c2ba265352a (&quot;drm/scheduler: use new iterator in drm_sched_job_add_implicit_dependencies v2&quot;)
landed, with its fixup of
commit 4eaf02d6076c (&quot;drm/scheduler: fix drm_sched_job_add_implicit_dependencies&quot;).

At that point it was a slightly different flavour of a double free, which
commit 963d0b356935 (&quot;drm/scheduler: fix drm_sched_job_add_implicit_dependencies harder&quot;)
noticed and attempted to fix.

But it only moved the double free from happening inside the
drm_sched_job_add_dependency(), when releasing the reference not yet
obtained, to the caller, when releasing the reference already released by
the former in the failure case.

As such it is not easy to identify the right target for the fixes tag so
lets keep it simple and just continue the chain.

While fixing we also improve the comment and explain the reason for taking
the reference and not dropping it.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40096</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.0</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="14" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfrm: delete x-&gt;tunnel as we delete x

The ipcomp fallback tunnels currently get deleted (from the various
lists and hashtables) as the last user state that needed that fallback
is destroyed (not deleted). If a reference to that user state still
exists, the fallback state will remain on the hashtables/lists,
triggering the WARN in xfrm_state_fini. Because of those remaining
references, the fix in commit f75a2804da39 (&quot;xfrm: destroy xfrm_state
synchronously on net exit path&quot;) is not complete.

We recently fixed one such situation in TCP due to defered freeing of
skbs (commit 9b6412e6979f (&quot;tcp: drop secpath at the same time as we
currently drop dst&quot;)). This can also happen due to IP reassembly: skbs
with a secpath remain on the reassembly queue until netns
destruction. If we can&apos;t guarantee that the queues are flushed by the
time xfrm_state_fini runs, there may still be references to a (user)
xfrm_state, preventing the timely deletion of the corresponding
fallback state.

Instead of chasing each instance of skbs holding a secpath one by one,
this patch fixes the issue directly within xfrm, by deleting the
fallback state as soon as the last user state depending on it has been
deleted. Destruction will still happen when the final reference is
dropped.

A separate lockdep class for the fallback state is required since
we&apos;re going to lock x-&gt;tunnel while x is locked.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40215</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="15" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fuse: fix livelock in synchronous file put from fuseblk workers

I observed a hang when running generic/323 against a fuseblk server.
This test opens a file, initiates a lot of AIO writes to that file
descriptor, and closes the file descriptor before the writes complete.
Unsurprisingly, the AIO exerciser threads are mostly stuck waiting for
responses from the fuseblk server:

# cat /proc/372265/task/372313/stack
[&lt;0&gt;] request_wait_answer+0x1fe/0x2a0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] __fuse_simple_request+0xd3/0x2b0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] fuse_do_getattr+0xfc/0x1f0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] fuse_file_read_iter+0xbe/0x1c0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] aio_read+0x130/0x1e0
[&lt;0&gt;] io_submit_one+0x542/0x860
[&lt;0&gt;] __x64_sys_io_submit+0x98/0x1a0
[&lt;0&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x37/0xf0
[&lt;0&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

But the /weird/ part is that the fuseblk server threads are waiting for
responses from itself:

# cat /proc/372210/task/372232/stack
[&lt;0&gt;] request_wait_answer+0x1fe/0x2a0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] __fuse_simple_request+0xd3/0x2b0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] fuse_file_put+0x9a/0xd0 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] fuse_release+0x36/0x50 [fuse]
[&lt;0&gt;] __fput+0xec/0x2b0
[&lt;0&gt;] task_work_run+0x55/0x90
[&lt;0&gt;] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xe9/0x100
[&lt;0&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
[&lt;0&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

The fuseblk server is fuse2fs so there&apos;s nothing all that exciting in
the server itself.  So why is the fuse server calling fuse_file_put?
The commit message for the fstest sheds some light on that:

&quot;By closing the file descriptor before calling io_destroy, you pretty
much guarantee that the last put on the ioctx will be done in interrupt
context (during I/O completion).

Aha.  AIO fgets a new struct file from the fd when it queues the ioctx.
The completion of the FUSE_WRITE command from userspace causes the fuse
server to call the AIO completion function.  The completion puts the
struct file, queuing a delayed fput to the fuse server task.  When the
fuse server task returns to userspace, it has to run the delayed fput,
which in the case of a fuseblk server, it does synchronously.

Sending the FUSE_RELEASE command sychronously from fuse server threads
is a bad idea because a client program can initiate enough simultaneous
AIOs such that all the fuse server threads end up in delayed_fput, and
now there aren&apos;t any threads left to handle the queued fuse commands.

Fix this by only using asynchronous fputs when closing files, and leave
a comment explaining why.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40220</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="16" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs/notify: call exportfs_encode_fid with s_umount

Calling intotify_show_fdinfo() on fd watching an overlayfs inode, while
the overlayfs is being unmounted, can lead to dereferencing NULL ptr.

This issue was found by syzkaller.

Race Condition Diagram:

Thread 1                           Thread 2
--------                           --------

generic_shutdown_super()
 shrink_dcache_for_umount
  sb-&gt;s_root = NULL

                    |
                    |             vfs_read()
                    |              inotify_fdinfo()
                    |               * inode get from mark *
                    |               show_mark_fhandle(m, inode)
                    |                exportfs_encode_fid(inode, ..)
                    |                 ovl_encode_fh(inode, ..)
                    |                  ovl_check_encode_origin(inode)
                    |                   * deref i_sb-&gt;s_root *
                    |
                    |
                    v
 fsnotify_sb_delete(sb)

Which then leads to:

[   32.133461] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
[   32.134438] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
[   32.135032] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 4468 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.17.0-rc6 #22 PREEMPT(none)

&lt;snip registers, unreliable trace&gt;

[   32.143353] Call Trace:
[   32.143732]  ovl_encode_fh+0xd5/0x170
[   32.144031]  exportfs_encode_inode_fh+0x12f/0x300
[   32.144425]  show_mark_fhandle+0xbe/0x1f0
[   32.145805]  inotify_fdinfo+0x226/0x2d0
[   32.146442]  inotify_show_fdinfo+0x1c5/0x350
[   32.147168]  seq_show+0x530/0x6f0
[   32.147449]  seq_read_iter+0x503/0x12a0
[   32.148419]  seq_read+0x31f/0x410
[   32.150714]  vfs_read+0x1f0/0x9e0
[   32.152297]  ksys_read+0x125/0x240

IOW ovl_check_encode_origin derefs inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_root, after it was set
to NULL in the unmount path.

Fix it by protecting calling exportfs_encode_fid() from
show_mark_fhandle() with s_umount lock.

This form of fix was suggested by Amir in [1].

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAOQ4uxhbDwhb+2Brs1UdkoF0a3NSdBAOQPNfEHjahrgoKJpLEw@mail.gmail.com/</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40237</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="17" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gfs2: Fix unlikely race in gdlm_put_lock

In gdlm_put_lock(), there is a small window of time in which the
DFL_UNMOUNT flag has been set but the lockspace hasn&apos;t been released,
yet.  In that window, dlm may still call gdlm_ast() and gdlm_bast().
To prevent it from dereferencing freed glock objects, only free the
glock if the lockspace has actually been released.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40242</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.9</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="18" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

devlink: rate: Unset parent pointer in devl_rate_nodes_destroy

The function devl_rate_nodes_destroy is documented to &quot;Unset parent for
all rate objects&quot;. However, it was only calling the driver-specific
`rate_leaf_parent_set` or `rate_node_parent_set` ops and decrementing
the parent&apos;s refcount, without actually setting the
`devlink_rate-&gt;parent` pointer to NULL.

This leaves a dangling pointer in the `devlink_rate` struct, which cause
refcount error in netdevsim[1] and mlx5[2]. In addition, this is
inconsistent with the behavior of `devlink_nl_rate_parent_node_set`,
where the parent pointer is correctly cleared.

This patch fixes the issue by explicitly setting `devlink_rate-&gt;parent`
to NULL after notifying the driver, thus fulfilling the function&apos;s
documented behavior for all rate objects.

[1]
repro steps:
echo 1 &gt; /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device
devlink dev eswitch set netdevsim/netdevsim1 mode switchdev
echo 1 &gt; /sys/bus/netdevsim/devices/netdevsim1/sriov_numvfs
devlink port function rate add netdevsim/netdevsim1/test_node
devlink port function rate set netdevsim/netdevsim1/128 parent test_node
echo 1 &gt; /sys/bus/netdevsim/del_device

dmesg:
refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 1530 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x42/0xe0
CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 1530 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4+ #1 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x42/0xe0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 devl_rate_leaf_destroy+0x8d/0x90
 __nsim_dev_port_del+0x6c/0x70 [netdevsim]
 nsim_dev_reload_destroy+0x11c/0x140 [netdevsim]
 nsim_drv_remove+0x2b/0xb0 [netdevsim]
 device_release_driver_internal+0x194/0x1f0
 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
 device_del+0x159/0x3c0
 device_unregister+0x1a/0x60
 del_device_store+0x111/0x170 [netdevsim]
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12e/0x1e0
 vfs_write+0x215/0x3d0
 ksys_write+0x5f/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x10f0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

[2]
devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:08:00.0 mode switchdev
devlink port add pci/0000:08:00.0 flavour pcisf pfnum 0 sfnum 1000
devlink port function rate add pci/0000:08:00.0/group1
devlink port function rate set pci/0000:08:00.0/32768 parent group1
modprobe -r mlx5_ib mlx5_fwctl mlx5_core

dmesg:
refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 16151 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x42/0xe0
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 16151 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.17.0-rc7_for_upstream_min_debug_2025_10_02_12_44 #1 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x42/0xe0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 devl_rate_leaf_destroy+0x8d/0x90
 mlx5_esw_offloads_devlink_port_unregister+0x33/0x60 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_esw_offloads_unload_rep+0x3f/0x50 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_eswitch_unload_sf_vport+0x40/0x90 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_sf_esw_event+0xc4/0x120 [mlx5_core]
 notifier_call_chain+0x33/0xa0
 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x3b/0x50
 mlx5_eswitch_disable_locked+0x50/0x110 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_eswitch_disable+0x63/0x90 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_unload+0x1d/0x170 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_uninit_one+0xa2/0x130 [mlx5_core]
 remove_one+0x78/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
 pci_device_remove+0x39/0xa0
 device_release_driver_internal+0x194/0x1f0
 unbind_store+0x99/0xa0
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12e/0x1e0
 vfs_write+0x215/0x3d0
 ksys_write+0x5f/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0x53/0x1f0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40251</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="19" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs/proc: fix uaf in proc_readdir_de()

Pde is erased from subdir rbtree through rb_erase(), but not set the node
to EMPTY, which may result in uaf access.  We should use RB_CLEAR_NODE()
set the erased node to EMPTY, then pde_subdir_next() will return NULL to
avoid uaf access.

We found an uaf issue while using stress-ng testing, need to run testcase
getdent and tun in the same time.  The steps of the issue is as follows:

1) use getdent to traverse dir /proc/pid/net/dev_snmp6/, and current
   pde is tun3;

2) in the [time windows] unregister netdevice tun3 and tun2, and erase
   them from rbtree.  erase tun3 first, and then erase tun2.  the
   pde(tun2) will be released to slab;

3) continue to getdent process, then pde_subdir_next() will return
   pde(tun2) which is released, it will case uaf access.

CPU 0                                      |    CPU 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
traverse dir /proc/pid/net/dev_snmp6/      |   unregister_netdevice(tun-&gt;dev)   //tun3 tun2
sys_getdents64()                           |
  iterate_dir()                            |
    proc_readdir()                         |
      proc_readdir_de()                    |     snmp6_unregister_dev()
        pde_get(de);                       |       proc_remove()
        read_unlock(&amp;proc_subdir_lock);    |         remove_proc_subtree()
                                           |           write_lock(&amp;proc_subdir_lock);
        [time window]                      |           rb_erase(&amp;root-&gt;subdir_node, &amp;parent-&gt;subdir);
                                           |           write_unlock(&amp;proc_subdir_lock);
        read_lock(&amp;proc_subdir_lock);      |
        next = pde_subdir_next(de);        |
        pde_put(de);                       |
        de = next;    //UAF                |

rbtree of dev_snmp6
                        |
                    pde(tun3)
                     /    \
                  NULL  pde(tun2)</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40271</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.0</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="20" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/secretmem: fix use-after-free race in fault handler

When a page fault occurs in a secret memory file created with
`memfd_secret(2)`, the kernel will allocate a new folio for it, mark the
underlying page as not-present in the direct map, and add it to the file
mapping.

If two tasks cause a fault in the same page concurrently, both could end
up allocating a folio and removing the page from the direct map, but only
one would succeed in adding the folio to the file mapping.  The task that
failed undoes the effects of its attempt by (a) freeing the folio again
and (b) putting the page back into the direct map.  However, by doing
these two operations in this order, the page becomes available to the
allocator again before it is placed back in the direct mapping.

If another task attempts to allocate the page between (a) and (b), and the
kernel tries to access it via the direct map, it would result in a
supervisor not-present page fault.

Fix the ordering to restore the direct map before the folio is freed.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40272</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="21" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/vmwgfx: Validate command header size against SVGA_CMD_MAX_DATASIZE

This data originates from userspace and is used in buffer offset
calculations which could potentially overflow causing an out-of-bounds
access.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40277</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="22" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix OOB access in parse_adv_monitor_pattern()

In the parse_adv_monitor_pattern() function, the value of
the &apos;length&apos; variable is currently limited to HCI_MAX_EXT_AD_LENGTH(251).
The size of the &apos;value&apos; array in the mgmt_adv_pattern structure is 31.
If the value of &apos;pattern[i].length&apos; is set in the user space
and exceeds 31, the &apos;patterns[i].value&apos; array can be accessed
out of bound when copied.

Increasing the size of the &apos;value&apos; array in
the &apos;mgmt_adv_pattern&apos; structure will break the userspace.
Considering this, and to avoid OOB access revert the limits for &apos;offset&apos;
and &apos;length&apos; back to the value of HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH.

Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center
(linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40294</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.3</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="23" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_event: validate skb length for unknown CC opcode

In hci_cmd_complete_evt(), if the command complete event has an unknown
opcode, we assume the first byte of the remaining skb-&gt;data contains the
return status. However, parameter data has previously been pulled in
hci_event_func(), which may leave the skb empty. If so, using skb-&gt;data[0]
for the return status uses un-init memory.

The fix is to check skb-&gt;len before using skb-&gt;data.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40301</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="24" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: bcsp: receive data only if registered

Currently, bcsp_recv() can be called even when the BCSP protocol has not
been registered. This leads to a NULL pointer dereference, as shown in
the following stack trace:

    KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000108-0x000000000000010f]
    RIP: 0010:bcsp_recv+0x13d/0x1740 drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c:590
    Call Trace:
     &lt;TASK&gt;
     hci_uart_tty_receive+0x194/0x220 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c:627
     tiocsti+0x23c/0x2c0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2290
     tty_ioctl+0x626/0xde0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2706
     vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
     __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
     __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
     do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
     do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

To prevent this, ensure that the HCI_UART_REGISTERED flag is set before
processing received data. If the protocol is not registered, return
-EUNATCH.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40308</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="25" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix race in hci_cmd_sync_dequeue_once

hci_cmd_sync_dequeue_once() does lookup and then cancel
the entry under two separate lock sections. Meanwhile,
hci_cmd_sync_work() can also delete the same entry,
leading to double list_del() and &quot;UAF&quot;.

Fix this by holding cmd_sync_work_lock across both
lookup and cancel, so that the entry cannot be removed
concurrently.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40318</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.0</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="26" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

futex: Don&apos;t leak robust_list pointer on exec race

sys_get_robust_list() and compat_get_robust_list() use ptrace_may_access()
to check if the calling task is allowed to access another task&apos;s
robust_list pointer. This check is racy against a concurrent exec() in the
target process.

During exec(), a task may transition from a non-privileged binary to a
privileged one (e.g., setuid binary) and its credentials/memory mappings
may change. If get_robust_list() performs ptrace_may_access() before
this transition, it may erroneously allow access to sensitive information
after the target becomes privileged.

A racy access allows an attacker to exploit a window during which
ptrace_may_access() passes before a target process transitions to a
privileged state via exec().

For example, consider a non-privileged task T that is about to execute a
setuid-root binary. An attacker task A calls get_robust_list(T) while T
is still unprivileged. Since ptrace_may_access() checks permissions
based on current credentials, it succeeds. However, if T begins exec
immediately afterwards, it becomes privileged and may change its memory
mappings. Because get_robust_list() proceeds to access T-&gt;robust_list
without synchronizing with exec() it may read user-space pointers from a
now-privileged process.

This violates the intended post-exec access restrictions and could
expose sensitive memory addresses or be used as a primitive in a larger
exploit chain. Consequently, the race can lead to unauthorized
disclosure of information across privilege boundaries and poses a
potential security risk.

Take a read lock on signal-&gt;exec_update_lock prior to invoking
ptrace_may_access() and accessing the robust_list/compat_robust_list.
This ensures that the target task&apos;s exec state remains stable during the
check, allowing for consistent and synchronized validation of
credentials.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40341</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Low</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>3.3</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="27" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvme-fc: use lock accessing port_state and rport state

nvme_fc_unregister_remote removes the remote port on a lport object at
any point in time when there is no active association. This races with
with the reconnect logic, because nvme_fc_create_association is not
taking a lock to check the port_state and atomically increase the
active count on the rport.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40342</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="28" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvmet-fc: avoid scheduling association deletion twice

When forcefully shutting down a port via the configfs interface,
nvmet_port_subsys_drop_link() first calls nvmet_port_del_ctrls() and
then nvmet_disable_port(). Both functions will eventually schedule all
remaining associations for deletion.

The current implementation checks whether an association is about to be
removed, but only after the work item has already been scheduled. As a
result, it is possible for the first scheduled work item to free all
resources, and then for the same work item to be scheduled again for
deletion.

Because the association list is an RCU list, it is not possible to take
a lock and remove the list entry directly, so it cannot be looked up
again. Instead, a flag (terminating) must be used to determine whether
the association is already in the process of being deleted.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40343</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.2</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="29" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

arch_topology: Fix incorrect error check in topology_parse_cpu_capacity()

Fix incorrect use of PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO() in topology_parse_cpu_capacity()
which causes the code to proceed with NULL clock pointers. The current
logic uses !PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cpu_clk) which evaluates to true for both
valid pointers and NULL, leading to potential NULL pointer dereference
in clk_get_rate().

Per include/linux/err.h documentation, PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(ptr) returns:
&quot;The error code within @ptr if it is an error pointer; 0 otherwise.&quot;

This means PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO() returns 0 for both valid pointers AND NULL
pointers. Therefore !PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cpu_clk) evaluates to true (proceed)
when cpu_clk is either valid or NULL, causing clk_get_rate(NULL) to be
called when of_clk_get() returns NULL.

Replace with !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(cpu_clk) which only proceeds for valid
pointers, preventing potential NULL pointer dereference in clk_get_rate().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40346</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="30" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

hfsplus: fix KMSAN uninit-value issue in hfsplus_delete_cat()

The syzbot reported issue in hfsplus_delete_cat():

[   70.682285][ T9333] =====================================================
[   70.682943][ T9333] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hfsplus_subfolders_dec+0x1d7/0x220
[   70.683640][ T9333]  hfsplus_subfolders_dec+0x1d7/0x220
[   70.684141][ T9333]  hfsplus_delete_cat+0x105d/0x12b0
[   70.684621][ T9333]  hfsplus_rmdir+0x13d/0x310
[   70.685048][ T9333]  vfs_rmdir+0x5ba/0x810
[   70.685447][ T9333]  do_rmdir+0x964/0xea0
[   70.685833][ T9333]  __x64_sys_rmdir+0x71/0xb0
[   70.686260][ T9333]  x64_sys_call+0xcd8/0x3cf0
[   70.686695][ T9333]  do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0
[   70.687119][ T9333]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   70.687646][ T9333]
[   70.687856][ T9333] Uninit was stored to memory at:
[   70.688311][ T9333]  hfsplus_subfolders_inc+0x1c2/0x1d0
[   70.688779][ T9333]  hfsplus_create_cat+0x148e/0x1800
[   70.689231][ T9333]  hfsplus_mknod+0x27f/0x600
[   70.689730][ T9333]  hfsplus_mkdir+0x5a/0x70
[   70.690146][ T9333]  vfs_mkdir+0x483/0x7a0
[   70.690545][ T9333]  do_mkdirat+0x3f2/0xd30
[   70.690944][ T9333]  __x64_sys_mkdir+0x9a/0xf0
[   70.691380][ T9333]  x64_sys_call+0x2f89/0x3cf0
[   70.691816][ T9333]  do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0
[   70.692229][ T9333]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   70.692773][ T9333]
[   70.692990][ T9333] Uninit was stored to memory at:
[   70.693469][ T9333]  hfsplus_subfolders_inc+0x1c2/0x1d0
[   70.693960][ T9333]  hfsplus_create_cat+0x148e/0x1800
[   70.694438][ T9333]  hfsplus_fill_super+0x21c1/0x2700
[   70.694911][ T9333]  mount_bdev+0x37b/0x530
[   70.695320][ T9333]  hfsplus_mount+0x4d/0x60
[   70.695729][ T9333]  legacy_get_tree+0x113/0x2c0
[   70.696167][ T9333]  vfs_get_tree+0xb3/0x5c0
[   70.696588][ T9333]  do_new_mount+0x73e/0x1630
[   70.697013][ T9333]  path_mount+0x6e3/0x1eb0
[   70.697425][ T9333]  __se_sys_mount+0x733/0x830
[   70.697857][ T9333]  __x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x150
[   70.698269][ T9333]  x64_sys_call+0x2691/0x3cf0
[   70.698704][ T9333]  do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0
[   70.699117][ T9333]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   70.699730][ T9333]
[   70.699946][ T9333] Uninit was created at:
[   70.700378][ T9333]  __alloc_pages_noprof+0x714/0xe60
[   70.700843][ T9333]  alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x2a2/0x9b0
[   70.701331][ T9333]  alloc_pages_noprof+0xf8/0x1f0
[   70.701774][ T9333]  allocate_slab+0x30e/0x1390
[   70.702194][ T9333]  ___slab_alloc+0x1049/0x33a0
[   70.702635][ T9333]  kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x5ce/0xb20
[   70.703153][ T9333]  hfsplus_alloc_inode+0x5a/0xd0
[   70.703598][ T9333]  alloc_inode+0x82/0x490
[   70.703984][ T9333]  iget_locked+0x22e/0x1320
[   70.704428][ T9333]  hfsplus_iget+0x5c/0xba0
[   70.704827][ T9333]  hfsplus_btree_open+0x135/0x1dd0
[   70.705291][ T9333]  hfsplus_fill_super+0x1132/0x2700
[   70.705776][ T9333]  mount_bdev+0x37b/0x530
[   70.706171][ T9333]  hfsplus_mount+0x4d/0x60
[   70.706579][ T9333]  legacy_get_tree+0x113/0x2c0
[   70.707019][ T9333]  vfs_get_tree+0xb3/0x5c0
[   70.707444][ T9333]  do_new_mount+0x73e/0x1630
[   70.707865][ T9333]  path_mount+0x6e3/0x1eb0
[   70.708270][ T9333]  __se_sys_mount+0x733/0x830
[   70.708711][ T9333]  __x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x150
[   70.709158][ T9333]  x64_sys_call+0x2691/0x3cf0
[   70.709630][ T9333]  do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0
[   70.710053][ T9333]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   70.710611][ T9333]
[   70.710842][ T9333] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9333 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-dirty #17
[   70.711568][ T9333] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   70.712490][ T9333] =====================================================
[   70.713085][ T9333] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[   70.713618][ T9333] Kernel panic - not syncing: kmsan.panic set ...
[   70.714159][ T9333] 
---truncated---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40351</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="31" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

riscv: stacktrace: Disable KASAN checks for non-current tasks

Unwinding the stack of a task other than current, KASAN would report
&quot;BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in walk_stackframe+0x41c/0x460&quot;

There is a same issue on x86 and has been resolved by the commit
84936118bdf3 (&quot;x86/unwind: Disable KASAN checks for non-current tasks&quot;)
The solution could be applied to RISC-V too.

This patch also can solve the issue:
https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2025/q4/23

[</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40358</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>6.3</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="32" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

perf/x86/intel: Fix KASAN global-out-of-bounds warning

When running &quot;perf mem record&quot; command on CWF, the below KASAN
global-out-of-bounds warning is seen.

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in cmt_latency_data+0x176/0x1b0
  Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffb721d000 by task dtlb/9850

  Call Trace:

   kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
   cmt_latency_data+0x176/0x1b0
   setup_arch_pebs_sample_data+0xf49/0x2560
   intel_pmu_drain_arch_pebs+0x577/0xb00
   handle_pmi_common+0x6c4/0xc80

The issue is caused by below code in __grt_latency_data(). The code
tries to access x86_hybrid_pmu structure which doesn&apos;t exist on
non-hybrid platform like CWF.

        WARN_ON_ONCE(hybrid_pmu(event-&gt;pmu)-&gt;pmu_type == hybrid_big)

So add is_hybrid() check before calling this WARN_ON_ONCE to fix the
global-out-of-bounds access issue.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40359</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="33" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-40361</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="34" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/fpu: Ensure XFD state on signal delivery

Sean reported [1] the following splat when running KVM tests:

   WARNING: CPU: 232 PID: 15391 at xfd_validate_state+0x65/0x70
   Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    fpu__clear_user_states+0x9c/0x100
    arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x142/0x210
    exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x55/0x100
    do_syscall_64+0x205/0x2c0
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Chao further identified [2] a reproducible scenario involving signal
delivery: a non-AMX task is preempted by an AMX-enabled task which
modifies the XFD MSR.

When the non-AMX task resumes and reloads XSTATE with init values,
a warning is triggered due to a mismatch between fpstate::xfd and the
CPU&apos;s current XFD state. fpu__clear_user_states() does not currently
re-synchronize the XFD state after such preemption.

Invoke xfd_update_state() which detects and corrects the mismatch if
there is a dynamic feature.

This also benefits the sigreturn path, as fpu__restore_sig() may call
fpu__clear_user_states() when the sigframe is inaccessible.

[ dhansen: minor changelog munging ]</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68171</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="35" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ftrace: Fix softlockup in ftrace_module_enable

A soft lockup was observed when loading amdgpu module.
If a module has a lot of tracable functions, multiple calls
to kallsyms_lookup can spend too much time in RCU critical
section and with disabled preemption, causing kernel panic.
This is the same issue that was fixed in
commit d0b24b4e91fc (&quot;ftrace: Prevent RCU stall on PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY
kernels&quot;) and commit 42ea22e754ba (&quot;ftrace: Add cond_resched() to
ftrace_graph_set_hash()&quot;).

Fix it the same way by adding cond_resched() in ftrace_module_enable.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68173</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="36" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

amd/amdkfd: enhance kfd process check in switch partition

current switch partition only check if kfd_processes_table is empty.
kfd_prcesses_table entry is deleted in kfd_process_notifier_release, but
kfd_process tear down is in kfd_process_wq_release.

consider two processes:

Process A (workqueue) -&gt; kfd_process_wq_release -&gt; Access kfd_node member
Process B switch partition -&gt; amdgpu_xcp_pre_partition_switch -&gt; amdgpu_amdkfd_device_fini_sw
-&gt; kfd_node tear down.

Process A and B may trigger a race as shown in dmesg log.

This patch is to resolve the race by adding an atomic kfd_process counter
kfd_processes_count, it increment as create kfd process, decrement as
finish kfd_process_wq_release.

v2: Put kfd_processes_count per kfd_dev, move decrement to kfd_process_destroy_pdds
and bug fix. (Philip Yang)

[3966658.307702] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[3966658.350818]  i10nm_edac
[3966658.356318] CPU: 124 PID: 38435 Comm: kworker/124:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted
[3966658.356890] Workqueue: kfd_process_wq kfd_process_wq_release [amdgpu]
[3966658.362839]  nfit
[3966658.366457] RIP: 0010:kfd_get_num_sdma_engines+0x17/0x40 [amdgpu]
[3966658.366460] Code: 00 00 e9 ac 81 02 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 4f 08 48 8b b7 00 01 00 00 8b 81 58 26 03 00 99 &lt;f7&gt; be b8 01 00 00 80 b9 70 2e 00 00 00 74 0b 83 f8 02 ba 02 00 00
[3966658.380967]  x86_pkg_temp_thermal
[3966658.391529] RSP: 0018:ffffc900a0edfdd8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[3966658.391531] RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8974e593b800 RCX: ffff888645900000
[3966658.391531] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888129154400 RDI: ffff888129151c00
[3966658.391532] RBP: ffff8883ad79d400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8890d2750af4
[3966658.391532] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: 0000000000000018 R12: 0000000000000000
[3966658.391533] R13: ffff8883ad79d400 R14: ffffe87ff662ba00 R15: ffff8974e593b800
[3966658.391533] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88fe7f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[3966658.391534] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[3966658.391534] CR2: 0000000000d71000 CR3: 000000dd0e970004 CR4: 0000000002770ee0
[3966658.391535] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[3966658.391535] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[3966658.391536] PKRU: 55555554
[3966658.391536] Call Trace:
[3966658.391674]  deallocate_sdma_queue+0x38/0xa0 [amdgpu]
[3966658.391762]  process_termination_cpsch+0x1ed/0x480 [amdgpu]
[3966658.399754]  intel_powerclamp
[3966658.402831]  kfd_process_dequeue_from_all_devices+0x5b/0xc0 [amdgpu]
[3966658.402908]  kfd_process_wq_release+0x1a/0x1a0 [amdgpu]
[3966658.410516]  coretemp
[3966658.434016]  process_one_work+0x1ad/0x380
[3966658.434021]  worker_thread+0x49/0x310
[3966658.438963]  kvm_intel
[3966658.446041]  ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
[3966658.446045]  kthread+0x118/0x140
[3966658.446047]  ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
[3966658.446050]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[3966658.446053] Modules linked in: kpatch_20765354(OEK)
[3966658.455310]  kvm
[3966658.464534]  mptcp_diag xsk_diag raw_diag unix_diag af_packet_diag netlink_diag udp_diag act_pedit act_mirred act_vlan cls_flower kpatch_21951273(OEK) kpatch_18424469(OEK) kpatch_19749756(OEK)
[3966658.473462]  idxd_mdev
[3966658.482306]  kpatch_17971294(OEK) sch_ingress xt_conntrack amdgpu(OE) amdxcp(OE) amddrm_buddy(OE) amd_sched(OE) amdttm(OE) amdkcl(OE) intel_ifs iptable_mangle tcm_loop target_core_pscsi tcp_diag target_core_file inet_diag target_core_iblock target_core_user target_core_mod coldpgs kpatch_18383292(OEK) ip6table_nat ip6table_filter ip6_tables ip_set_hash_ipportip ip_set_hash_ipportnet ip_set_hash_ipport ip_set_bitmap_port xt_comment iptable_nat nf_nat iptable_filter ip_tables ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 sn_core_odd(OE) i40e overlay binfmt_misc tun bonding(OE) aisqos(OE) aisqo
---truncated---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68174</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="37" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

PCI: cadence: Check for the existence of cdns_pcie::ops before using it

cdns_pcie::ops might not be populated by all the Cadence glue drivers. This
is going to be true for the upcoming Sophgo platform which doesn&apos;t set the
ops.

Hence, add a check to prevent NULL pointer dereference.

[mani: reworded subject and description]</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68176</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="38" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tcp: use dst_dev_rcu() in tcp_fastopen_active_disable_ofo_check()

Use RCU to avoid a pair of atomic operations and a potential
UAF on dst_dev()-&gt;flags.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68188</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="39" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Add bpf_prog_run_data_pointers()

syzbot found that cls_bpf_classify() is able to change
tc_skb_cb(skb)-&gt;drop_reason triggering a warning in sk_skb_reason_drop().

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5965 at net/core/skbuff.c:1192 __sk_skb_reason_drop net/core/skbuff.c:1189 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5965 at net/core/skbuff.c:1192 sk_skb_reason_drop+0x76/0x170 net/core/skbuff.c:1214

struct tc_skb_cb has been added in commit ec624fe740b4 (&quot;net/sched:
Extend qdisc control block with tc control block&quot;), which added a wrong
interaction with db58ba459202 (&quot;bpf: wire in data and data_end for
cls_act_bpf&quot;).

drop_reason was added later.

Add bpf_prog_run_data_pointers() helper to save/restore the net_sched
storage colliding with BPF data_meta/data_end.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68200</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="40" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nft_ct: add seqadj extension for natted connections

Sequence adjustment may be required for FTP traffic with PASV/EPSV modes.
due to need to re-write packet payload (IP, port) on the ftp control
connection. This can require changes to the TCP length and expected
seq / ack_seq.

The easiest way to reproduce this issue is with PASV mode.
Example ruleset:
table inet ftp_nat {
        ct helper ftp_helper {
                type &quot;ftp&quot; protocol tcp
                l3proto inet
        }

        chain prerouting {
                type filter hook prerouting priority 0; policy accept;
                tcp dport 21 ct state new ct helper set &quot;ftp_helper&quot;
        }
}
table ip nat {
        chain prerouting {
                type nat hook prerouting priority -100; policy accept;
                tcp dport 21 dnat ip prefix to ip daddr map {
			192.168.100.1 : 192.168.13.2/32 }
        }

        chain postrouting {
                type nat hook postrouting priority 100 ; policy accept;
                tcp sport 21 snat ip prefix to ip saddr map {
			192.168.13.2 : 192.168.100.1/32 }
        }
}

Note that the ftp helper gets assigned *after* the dnat setup.

The inverse (nat after helper assign) is handled by an existing
check in nf_nat_setup_info() and will not show the problem.

Topoloy:

 +-------------------+     +----------------------------------+
 | FTP: 192.168.13.2 | &lt;-&gt; | NAT: 192.168.13.3, 192.168.100.1 |
 +-------------------+     +----------------------------------+
                                      |
                         +-----------------------+
                         | Client: 192.168.100.2 |
                         +-----------------------+

ftp nat changes do not work as expected in this case:
Connected to 192.168.100.1.
[..]
ftp&gt; epsv
EPSV/EPRT on IPv4 off.
ftp&gt; ls
227 Entering passive mode (192,168,100,1,209,129).
421 Service not available, remote server has closed connection.

Kernel logs:
Missing nfct_seqadj_ext_add() setup call
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_seqadj.c:41
[..]
 __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet+0x100/0x160 [nf_nat]
 nf_nat_ftp+0x142/0x280 [nf_nat_ftp]
 help+0x4d1/0x880 [nf_conntrack_ftp]
 nf_confirm+0x122/0x2e0 [nf_conntrack]
 nf_hook_slow+0x3c/0xb0
 ..

Fix this by adding the required extension when a conntrack helper is assigned
to a connection that has a nat binding.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68206</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="41" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: account for current allocated stack depth in widen_imprecise_scalars()

The usage pattern for widen_imprecise_scalars() looks as follows:

    prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, ...);
    queued_st = push_stack(...);
    widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st);

Where prev_st is an ancestor of the queued_st in the explored states
tree. This ancestor is not guaranteed to have same allocated stack
depth as queued_st. E.g. in the following case:

    def main():
      for i in 1..2:
        foo(i)        // same callsite, differnt param

    def foo(i):
      if i == 1:
        use 128 bytes of stack
      iterator based loop

Here, for a second &apos;foo&apos; call prev_st-&gt;allocated_stack is 128,
while queued_st-&gt;allocated_stack is much smaller.
widen_imprecise_scalars() needs to take this into account and avoid
accessing bpf_verifier_state-&gt;frame[*]-&gt;stack out of bounds.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68208</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="42" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

timers: Fix NULL function pointer race in timer_shutdown_sync()

There is a race condition between timer_shutdown_sync() and timer
expiration that can lead to hitting a WARN_ON in expire_timers().

The issue occurs when timer_shutdown_sync() clears the timer function
to NULL while the timer is still running on another CPU. The race
scenario looks like this:

CPU0					CPU1
					&lt;SOFTIRQ&gt;
					lock_timer_base()
					expire_timers()
					base-&gt;running_timer = timer;
					unlock_timer_base()
					[call_timer_fn enter]
					mod_timer()
					...
timer_shutdown_sync()
lock_timer_base()
// For now, will not detach the timer but only clear its function to NULL
if (base-&gt;running_timer != timer)
	ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true);
if (shutdown)
	timer-&gt;function = NULL;
unlock_timer_base()
					[call_timer_fn exit]
					lock_timer_base()
					base-&gt;running_timer = NULL;
					unlock_timer_base()
					...
					// Now timer is pending while its function set to NULL.
					// next timer trigger
					&lt;SOFTIRQ&gt;
					expire_timers()
					WARN_ON_ONCE(!fn) // hit
					...
lock_timer_base()
// Now timer will detach
if (base-&gt;running_timer != timer)
	ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true);
if (shutdown)
	timer-&gt;function = NULL;
unlock_timer_base()

The problem is that timer_shutdown_sync() clears the timer function
regardless of whether the timer is currently running. This can leave a
pending timer with a NULL function pointer, which triggers the
WARN_ON_ONCE(!fn) check in expire_timers().

Fix this by only clearing the timer function when actually detaching the
timer. If the timer is running, leave the function pointer intact, which is
safe because the timer will be properly detached when it finishes running.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68214</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="43" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nouveau/firmware: Add missing kfree() of nvkm_falcon_fw::boot

nvkm_falcon_fw::boot is allocated, but no one frees it. This causes a
kmemleak warning.

Make sure this data is deallocated.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68235</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="44" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: SVM: Don&apos;t skip unrelated instruction if INT3/INTO is replaced

When re-injecting a soft interrupt from an INT3, INT0, or (select) INTn
instruction, discard the exception and retry the instruction if the code
stream is changed (e.g. by a different vCPU) between when the CPU
executes the instruction and when KVM decodes the instruction to get the
next RIP.

As effectively predicted by commit 6ef88d6e36c2 (&quot;KVM: SVM: Re-inject
INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction&quot;), failure to verify that
the correct INTn instruction was decoded can effectively clobber guest
state due to decoding the wrong instruction and thus specifying the
wrong next RIP.

The bug most often manifests as &quot;Oops: int3&quot; panics on static branch
checks in Linux guests.  Enabling or disabling a static branch in Linux
uses the kernel&apos;s &quot;text poke&quot; code patching mechanism.  To modify code
while other CPUs may be executing that code, Linux (temporarily)
replaces the first byte of the original instruction with an int3 (opcode
0xcc), then patches in the new code stream except for the first byte,
and finally replaces the int3 with the first byte of the new code
stream.  If a CPU hits the int3, i.e. executes the code while it&apos;s being
modified, then the guest kernel must look up the RIP to determine how to
handle the #BP, e.g. by emulating the new instruction.  If the RIP is
incorrect, then this lookup fails and the guest kernel panics.

The bug reproduces almost instantly by hacking the guest kernel to
repeatedly check a static branch[1] while running a drgn script[2] on
the host to constantly swap out the memory containing the guest&apos;s TSS.

[1]: https://gist.github.com/osandov/44d17c51c28c0ac998ea0334edf90b5a
[2]: https://gist.github.com/osandov/10e45e45afa29b11e0c7209247afc00b</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68259</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="45" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: add i_data_sem protection in ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock()

Fix a race between inline data destruction and block mapping.

The function ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock() changes the inode data
layout by clearing EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA and setting EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS.
At the same time, another thread may execute ext4_map_blocks(), which
tests EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS to decide whether to call ext4_ext_map_blocks()
or ext4_ind_map_blocks().

Without i_data_sem protection, ext4_ind_map_blocks() may receive inode
with EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS flag and triggering assert.

kernel BUG at fs/ext4/indirect.c:546!
EXT4-fs (loop2): unmounting filesystem.
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ext4_ind_map_blocks.cold+0x2b/0x5a fs/ext4/indirect.c:546

Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ext4_map_blocks+0xb9b/0x16f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:681
 _ext4_get_block+0x242/0x590 fs/ext4/inode.c:822
 ext4_block_write_begin+0x48b/0x12c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:1124
 ext4_write_begin+0x598/0xef0 fs/ext4/inode.c:1255
 ext4_da_write_begin+0x21e/0x9c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:3000
 generic_perform_write+0x259/0x5d0 mm/filemap.c:3846
 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x15b/0x470 fs/ext4/file.c:285
 ext4_file_write_iter+0x8e0/0x17f0 fs/ext4/file.c:679
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2271 [inline]
 do_iter_readv_writev+0x212/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:735
 do_iter_write+0x186/0x710 fs/read_write.c:861
 vfs_iter_write+0x70/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902
 iter_file_splice_write+0x73b/0xc90 fs/splice.c:685
 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:763 [inline]
 direct_splice_actor+0x10f/0x170 fs/splice.c:950
 splice_direct_to_actor+0x33a/0xa10 fs/splice.c:896
 do_splice_direct+0x1a9/0x280 fs/splice.c:1002
 do_sendfile+0xb13/0x12c0 fs/read_write.c:1255
 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cf/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1309
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68261</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="46" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: refresh inline data size before write operations

The cached ei-&gt;i_inline_size can become stale between the initial size
check and when ext4_update_inline_data()/ext4_create_inline_data() use
it. Although ext4_get_max_inline_size() reads the correct value at the
time of the check, concurrent xattr operations can modify i_inline_size
before ext4_write_lock_xattr() is acquired.

This causes ext4_update_inline_data() and ext4_create_inline_data() to
work with stale capacity values, leading to a BUG_ON() crash in
ext4_write_inline_data():

  kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inline.c:1331!
  BUG_ON(pos + len &gt; EXT4_I(inode)-&gt;i_inline_size);

The race window:
1. ext4_get_max_inline_size() reads i_inline_size = 60 (correct)
2. Size check passes for 50-byte write
3. [Another thread adds xattr, i_inline_size changes to 40]
4. ext4_write_lock_xattr() acquires lock
5. ext4_update_inline_data() uses stale i_inline_size = 60
6. Attempts to write 50 bytes but only 40 bytes actually available
7. BUG_ON() triggers

Fix this by recalculating i_inline_size via ext4_find_inline_data_nolock()
immediately after acquiring xattr_sem. This ensures ext4_update_inline_data()
and ext4_create_inline_data() work with current values that are protected
from concurrent modifications.

This is similar to commit a54c4613dac1 (&quot;ext4: fix race writing to an
inline_data file while its xattrs are changing&quot;) which fixed i_inline_off
staleness. This patch addresses the related i_inline_size staleness issue.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68264</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="47" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime

The namespaces can access the controller&apos;s admin request_queue, and
stale references on the namespaces may exist after tearing down the
controller. Ensure the admin request_queue is active by moving the
controller&apos;s &apos;put&apos; to after all controller references have been released
to ensure no one is can access the request_queue. This fixes a reported
use-after-free bug:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88c0a53819f8 by task nvme/3287
  CPU: 67 UID: 0 PID: 3287 Comm: nvme Tainted: G            E       6.13.2-ga1582f1a031e #15
  Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
  Hardware name: Jabil /EGS 2S MB1, BIOS 1.00 06/18/2025
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0x4f/0x60
   print_report+0xc4/0x620
   ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x70/0xb0
   ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x30
   ? blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0
   kasan_report+0xab/0xe0
   ? blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0
   blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0
   ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x75/0x1d0
   ? blk_queue_start_drain+0x70/0x70
   ? irq_work_queue+0x18/0x20
   ? vprintk_emit.part.0+0x1cc/0x350
   ? wake_up_klogd_work_func+0x60/0x60
   blk_mq_alloc_request+0x2b7/0x6b0
   ? __blk_mq_alloc_requests+0x1060/0x1060
   ? __switch_to+0x5b7/0x1060
   nvme_submit_user_cmd+0xa9/0x330
   nvme_user_cmd.isra.0+0x240/0x3f0
   ? force_sigsegv+0xe0/0xe0
   ? nvme_user_cmd64+0x400/0x400
   ? vfs_fileattr_set+0x9b0/0x9b0
   ? cgroup_update_frozen_flag+0x24/0x1c0
   ? cgroup_leave_frozen+0x204/0x330
   ? nvme_ioctl+0x7c/0x2c0
   blkdev_ioctl+0x1a8/0x4d0
   ? blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1930/0x1930
   ? fdget+0x54/0x380
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x190
   do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  RIP: 0033:0x7f765f703b0b
  Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d dd 52 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  RSP: 002b:00007ffe2cefe808 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe2cefe860 RCX: 00007f765f703b0b
  RDX: 00007ffe2cefe860 RSI: 00000000c0484e41 RDI: 0000000000000003
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 00007f765f611d50 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003
  R13: 00000000c0484e41 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007ffe2cefea60
   &lt;/TASK&gt;</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68265</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="48" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: fix crash in process_v2_sparse_read() for encrypted directories

The crash in process_v2_sparse_read() for fscrypt-encrypted directories
has been reported. Issue takes place for Ceph msgr2 protocol in secure
mode. It can be reproduced by the steps:

sudo mount -t ceph :/ /mnt/cephfs/ -o name=admin,fs=cephfs,ms_mode=secure

(1) mkdir /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3
(2) cp area_decrypted.tar /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3
(3) fscrypt encrypt --source=raw_key --key=./my.key /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3
(4) fscrypt lock /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3
(5) fscrypt unlock --key=my.key /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3
(6) cat /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3/area_decrypted.tar
(7) Issue has been triggered

[  408.072247] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  408.072251] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 392 at net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:865
ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x4b39/0x72f0
[  408.072267] Modules linked in: intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common
intel_uncore_frequency_common intel_pmc_core pmt_telemetry pmt_discovery
pmt_class intel_pmc_ssram_telemetry intel_vsec kvm_intel joydev kvm irqbypass
polyval_clmulni ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel rapl input_leds psmouse
serio_raw i2c_piix4 vga16fb bochs vgastate i2c_smbus floppy mac_hid qemu_fw_cfg
pata_acpi sch_fq_codel rbd msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore
[  408.072304] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 392 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc7+
[  408.072307] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.17.0-5.fc42 04/01/2014
[  408.072310] Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn
[  408.072314] RIP: 0010:ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x4b39/0x72f0
[  408.072317] Code: c7 c1 20 f0 d4 ae 50 31 d2 48 c7 c6 60 27 d5 ae 48 c7 c7 f8
8e 6f b0 68 60 38 d5 ae e8 00 47 61 fe 48 83 c4 18 e9 ac fc ff ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b e9 06
fe ff ff 4c 8b 9d 98 fd ff ff 0f 84 64 e7 ff ff 89 85
[  408.072319] RSP: 0018:ffff88811c3e7a30 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  408.072322] RAX: ffffed1024874c6f RBX: ffffea00042c2b40 RCX: 0000000000000f38
[  408.072324] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  408.072325] RBP: ffff88811c3e7ca8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000000000c8
[  408.072326] R10: 00000000000000c8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000000c8
[  408.072327] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8881243a6030 R15: 0000000000003000
[  408.072329] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88823eadf000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  408.072331] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  408.072332] CR2: 000000c0003c6000 CR3: 000000010c106005 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
[  408.072336] PKRU: 55555554
[  408.072337] Call Trace:
[  408.072338]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  408.072340]  ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10
[  408.072344]  ? __pfx_ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x10/0x10
[  408.072347]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x40
[  408.072349]  ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x15d/0x830
[  408.072353]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  408.072357]  ? mutex_lock+0x84/0xe0
[  408.072359]  ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[  408.072361]  ceph_con_workfn+0x27e/0x10e0
[  408.072364]  ? metric_delayed_work+0x311/0x2c50
[  408.072367]  process_one_work+0x611/0xe20
[  408.072371]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  408.072373]  worker_thread+0x7e3/0x1580
[  408.072375]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[  408.072378]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  408.072381]  kthread+0x381/0x7a0
[  408.072383]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
[  408.072385]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  408.072387]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[  408.072389]  ? recalc_sigpending+0x160/0x220
[  408.072392]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xe/0x50
[  408.072394]  ? calculate_sigpending+0x78/0xb0
[  408.072395]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  408.072397]  ret_from_fork+0x2b6/0x380
[  408.072400]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  408.072402]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  408.072406]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
[  408.072407] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  408.072418] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical
address 0xdffffc00000000
---truncated---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68297</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="49" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

PCI/AER: Fix NULL pointer access by aer_info

The kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL) may return NULL, so all accesses to aer_info-&gt;xxx
will result in kernel panic. Fix it.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68309</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="50" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: uas: fix urb unmapping issue when the uas device is remove during ongoing data transfer

When a UAS device is unplugged during data transfer, there is
a probability of a system panic occurring. The root cause is
an access to an invalid memory address during URB callback handling.
Specifically, this happens when the dma_direct_unmap_sg() function
is called within the usb_hcd_unmap_urb_for_dma() interface, but the
sg-&gt;dma_address field is 0 and the sg data structure has already been
freed.

The SCSI driver sends transfer commands by invoking uas_queuecommand_lck()
in uas.c, using the uas_submit_urbs() function to submit requests to USB.
Within the uas_submit_urbs() implementation, three URBs (sense_urb,
data_urb, and cmd_urb) are sequentially submitted. Device removal may
occur at any point during uas_submit_urbs execution, which may result
in URB submission failure. However, some URBs might have been successfully
submitted before the failure, and uas_submit_urbs will return the -ENODEV
error code in this case. The current error handling directly calls
scsi_done(). In the SCSI driver, this eventually triggers scsi_complete()
to invoke scsi_end_request() for releasing the sgtable. The successfully
submitted URBs, when being unlinked to giveback, call
usb_hcd_unmap_urb_for_dma() in hcd.c, leading to exceptions during sg
unmapping operations since the sg data structure has already been freed.

This patch modifies the error condition check in the uas_submit_urbs()
function. When a UAS device is removed but one or more URBs have already
been successfully submitted to USB, it avoids immediately invoking
scsi_done() and save the cmnd to devinfo-&gt;cmnd array. If the successfully
submitted URBs is completed before devinfo-&gt;resetting being set, then
the scsi_done() function will be called within uas_try_complete() after
all pending URB operations are finalized. Otherwise, the scsi_done()
function will be called within uas_zap_pending(), which is executed after
usb_kill_anchored_urbs().

The error handling only takes effect when uas_queuecommand_lck() calls
uas_submit_urbs() and returns the error value -ENODEV . In this case,
the device is disconnected, and the flow proceeds to uas_disconnect(),
where uas_zap_pending() is invoked to call uas_try_complete().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68331</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="51" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

jbd2: avoid bug_on in jbd2_journal_get_create_access() when file system corrupted

There&apos;s issue when file system corrupted:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:1289!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 2031 Comm: mkdir Not tainted 6.18.0-rc1-next
RIP: 0010:jbd2_journal_get_create_access+0x3b6/0x4d0
RSP: 0018:ffff888117aafa30 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811a86b000 RCX: ffffffff89a63534
RDX: 1ffff110200ec602 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888100763010
RBP: ffff888100763000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888100763028
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff88812c432000 R14: ffff88812c608000 R15: ffff888120bfc000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f91d6970c99 CR3: 00000001159c4000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __ext4_journal_get_create_access+0x42/0x170
 ext4_getblk+0x319/0x6f0
 ext4_bread+0x11/0x100
 ext4_append+0x1e6/0x4a0
 ext4_init_new_dir+0x145/0x1d0
 ext4_mkdir+0x326/0x920
 vfs_mkdir+0x45c/0x740
 do_mkdirat+0x234/0x2f0
 __x64_sys_mkdir+0xd6/0x120
 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0xfa0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The above issue occurs with us in errors=continue mode when accompanied by
storage failures. There have been many inconsistencies in the file system
data.
In the case of file system data inconsistency, for example, if the block
bitmap of a referenced block is not set, it can lead to the situation where
a block being committed is allocated and used again. As a result, the
following condition will not be satisfied then trigger BUG_ON. Of course,
it is entirely possible to construct a problematic image that can trigger
this BUG_ON through specific operations. In fact, I have constructed such
an image and easily reproduced this issue.
Therefore, J_ASSERT() holds true only under ideal conditions, but it may
not necessarily be satisfied in exceptional scenarios. Using J_ASSERT()
directly in abnormal situations would cause the system to crash, which is
clearly not what we want. So here we directly trigger a JBD abort instead
of immediately invoking BUG_ON.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68337</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="52" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

NFSv4/pNFS: Clear NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT in pnfs_mark_layout_stateid_invalid

Fixes a crash when layout is null during this call stack:

write_inode
    -&gt; nfs4_write_inode
        -&gt; pnfs_layoutcommit_inode

pnfs_set_layoutcommit relies on the lseg refcount to keep the layout
around. Need to clear NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT otherwise we might attempt
to reference a null layout.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68349</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="53" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

regulator: core: Protect regulator_supply_alias_list with regulator_list_mutex

regulator_supply_alias_list was accessed without any locking in
regulator_supply_alias(), regulator_register_supply_alias(), and
regulator_unregister_supply_alias(). Concurrent registration,
unregistration and lookups can race, leading to:

1 use-after-free if an alias entry is removed while being read,
2 duplicate entries when two threads register the same alias,
3 inconsistent alias mappings observed by consumers.

Protect all traversals, insertions and deletions on
regulator_supply_alias_list with the existing regulator_list_mutex.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68354</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="54" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gfs2: Prevent recursive memory reclaim

Function new_inode() returns a new inode with inode-&gt;i_mapping-&gt;gfp_mask
set to GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE.  This value includes the __GFP_FS flag, so
allocations in that address space can recurse into filesystem memory
reclaim.  We don&apos;t want that to happen because it can consume a
significant amount of stack memory.

Worse than that is that it can also deadlock: for example, in several
places, gfs2_unstuff_dinode() is called inside filesystem transactions.
This calls filemap_grab_folio(), which can allocate a new folio, which
can trigger memory reclaim.  If memory reclaim recurses into the
filesystem and starts another transaction, a deadlock will ensue.

To fix these kinds of problems, prevent memory reclaim from recursing
into filesystem code by making sure that the gfp_mask of inode address
spaces doesn&apos;t include __GFP_FS.

The &quot;meta&quot; and resource group address spaces were already using GFP_NOFS
as their gfp_mask (which doesn&apos;t include __GFP_FS).  The default value
of GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE is less restrictive than GFP_NOFS, though.  To
avoid being overly limiting, use the default value and only knock off
the __GFP_FS flag.  I&apos;m not sure if this will actually make a
difference, but it also shouldn&apos;t hurt.

This patch is loosely based on commit ad22c7a043c2 (&quot;xfs: prevent stack
overflows from page cache allocation&quot;).

Fixes xfstest generic/273.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68356</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="55" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: rtl818x: rtl8187: Fix potential buffer underflow in rtl8187_rx_cb()

The rtl8187_rx_cb() calculates the rx descriptor header address
by subtracting its size from the skb tail pointer.
However, it does not validate if the received packet
(skb-&gt;len from urb-&gt;actual_length) is large enough to contain this
header.

If a truncated packet is received, this will lead to a buffer
underflow, reading memory before the start of the skb data area,
and causing a kernel panic.

Add length checks for both rtl8187 and rtl8187b descriptor headers
before attempting to access them, dropping the packet cleanly if the
check fails.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68362</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>6.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="56" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Check skb-&gt;transport_header is set in bpf_skb_check_mtu

The bpf_skb_check_mtu helper needs to use skb-&gt;transport_header when
the BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS flag is used:

	bpf_skb_check_mtu(skb, ifindex, &amp;mtu_len, 0, BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS)

The transport_header is not always set. There is a WARN_ON_ONCE
report when CONFIG_DEBUG_NET is enabled + skb-&gt;gso_size is set +
bpf_prog_test_run is used:

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2216 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3071
 skb_gso_validate_network_len
 bpf_skb_check_mtu
 bpf_prog_3920e25740a41171_tc_chk_segs_flag # A test in the next patch
 bpf_test_run
 bpf_prog_test_run_skb

For a normal ingress skb (not test_run), skb_reset_transport_header
is performed but there is plan to avoid setting it as described in
commit 2170a1f09148 (&quot;net: no longer reset transport_header in __netif_receive_skb_core()&quot;).

This patch fixes the bpf helper by checking
skb_transport_header_was_set(). The check is done just before
skb-&gt;transport_header is used, to avoid breaking the existing bpf prog.
The WARN_ON_ONCE is limited to bpf_prog_test_run, so targeting bpf-next.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68363</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="57" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

coresight: ETR: Fix ETR buffer use-after-free issue

When ETR is enabled as CS_MODE_SYSFS, if the buffer size is changed
and enabled again, currently sysfs_buf will point to the newly
allocated memory(buf_new) and free the old memory(buf_old). But the
etr_buf that is being used by the ETR remains pointed to buf_old, not
updated to buf_new. In this case, it will result in a memory
use-after-free issue.

Fix this by checking ETR&apos;s mode before updating and releasing buf_old,
if the mode is CS_MODE_SYSFS, then skip updating and releasing it.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68376</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="58" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix stackmap overflow check in __bpf_get_stackid()

Syzkaller reported a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write in __bpf_get_stackid()
when copying stack trace data. The issue occurs when the perf trace
 contains more stack entries than the stack map bucket can hold,
 leading to an out-of-bounds write in the bucket&apos;s data array.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68378</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="59" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: asymmetric_keys - prevent overflow in asymmetric_key_generate_id

Use check_add_overflow() to guard against potential integer overflows
when adding the binary blob lengths and the size of an asymmetric_key_id
structure and return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW) accordingly. This prevents a
possible buffer overflow when copying data from potentially malicious
X.509 certificate fields that can be arbitrarily large, such as ASN.1
INTEGER serial numbers, issuer names, etc.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68724</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="60" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Do not let BPF test infra emit invalid GSO types to stack

Yinhao et al. reported that their fuzzer tool was able to trigger a
skb_warn_bad_offload() from netif_skb_features() -&gt; gso_features_check().
When a BPF program - triggered via BPF test infra - pushes the packet
to the loopback device via bpf_clone_redirect() then mentioned offload
warning can be seen. GSO-related features are then rightfully disabled.

We get into this situation due to convert___skb_to_skb() setting
gso_segs and gso_size but not gso_type. Technically, it makes sense
that this warning triggers since the GSO properties are malformed due
to the gso_type. Potentially, the gso_type could be marked non-trustworthy
through setting it at least to SKB_GSO_DODGY without any other specific
assumptions, but that also feels wrong given we should not go further
into the GSO engine in the first place.

The checks were added in 121d57af308d (&quot;gso: validate gso_type in GSO
handlers&quot;) because there were malicious (syzbot) senders that combine
a protocol with a non-matching gso_type. If we would want to drop such
packets, gso_features_check() currently only returns feature flags via
netif_skb_features(), so one location for potentially dropping such skbs
could be validate_xmit_unreadable_skb(), but then otoh it would be
an additional check in the fast-path for a very corner case. Given
bpf_clone_redirect() is the only place where BPF test infra could emit
such packets, lets reject them right there.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68725</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="61" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

isdn: mISDN: hfcsusb: fix memory leak in hfcsusb_probe()

In hfcsusb_probe(), the memory allocated for ctrl_urb gets leaked when
setup_instance() fails with an error code. Fix that by freeing the urb
before freeing the hw structure. Also change the error paths to use the
goto ladder style.

Compile tested only. Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68734</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="62" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Fix improper freeing of purex item

In qla2xxx_process_purls_iocb(), an item is allocated via
qla27xx_copy_multiple_pkt(), which internally calls
qla24xx_alloc_purex_item().

The qla24xx_alloc_purex_item() function may return a pre-allocated item
from a per-adapter pool for small allocations, instead of dynamically
allocating memory with kzalloc().

An error handling path in qla2xxx_process_purls_iocb() incorrectly uses
kfree() to release the item. If the item was from the pre-allocated
pool, calling kfree() on it is a bug that can lead to memory corruption.

Fix this by using the correct deallocation function,
qla24xx_free_purex_item(), which properly handles both dynamically
allocated and pre-allocated items.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68741</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="63" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Free special fields when update [lru_,]percpu_hash maps

As [lru_,]percpu_hash maps support BPF_KPTR_{REF,PERCPU}, missing
calls to &apos;bpf_obj_free_fields()&apos; in &apos;pcpu_copy_value()&apos; could cause the
memory referenced by BPF_KPTR_{REF,PERCPU} fields to be held until the
map gets freed.

Fix this by calling &apos;bpf_obj_free_fields()&apos; after
&apos;copy_map_value[,_long]()&apos; in &apos;pcpu_copy_value()&apos;.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68744</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="64" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Clear cmds after chip reset

Commit aefed3e5548f (&quot;scsi: qla2xxx: target: Fix offline port handling
and host reset handling&quot;) caused two problems:

1. Commands sent to FW, after chip reset got stuck and never freed as FW
   is not going to respond to them anymore.

2. BUG_ON(cmd-&gt;sg_mapped) in qlt_free_cmd().  Commit 26f9ce53817a
   (&quot;scsi: qla2xxx: Fix missed DMA unmap for aborted commands&quot;)
   attempted to fix this, but introduced another bug under different
   circumstances when two different CPUs were racing to call
   qlt_unmap_sg() at the same time: BUG_ON(!valid_dma_direction(dir)) in
   dma_unmap_sg_attrs().

So revert &quot;scsi: qla2xxx: Fix missed DMA unmap for aborted commands&quot; and
partially revert &quot;scsi: qla2xxx: target: Fix offline port handling and
host reset handling&quot; at __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68745</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.0</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="65" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

block: Use RCU in blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset() instead of set-&gt;tag_list_lock

blk_mq_{add,del}_queue_tag_set() functions add and remove queues from
tagset, the functions make sure that tagset and queues are marked as
shared when two or more queues are attached to the same tagset.
Initially a tagset starts as unshared and when the number of added
queues reaches two, blk_mq_add_queue_tag_set() marks it as shared along
with all the queues attached to it. When the number of attached queues
drops to 1 blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set() need to mark both the tagset and
the remaining queues as unshared.

Both functions need to freeze current queues in tagset before setting on
unsetting BLK_MQ_F_TAG_QUEUE_SHARED flag. While doing so, both functions
hold set-&gt;tag_list_lock mutex, which makes sense as we do not want
queues to be added or deleted in the process. This used to work fine
until commit 98d81f0df70c (&quot;nvme: use blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset&quot;)
made the nvme driver quiesce tagset instead of quiscing individual
queues. blk_mq_quiesce_tagset() does the job and quiesce the queues in
set-&gt;tag_list while holding set-&gt;tag_list_lock also.

This results in deadlock between two threads with these stacktraces:

  __schedule+0x47c/0xbb0
  ? timerqueue_add+0x66/0xb0
  schedule+0x1c/0xa0
  schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10
  __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x271/0x600
  blk_mq_quiesce_tagset+0x25/0xc0
  nvme_dev_disable+0x9c/0x250
  nvme_timeout+0x1fc/0x520
  blk_mq_handle_expired+0x5c/0x90
  bt_iter+0x7e/0x90
  blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x27e/0x550
  ? __blk_mq_complete_request_remote+0x10/0x10
  ? __blk_mq_complete_request_remote+0x10/0x10
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x1c0/0x210
  blk_mq_timeout_work+0x12d/0x170
  process_one_work+0x12e/0x2d0
  worker_thread+0x288/0x3a0
  ? rescuer_thread+0x480/0x480
  kthread+0xb8/0xe0
  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
  ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

  __schedule+0x47c/0xbb0
  ? xas_find+0x161/0x1a0
  schedule+0x1c/0xa0
  blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x3d/0x70
  ? destroy_sched_domains_rcu+0x30/0x30
  blk_mq_update_tag_set_shared+0x44/0x80
  blk_mq_exit_queue+0x141/0x150
  del_gendisk+0x25a/0x2d0
  nvme_ns_remove+0xc9/0x170
  nvme_remove_namespaces+0xc7/0x100
  nvme_remove+0x62/0x150
  pci_device_remove+0x23/0x60
  device_release_driver_internal+0x159/0x200
  unbind_store+0x99/0xa0
  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x112/0x1e0
  vfs_write+0x2b1/0x3d0
  ksys_write+0x4e/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

The top stacktrace is showing nvme_timeout() called to handle nvme
command timeout. timeout handler is trying to disable the controller and
as a first step, it needs to blk_mq_quiesce_tagset() to tell blk-mq not
to call queue callback handlers. The thread is stuck waiting for
set-&gt;tag_list_lock as it tries to walk the queues in set-&gt;tag_list.

The lock is held by the second thread in the bottom stack which is
waiting for one of queues to be frozen. The queue usage counter will
drop to zero after nvme_timeout() finishes, and this will not happen
because the thread will wait for this mutex forever.

Given that [un]quiescing queue is an operation that does not need to
sleep, update blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset() to use RCU instead of taking
set-&gt;tag_list_lock, update blk_mq_{add,del}_queue_tag_set() to use RCU
safe list operations. Also, delete INIT_LIST_HEAD(&amp;q-&gt;tag_set_list)
in blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set() because we can not re-initialize it while
the list is being traversed under RCU. The deleted queue will not be
added/deleted to/from a tagset and it will be freed in blk_free_queue()
after the end of RCU grace period.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68756</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="66" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sched/deadline: only set free_cpus for online runqueues

Commit 16b269436b72 (&quot;sched/deadline: Modify cpudl::free_cpus
to reflect rd-&gt;online&quot;) introduced the cpudl_set/clear_freecpu
functions to allow the cpu_dl::free_cpus mask to be manipulated
by the deadline scheduler class rq_on/offline callbacks so the
mask would also reflect this state.

Commit 9659e1eeee28 (&quot;sched/deadline: Remove cpu_active_mask
from cpudl_find()&quot;) removed the check of the cpu_active_mask to
save some processing on the premise that the cpudl::free_cpus
mask already reflected the runqueue online state.

Unfortunately, there are cases where it is possible for the
cpudl_clear function to set the free_cpus bit for a CPU when the
deadline runqueue is offline. When this occurs while a CPU is
connected to the default root domain the flag may retain the bad
state after the CPU has been unplugged. Later, a different CPU
that is transitioning through the default root domain may push a
deadline task to the powered down CPU when cpudl_find sees its
free_cpus bit is set. If this happens the task will not have the
opportunity to run.

One example is outlined here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68780</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="67" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: target: Reset t_task_cdb pointer in error case

If allocation of cmd-&gt;t_task_cdb fails, it remains NULL but is later
dereferenced in the &apos;err&apos; path.

In case of error, reset NULL t_task_cdb value to point at the default
fixed-size buffer.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68782</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="68" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iomap: adjust read range correctly for non-block-aligned positions

iomap_adjust_read_range() assumes that the position and length passed in
are block-aligned. This is not always the case however, as shown in the
syzbot generated case for erofs. This causes too many bytes to be
skipped for uptodate blocks, which results in returning the incorrect
position and length to read in. If all the blocks are uptodate, this
underflows length and returns a position beyond the folio.

Fix the calculation to also take into account the block offset when
calculating how many bytes can be skipped for uptodate blocks.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68794</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="69" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

NFSD: NFSv4 file creation neglects setting ACL

An NFSv4 client that sets an ACL with a named principal during file
creation retrieves the ACL afterwards, and finds that it is only a
default ACL (based on the mode bits) and not the ACL that was
requested during file creation. This violates RFC 8881 section
6.4.1.3: &quot;the ACL attribute is set as given&quot;.

The issue occurs in nfsd_create_setattr(), which calls
nfsd_attrs_valid() to determine whether to call nfsd_setattr().
However, nfsd_attrs_valid() checks only for iattr changes and
security labels, but not POSIX ACLs. When only an ACL is present,
the function returns false, nfsd_setattr() is skipped, and the
POSIX ACL is never applied to the inode.

Subsequently, when the client retrieves the ACL, the server finds
no POSIX ACL on the inode and returns one generated from the file&apos;s
mode bits rather than returning the originally-specified ACL.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68803</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="70" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring: fix filename leak in __io_openat_prep()

 __io_openat_prep() allocates a struct filename using getname(). However,
for the condition of the file being installed in the fixed file table as
well as having O_CLOEXEC flag set, the function returns early. At that
point, the request doesn&apos;t have REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP flag set. Due to this,
the memory for the newly allocated struct filename is not cleaned up,
causing a memory leak.

Fix this by setting the REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP for the request just after the
successful getname() call, so that when the request is torn down, the
filename will be cleaned up, along with other resources needing cleanup.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68814</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="71" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5: fw_tracer, Validate format string parameters

Add validation for format string parameters in the firmware tracer to
prevent potential security vulnerabilities and crashes from malformed
format strings received from firmware.

The firmware tracer receives format strings from the device firmware and
uses them to format trace messages. Without proper validation, bad
firmware could provide format strings with invalid format specifiers
(e.g., %s, %p, %n) that could lead to crashes, or other undefined
behavior.

Add mlx5_tracer_validate_params() to validate that all format specifiers
in trace strings are limited to safe integer/hex formats (%x, %d, %i,
%u, %llx, %lx, etc.). Reject strings containing other format types that
could be used to access arbitrary memory or cause crashes.
Invalid format strings are added to the trace output for visibility with
&quot;BAD_FORMAT: &quot; prefix.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68816</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.6</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:P/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="72" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: Revert &quot;scsi: qla2xxx: Perform lockless command completion in abort path&quot;

This reverts commit 0367076b0817d5c75dfb83001ce7ce5c64d803a9.

The commit being reverted added code to __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds() to
call sp-&gt;done() without holding a spinlock.  But unlike the older code
below it, this new code failed to check sp-&gt;cmd_type and just assumed
TYPE_SRB, which results in a jump to an invalid pointer in target-mode
with TYPE_TGT_CMD:

qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-d034:8: qla24xx_do_nack_work create sess success
  0000000009f7a79b
qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-5003:8: ISP System Error - mbx1=1ff5h mbx2=10h
  mbx3=0h mbx4=0h mbx5=191h mbx6=0h mbx7=0h.
qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-d01e:8: -&gt; fwdump no buffer
qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-f03a:8: qla_target(0): System error async event
  0x8002 occurred
qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-00af:8: Performing ISP error recovery -
  ha=0000000058183fda.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP
CPU: 2 PID: 9446 Comm: qla2xxx_8_dpc Tainted: G           O       6.1.133 #1
Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPL-F, BIOS 4.2 12/15/2023
RIP: 0010:0x0
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001f93dc8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000282 RBX: 0000000000000355 RCX: ffff88810d16a000
RDX: ffff88810dbadaa8 RSI: 0000000000080000 RDI: ffff888169dc38c0
RBP: ffff888169dc38c0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000045
R10: ffffffffa034bdf0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810800bb40
R13: 0000000000001aa8 R14: ffff888100136610 R15: ffff8881070f7400
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bf80080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000010c8ff006 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ? __die+0x4d/0x8b
 ? page_fault_oops+0x91/0x180
 ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit_regs+0x38/0x1a0
 ? exc_page_fault+0x391/0x5e0
 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
 __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0xcb/0x3e0 [qla2xxx_scst]
 qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0x50/0x70 [qla2xxx_scst]
 qla2x00_abort_isp_cleanup+0x3b7/0x4b0 [qla2xxx_scst]
 qla2x00_abort_isp+0xfd/0x860 [qla2xxx_scst]
 qla2x00_do_dpc+0x581/0xa40 [qla2xxx_scst]
 kthread+0xa8/0xd0
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Then commit 4475afa2646d (&quot;scsi: qla2xxx: Complete command early within
lock&quot;) added the spinlock back, because not having the lock caused a
race and a crash.  But qla2x00_abort_srb() in the switch below already
checks for qla2x00_chip_is_down() and handles it the same way, so the
code above the switch is now redundant and still buggy in target-mode.
Remove it.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68818</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="73" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

shmem: fix recovery on rename failures

maple_tree insertions can fail if we are seriously short on memory;
simple_offset_rename() does not recover well if it runs into that.
The same goes for simple_offset_rename_exchange().

Moreover, shmem_whiteout() expects that if it succeeds, the caller will
progress to d_move(), i.e. that shmem_rename2() won&apos;t fail past the
successful call of shmem_whiteout().

Not hard to fix, fortunately - mtree_store() can&apos;t fail if the index we
are trying to store into is already present in the tree as a singleton.

For simple_offset_rename_exchange() that&apos;s enough - we just need to be
careful about the order of operations.

For simple_offset_rename() solution is to preinsert the target into the
tree for new_dir; the rest can be done without any potentially failing
operations.

That preinsertion has to be done in shmem_rename2() rather than in
simple_offset_rename() itself - otherwise we&apos;d need to deal with the
possibility of failure after successful shmem_whiteout().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71072</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="74" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: x86: Fix VM hard lockup after prolonged inactivity with periodic HV timer

When advancing the target expiration for the guest&apos;s APIC timer in periodic
mode, set the expiration to &quot;now&quot; if the target expiration is in the past
(similar to what is done in update_target_expiration()).  Blindly adding
the period to the previous target expiration can result in KVM generating
a practically unbounded number of hrtimer IRQs due to programming an
expired timer over and over.  In extreme scenarios, e.g. if userspace
pauses/suspends a VM for an extended duration, this can even cause hard
lockups in the host.

Currently, the bug only affects Intel CPUs when using the hypervisor timer
(HV timer), a.k.a. the VMX preemption timer.  Unlike the software timer,
a.k.a. hrtimer, which KVM keeps running even on exits to userspace, the
HV timer only runs while the guest is active.  As a result, if the vCPU
does not run for an extended duration, there will be a huge gap between
the target expiration and the current time the vCPU resumes running.
Because the target expiration is incremented by only one period on each
timer expiration, this leads to a series of timer expirations occurring
rapidly after the vCPU/VM resumes.

More critically, when the vCPU first triggers a periodic HV timer
expiration after resuming, advancing the expiration by only one period
will result in a target expiration in the past.  As a result, the delta
may be calculated as a negative value.  When the delta is converted into
an absolute value (tscdeadline is an unsigned u64), the resulting value
can overflow what the HV timer is capable of programming.  I.e. the large
value will exceed the VMX Preemption Timer&apos;s maximum bit width of
cpu_preemption_timer_multi + 32, and thus cause KVM to switch from the
HV timer to the software timer (hrtimers).

After switching to the software timer, periodic timer expiration callbacks
may be executed consecutively within a single clock interrupt handler,
because hrtimers honors KVM&apos;s request for an expiration in the past and
immediately re-invokes KVM&apos;s callback after reprogramming.  And because
the interrupt handler runs with IRQs disabled, restarting KVM&apos;s hrtimer
over and over until the target expiration is advanced to &quot;now&quot; can result
in a hard lockup.

E.g. the following hard lockup was triggered in the host when running a
Windows VM (only relevant because it used the APIC timer in periodic mode)
after resuming the VM from a long suspend (in the host).

  NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 45
  ...
  RIP: 0010:advance_periodic_target_expiration+0x4d/0x80 [kvm]
  ...
  RSP: 0018:ff4f88f5d98d8ef0 EFLAGS: 00000046
  RAX: fff0103f91be678e RBX: fff0103f91be678e RCX: 00843a7d9e127bcc
  RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0052ca4003697505 RDI: ff440d5bfbdbd500
  RBP: ff440d5956f99200 R08: ff2ff2a42deb6a84 R09: 000000000002a6c0
  R10: 0122d794016332b3 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff440db1af39cfc0
  R13: ff440db1af39cfc0 R14: ffffffffc0d4a560 R15: ff440db1af39d0f8
  FS:  00007f04a6ffd700(0000) GS:ff440db1af380000(0000) knlGS:000000e38a3b8000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 000000d5651feff8 CR3: 000000684e038002 CR4: 0000000000773ee0
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
   &lt;IRQ&gt;
   apic_timer_fn+0x31/0x50 [kvm]
   __hrtimer_run_queues+0x100/0x280
   hrtimer_interrupt+0x100/0x210
   ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x19/0x160
   smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6a/0x130
   apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
   &lt;/IRQ&gt;

Moreover, if the suspend duration of the virtual machine is not long enough
to trigger a hard lockup in this scenario, since commit 98c25ead5eda
(&quot;KVM: VMX: Move preemption timer &lt;=&gt; hrtimer dance to common x86&quot;), KVM
will continue using the software timer until the guest reprograms the APIC
timer in some way.  Since the periodic timer does not require frequent APIC
timer register programming, the guest may continue to use the software
timer in 
---truncated---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71104</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="75" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: make decode_pool() more resilient against corrupted osdmaps

If the osdmap is (maliciously) corrupted such that the encoded length
of ceph_pg_pool envelope is less than what is expected for a particular
encoding version, out-of-bounds reads may ensue because the only bounds
check that is there is based on that length value.

This patch adds explicit bounds checks for each field that is decoded
or skipped.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71116</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="76" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: seqiv - Do not use req-&gt;iv after crypto_aead_encrypt

As soon as crypto_aead_encrypt is called, the underlying request
may be freed by an asynchronous completion.  Thus dereferencing
req-&gt;iv after it returns is invalid.

Instead of checking req-&gt;iv against info, create a new variable
unaligned_info and use it for that purpose instead.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71131</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="77" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KEYS: trusted: Fix a memory leak in tpm2_load_cmd

&apos;tpm2_load_cmd&apos; allocates a tempoary blob indirectly via &apos;tpm2_key_decode&apos;
but it is not freed in the failure paths. Address this by wrapping the blob
into with a cleanup helper.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71147</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="78" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/poll: correctly handle io_poll_add() return value on update

When the core of io_uring was updated to handle completions
consistently and with fixed return codes, the POLL_REMOVE opcode
with updates got slightly broken. If a POLL_ADD is pending and
then POLL_REMOVE is used to update the events of that request, if that
update causes the POLL_ADD to now trigger, then that completion is lost
and a CQE is never posted.

Additionally, ensure that if an update does cause an existing POLL_ADD
to complete, that the completion value isn&apos;t always overwritten with
-ECANCELED. For that case, whatever io_poll_add() set the value to
should just be retained.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71149</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="79" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: Fix refcount leak when invalid session is found on session lookup

When a session is found but its state is not SMB2_SESSION_VALID, It
indicates that no valid session was found, but it is missing to decrement
the reference count acquired by the session lookup, which results in
a reference count leak. This patch fixes the issue by explicitly calling
ksmbd_user_session_put to release the reference to the session.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71150</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="80" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: Don&apos;t store mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink priv

mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile
attaching fails, mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink private is used to
reference the netdev and mdev associated with that struct. Instead,
store netdev directly into mlx5e_dev and get mdev from the containing
mlx5_adev aux device structure.

This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due
to change profile failure.

$ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev
Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads.
dmesg:
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq &quot;mlx5e&quot;: -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq &quot;mlx5e&quot;: -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12

$ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==&gt; oops

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000520
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 521 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ #117 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_remove+0x68/0x130
RSP: 0018:ffffc900034838f0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff88810283c380 RBX: ffff888101874400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff888102d789c0 R08: ffff8881007137f0 R09: ffff888100264e10
R10: ffffc90003483898 R11: ffffc900034838a0 R12: ffff888100d261a0
R13: ffff888100d261a0 R14: ffff8881018749a0 R15: ffff888101874400
FS:  00007f8565fea740(0000) GS:ffff88856a759000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000520 CR3: 000000010b11a004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200
 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
 device_del+0x160/0x3d0
 ? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90
 mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0
 mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70
 mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220
 devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260
 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-22996</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="81" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvme-tcp: fix NULL pointer dereferences in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec

Commit efa56305908b (&quot;nvmet-tcp: Fix a kernel panic when host sends an invalid H2C PDU length&quot;)
added ttag bounds checking and data_offset
validation in nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu(), but it did not validate
whether the command&apos;s data structures (cmd-&gt;req.sg and cmd-&gt;iov) have
been properly initialized before processing H2C_DATA PDUs.

The nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() function dereferences these pointers
without NULL checks. This can be triggered by sending H2C_DATA PDU
immediately after the ICREQ/ICRESP handshake, before
sending a CONNECT command or NVMe write command.

Attack vectors that trigger NULL pointer dereferences:
1. H2C_DATA PDU sent before CONNECT → both pointers NULL
2. H2C_DATA PDU for READ command → cmd-&gt;req.sg allocated, cmd-&gt;iov NULL
3. H2C_DATA PDU for uninitialized command slot → both pointers NULL

The fix validates both cmd-&gt;req.sg and cmd-&gt;iov before calling
nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(). Both checks are required because:
- Uninitialized commands: both NULL
- READ commands: cmd-&gt;req.sg allocated, cmd-&gt;iov NULL
- WRITE commands: both allocated</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-22998</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="82" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: Fix crash on profile change rollback failure

mlx5e_netdev_change_profile can fail to attach a new profile and can
fail to rollback to old profile, in such case, we could end up with a
dangling netdev with a fully reset netdev_priv. A retry to change
profile, e.g. another attempt to call mlx5e_netdev_change_profile via
switchdev mode change, will crash trying to access the now NULL
priv-&gt;mdev.

This fix allows mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() to handle previous
failures and an empty priv, by not assuming priv is valid.

Pass netdev and mdev to all flows requiring
mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() and avoid passing priv.
In mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() check if current priv is valid, and if
not, just attach the new profile without trying to access the old one.

This fixes the following oops, when enabling switchdev mode for the 2nd
time after first time failure:

 ## Enabling switchdev mode first time:

mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq &quot;mlx5e&quot;: -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq &quot;mlx5e&quot;: -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12
                                                                         ^^^^^^^^
mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0)

 ## retry: Enabling switchdev mode 2nd time:

mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4+ #91 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x3c/0x90
Code: 50 00 00 f0 80 4f 78 02 48 8b bf e8 07 00 00 48 85 ff 74 16 48 8b 73 78 48 d1 ee 83 e6 01 83 f6 01 40 0f b6 f6 e8 c4 42 00 00 &lt;48&gt; 8b 45 38 48 85 c0 74 08 48 89 df e8 cc 47 40 1e 48 8b bb f0 07
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000673890 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881036a89c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888113f63800 RSI: ffffffff822fe720 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000002dcd R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc900006738e8 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8881036a89c0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007fdfb8384740(0000) GS:ffff88856a9d6000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 0000000112ae0005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0x45/0xb0
 mlx5e_vport_rep_load+0x27b/0x2d0
 mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_load+0x72/0xf0
 esw_offloads_enable+0x5d0/0x970
 mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x349/0x430
 ? is_mp_supported+0x57/0xb0
 mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x26b/0x430
 devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x6f/0xf0
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140
 genl_rcv_msg+0x18b/0x290
 ? __pfx_devlink_nl_pre_doit+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_devlink_nl_post_doit+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x52/0x100
 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
 netlink_unicast+0x282/0x3e0
 ? __alloc_skb+0xd6/0x190
 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430
 __sys_sendto+0x213/0x220
 ? __sys_recvmsg+0x6a/0xd0
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1f0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fdfb8495047</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23000</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="83" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/fpu: Clear XSTATE_BV[i] in guest XSAVE state whenever XFD[i]=1

When loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in
response to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to
be restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn&apos;t attempt to load state for
features that are disabled via the guest&apos;s XFD.  Because the kernel
executes XRSTOR with the guest&apos;s XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1
will cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel.

E.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #171 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
   switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   &lt;/TASK&gt;
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1,
and a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler&apos;s
call to fpu_update_guest_xfd().

and if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #168 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
   fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120
   kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   &lt;/TASK&gt;
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

The new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture.  Per Intel&apos;s SDM,
XSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as &apos;0&apos; for components that are disabled via XFD
(and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state
component):

  If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i,
  the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1;
  instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was
  in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE
  header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the
  state component (the other instructions do not save state component i).

Alternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using
a constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for
a struct fpu_guest.  However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled
features can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar
scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()&apos;s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the
outgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the
first WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD.

Therefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above
interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on
preemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM
ABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features.

[Move clea
---truncated---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23005</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="84" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: Pass netdev to mlx5e_destroy_netdev instead of priv

mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile
attaching fails.

Pass netdev to mlx5e_destroy_netdev() to guarantee it will work on a
valid netdev.

On mlx5e_remove: Check validity of priv-&gt;profile, before attempting
to cleanup any resources that might be not there.

This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due
to change profile failure.

$ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev
Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads.
dmesg:
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq &quot;mlx5e&quot;: -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq &quot;mlx5e&quot;: -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12

$ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==&gt; oops

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000370
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ #115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_dcbnl_dscp_app+0x23/0x100
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000083f8b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff8881126fc380 RBX: ffff8881015ac400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8881035109c0
RBP: ffff8881035109c0 R08: ffff888101e3e838 R09: ffff888100264e10
R10: ffffc9000083f898 R11: ffffc9000083f8a0 R12: ffff888101b921a0
R13: ffff888101b921a0 R14: ffff8881015ac9a0 R15: ffff8881015ac400
FS:  00007f789a3c8740(0000) GS:ffff88856aa59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000370 CR3: 000000010b6c0001 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 mlx5e_remove+0x57/0x110
 device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200
 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
 device_del+0x160/0x3d0
 ? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90
 mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0
 mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70
 mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220
 devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260
 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23035</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="85" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tracing: Add recursion protection in kernel stack trace recording

A bug was reported about an infinite recursion caused by tracing the rcu
events with the kernel stack trace trigger enabled. The stack trace code
called back into RCU which then called the stack trace again.

Expand the ftrace recursion protection to add a set of bits to protect
events from recursion. Each bit represents the context that the event is
in (normal, softirq, interrupt and NMI).

Have the stack trace code use the interrupt context to protect against
recursion.

Note, the bug showed an issue in both the RCU code as well as the tracing
stacktrace code. This only handles the tracing stack trace side of the
bug. The RCU fix will be handled separately.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-03-27</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23138</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-03-27</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1759</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
</cvrfdoc>